

# Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly An Evolutionary Journey

Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly: An Evolutionary Journey  
By Joseph E. Schwartzberg

Published by the Committee for a Democratic U.N., Berlin, 2012.  
[www.kdun.org](http://www.kdun.org)

With kind support of Earthrise Society, Munich.  
[www.earthrise-society.org](http://www.earthrise-society.org)

Copyright by Committee for a Democratic U.N., 2012.

All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-3-942282-12-3

# **Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly An Evolutionary Journey**

by Joseph E. Schwartzberg

COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC U.N.



*With gratitude for the vision of  
Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804,  
the analytical rigor of  
Hannah Newcombe, 1922-2011,  
and the commitment of countless individuals  
who labor in the cause of a more lawful,  
humane and peaceful world.*

This study explores how the democratic deficit of the United Nations can be progressively minimized by the development of a global parliamentary body. After establishing a conceptual platform, three evolutionary steps with four specific models for the apportionment of seats are set forth for what would eventually become a directly elected world assembly.

“This important study for the first time demonstrates successive models for the implementation of a world parliament. It makes the undertaking very tangible and shows that, in principle, there are no technical obstacles that cannot be overcome. What is needed is the political will.”

— *Jo Leinen, Member of the European Parliament*

“The creation of a global parliamentary assembly should be on the political agenda sooner or later. The apportionment of seats is a key question. This inspiring study demonstrates possible approaches.”

— *Shashi Tharoor, Member of the Indian Parliament, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information*

“Joseph Schwartzberg is a remarkable scholar with the courage and foresight to think outside the box. Based on his in-depth understanding of the problems inherent in UN decision-making and on his detailed study of multilateral governance structures, Schwartzberg has developed a comprehensive, carefully crafted strategy for overcoming the current democratic deficit. A must read for UN scholars, students and practitioners.”

— *Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Professor of Political Science, University of Western Ontario*

“For anyone who believes in democracy—rule by the consent of the ruled— a *world* democracy is part of it. A democratic United Nations with an evolving world parliamentary assembly is the way to go. This book is wonderful contribution along that road.”

— *Johan Galtung, Professor of Peace Studies and Founder of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo and of Transcend International*

# Contents

Editor's Preface .....	10
Foreword by <i>Daniele Archibugi</i> .....	11
1. Introduction .....	14
2. Relevant Constitutional Experience .....	20
3. A Menu of Options .....	25
Working Through the Inter-Parliamentary Union .....	25
An E-Parliament .....	27
An Assembly outside the UN Initiated through Civil Society .....	29
A World Parliamentary Assembly within the UN .....	31
4. Difficulties to Be Overcome with the WPA Option .....	33
5. Desiderata .....	36
6. Preparatory Measures .....	38
7. Stage One: An Advisory Body with Universal Membership (Model A) .....	40
Method of Apportionment .....	40
Functioning .....	45
8. An Electoral Commission, Rules of Fairness and Gender Equity .....	51
9. Stage Two: A Popularly Elected Assembly .....	56
Background .....	56
Apportionment via a System of Degressive Proportionality, in Which MWPs Cast Equal Votes (Model B.1) .....	63
Apportionment via a System in Which MWPs Cast Weighted Votes (Model B.2) .....	69
Proportional Representation .....	75
Assembly Procedures and Qualified Majority Voting .....	78
Institutional Process .....	80
Costs .....	81
10. A Comparison of Methods .....	84
11. Stage Three: Institutionalizing Electoral Fields Worldwide and Maximizing Use of the One Person – One Vote Principle .....	90
12. Conclusions .....	95
Appendices .....	97
I. Population of UN Member Nations, 2010, and Guide to Their Location on Appendices II to V .....	98
II. Model A: Apportionment of Seats in a Hypothetical World Parlia- mentary Assembly Whose Members Are Selected by Their Re- spective National Governments .....	103

III. Model B.1: Apportionment of Seats in Excess of One per Nation in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected 1,000-seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members of Parliament Cast Equal Votes and in Which Constituencies Are Delimited within Individual Nations. ....	111
IV. Model B.2: Apportionment of Seats and Determination of Weighted Votes in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Constituencies Are Delimited within Individual Nations.....	115
V. Model C: Composition of Proposed Electoral Fields in the Americas and Apportionment of Seats per Field in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected 1,000-seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which the Average Number of Constituents per Seat is More or Less Equal in Each Electoral Field.....	121
Acknowledgments.....	123
On the Author.....	124

#### —Maps—

1. Model A: Proposed Apportionment of Seats in Stage One of a Hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly .....	43
2. Model B.1: Proposed Apportionment of Seats in Stage Two of a Hypothetical 1000-Seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members of Parliament Cast Equal Votes.....	67
3. Model B.2: Proposed Apportionment of Seats and Seat Weights in Stage Two of a Hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members of Parliament Cast Weighted Votes .....	73
4. Model C: Hypothetical Apportionment of Seats for the Americas in Proposed 1000-Seat World Parliamentary Assembly, by Electoral Fields .....	92

#### —Graphs—

1-3. Degrees of Inequality in Distribution of 2010 Population among UN Member Nations, EU Member Nations, and US States.....	58
--	----

#### —Tables—

1. Shares of UN Member Nations, Seats and Population (2010), in a World Parliamentary Assembly with Selection of Parliamentarians by National Governments (Model A), by Groups Based on Number of Seats per Nation.....	44
2. Shares of UN Member Nations, Seats and Population (2010), in a Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly, with Apportionment Based on a System of Degressive Proportionality (Model B.1), by Groups Based on Number of Seats per Nation.....	68

3. Shares of UN Member Nations, Seats and Population (2010), in a Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly, with Apportionment According to the Square Root of Each Nation's Population in Millions and with Weights Attached to the Vote of Each Seat Holder (Model B.2), by Groups Based on Number of Seats per Nation .....75

4. Range in Number of Electoral Fields for Parliamentary Assembly Elections for the World's Most Populous Nations under Two Model Scenarios, 2010.....77

5. Comparison of Voting Strength of the World's 25 Most Populous Nations under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly .....86

6. Comparison of Voting Strength of Nations with Seven or Fewer Seats under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly .....87

7. Comparison of Voting Strength of Major Economic Blocs under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly .....88

8. Comparison of Voting Strength of Nations Grouped According to Freedom House Ratings under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly .....89

## Editor's Preface

**T**he creation of a global parliamentary assembly as a means of achieving a more democratic and more effective global order is not an abstract undertaking. Quite the contrary, to be successfully implemented as a practical political project, it will be necessary to devise precise models that demonstrate exactly how such an assembly could be designed. There are at least three closely connected features that need to be addressed: What powers shall such an assembly have? By what method are its members to be chosen? How are the seats to be apportioned?

This study by Joseph Schwartzberg not only provides models that address these questions (with an emphasis on the apportionment of seats), but also, as the subtitle makes clear, integrates these models into a three-stage evolutionary scenario. For the first time it is demonstrated in precise detail, how a consultative UN Parliamentary Assembly based on the principle of degressive proportionality could evolve into a directly elected World Parliament that implements the principle of one person – one vote as best as practicable. Pragmatists and visionaries alike will find inspiration in this study.

The present monograph is a major contribution to the ongoing work on the establishment of a UN Parliamentary Assembly and to the debate on global democracy in general. The Committee for a Democratic U.N. is delighted to continue its series on these subjects with this study.

We would like to express our gratitude to all those who have helped to make this publication possible. In particular, we thank Marianne Obermüller and the Earthrise Society in Munich, Germany, for their financial support.

**Andreas Bummel**  
Committee for a Democratic U.N.

## **Foreword by Daniele Archibugi**

**E**lected assemblies have been one of the core distinctive features of modernity. While there were just a few in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, they have flourished in the last two centuries and have become core political institution of contemporary public life. Of course, parliamentary assemblies are full of problems, which are often recognized by political activists, academic analysts and journalists, as well as in public opinion. They are often accused of being slow in decision-making, too costly, too bureaucratic. Even worse, members of parliaments are often guilty of abuses of power and corruption. But very few critics would argue that public life would be improved without elected parliamentary assemblies. Constructive critics of parliaments and, more broadly, of representative democracy, hope to improve their operations in order to make them more reactive, more representative, and more powerful, rather than to abolish them.

Support for parliamentary democracy has steadily grown during the 20th century. In both 1945 and in 1989, milestone years in the triumphant march of democracy, elected parliaments were instituted in countries that never had them or where they were suppressed for many years.

A large majority of parliaments operate at the national level or in territorial units within nations. Thus, when most citizens think about a parliament, they view it as an institution associated with a specific national flag. In spite of the growing and widely recognized importance of trans-national flows, in spite of the increasing importance of international organizations, in spite of the fact that democracy has become a mantra of foreign policy for many countries, the very idea that a world parliament could be as useful as national parliaments is still dismissed. And certainly it is an ambitious idea in the current realm of world politics, where the most important decisions continue to be taken by national governments, often in summits that are anything but accountable and transparent.

In this passionate and meticulous book, Professor Schwartzberg shows that the vision of a world parliament, while still in its infancy, is not new. Many forerunners have suggested that a world parliament may be a useful institution to exchange views, to hold debates and, above all, to give to the inhabitants of the planet the feeling that their opinions and needs are being taken into account. While those who propose a world parliament have done so from very different perspectives, they have in common a faith in reason

and dialogue in the belief that humans can find solutions that are advantageous for society as a whole.

A World Parliamentary Assembly can be established in several different ways that are not necessarily antagonistic. The menu for choice is clearly presented in this book. It can be virtual, as in the idea of an e-Parliament, or real. It can be a new body within the United Nations system, or an independent international organization. It can be based on a large variety of electoral devices, each of which would advantage some states and disadvantage others.

Professor Schwartzberg goes well beyond the current state of the art, showing how various proposals could lead to differing distributions of seats and representation. The vision is supported with tangible examples of the number of the seats that will be associated with each country. Drawing on his life-long experience as a geographer, he provides four maps showing how parliamentary seats and voting strength would be apportioned under differing systemic models, as well as tables indicating the voting strengths of large and small nations. The illustrations provided in this work will help those who dare to obtain a clearer idea of what they are advocating and enable those with less imagination to better understand what we are talking about.

A first question that this book will inevitably raise is: how far are we from seeing the dream of a world parliament being realized? Will our children be able to vote for, and to be elected to, a world parliament? As a European citizen, I can testify that similar discussions were held, with reference to a European Parliament, by my grandparents and my parents as early as the 1950s and 1960s. While they were often considered optimists, they would have never expected that when I was first able to vote in 1979, it would be for both my own national parliament and for the newly instituted European Parliament.

The second question raised by this book is whether a World Parliamentary Assembly would make a meaningful difference in dealing with the world's most pressing issues. Of course, it will be able to increase representation, transparency, accountability and participation. But will the institutional machinery be a sort of empty shell, leaving all the important decisions to be taken by other bodies. We are well aware that a World Parliamentary Assembly will have limited powers. World citizens will not be satisfied just with participation; they would like to see the global agenda effectively addressed and ensure the delivery of global political goods: from security to environmental sustainability, and from financial stability to economic and social development. Again, the European Parliament could provide a good comparison: in spite of being much more representative than the European Council, it is not (yet) there that the core decisions about the future of Europe are taken. Still, to have for the first time an assembly that will directly repre-

sent citizens rather than the governments will allow political struggles to be carried out at another and more effective level.

It is hard to sustain forever a situation in which we are world citizens for so many aspects of our economic, social and cultural life, yet are still unable to act also as world citizens in the political realm. We need to be ready for a new form of political globalization, and do so soon. The Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly has already assembled a wide-ranging coalition involving a remarkably high number of institutions, politicians, intellectuals and informed citizens. With this work Joseph Schwartzberg is providing important tools to promote this goal. Audacious thinkers and politicians should now use them.

*Daniele Archibugi is Research Director at the Italian National Research Council in Rome and Professor of Innovation, Governance and Public Policy at the University of London, Birkbeck College. His latest work in the field is The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2008).*

# 1

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

*The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.*

—Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, Clause 3.

*A United Nations Parliamentary Assembly—a global body of elected representatives – could invigorate our institutions of global governance with unprecedented democratic legitimacy, transparency and accountability.*

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali<sup>2</sup>

*Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.*

—Reinhold Niebuhr<sup>3</sup>

**T**he United Nations Charter begins on a deceptively promising note. “We, the Peoples” are its opening words. One will seek in vain, however, for any clause in that document that specifies a means by which ordinary people—or “peoples”—can play a role in the organization’s deliberations and decision-making. The UN, as is well known, is presently an organization of *States*, not of *persons*. Its democratic deficit is profound. How best to progressively minimize that deficit forms the subject of the present work.

What are the implications for the United Nations, of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cited above? Since the Article clear-

<sup>1</sup> This work is an expansion and adaptation of a book chapter, “A World Parliamentary Assembly,” from the author’s forthcoming book, *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World*.

<sup>2</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The Missing Link of Democratization,” *Open Democracy*, <http://opendemocracy.net/article.boutros-boutros-ghali/UN-parliament-global-democracy>, p.2.

<sup>3</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, 1944.

ly stipulates that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of *government*” [emphasis added], some will argue that the Article is simply not relevant. The United Nations, after all, was not intended to be a world government. Nevertheless, there can be no denying that many decisions taken by the entities comprising the United Nations system, whether or not they are regarded as binding, contribute to the governance of masses of citizens of the UN’s 193 member States. Whatever the intentions of the UN’s founders may have been, governance decisions taken within the organization over the decades since the UN’s creation have significantly impacted the lives of virtually the whole of humanity; and they are certain to do so increasingly in the decades ahead. Thus, a powerful case can be made for greater citizen input into the UN decision-making process.

In fact, support for some form of citizen input in the making of decisions relative to global governance has assumed a variety of forms over the past few generations; and not all of the innovations recommended entail working under the umbrella of the UN system. While various systems for ascertaining citizens’ views outside the UN are certainly feasible in the near term, I firmly believe that a World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA)—difficult though its creation will be—would be the optimal vehicle for achieving this objective and for imparting to the UN, the “unprecedented democratic legitimacy, transparency and accountability” which former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, among many other forward thinkers, believes it should have.

In any event, the time has come for the UN General Assembly to assume a greater role in making binding decisions in respect to a limited range of matters of truly global concern, i.e., in respect to problems that cannot possibly be adequately addressed by nations acting on their own. In short, the GA should evolve from what many believe to be a generally ineffectual “talk-shop” into a viable legislative body. And if there were to be, as hoped, a United Nations legislature, acceptability of its decisions would be substantially heightened if it represented *people* as well as *states*. The UN’s democratic deficit can and should be overcome. A more democratic UN will inevitably be a stronger and more legitimate organization.

In what follows, I shall first examine the constitutional evolution and composition of various democratic legislatures, with particular attention to that of the European Union, to see what lessons they may hold in regard to a global legislative body. I shall then briefly set forth and evaluate a diverse menu of proposals for giving ordinary citizens the voice they presently lack. We will next consider a number of organizational issues that will have to be addressed—or hurdles to be overcome—if a viable parliamentary body is to be brought into being. Further, I shall indicate a set of desiderata that might guide decisions on the type of “people’s house” best suited to the evolving needs of the world as a whole.

Once having established a conceptual platform for new proposals, it will be in order to suggest possible evolutionary paths towards what would eventually become a maximally democratic and viable World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA). I stress the word “possible” in the foregoing sentence because I believe that human creativity is capable of devising many workable and meritorious ideas in addition to my own. I am simply putting forward the best that I can currently conceive, recognizing that none is perfect, and would anticipate and welcome alternative formulations.

The recommended beginning of our journey—Stage One—would be the establishment by the UN General Assembly (GA), under Article 22 of the Charter, of a World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA) open to the participation of all member nations, in which parliamentarians are chosen by their respective governments.<sup>4</sup> The precise means for doing so would be left to each member nation; but the method generally recommended would be to assign the choice to the nation’s own legislature. Further, each legislature would be enjoined to select WPA parliamentarians (MWP) in proportion to the strength of the various parties represented therein. However, more than a few countries lack an effectively functioning legislature; in such cases, the choice of representative(s) would, as a rule, fall to the national executive.

To make the WPA in its initial form acceptable to the more powerful members of the UN, it would be necessary to apportion representation not solely on the basis of population, in accordance with the dominant global paradigm, but also with a view to some arguably relevant economic factor. The factor suggested for the initial proposal is national contributions to the UN budget. Additionally, in deference to the vast majority of UN members that are neither populous nor economically strong, the initial apportionment formula would have to take account of the persistent Westphalian notion of the sovereign equality of nations.<sup>5</sup>

As is the case in the present GA, resolutions passed by the WPA would be advisory, rather than binding. That does not mean, however, that they would lack moral force. One might, in fact, confidently expect that many would resonate strongly with worldwide audiences, be taken up by civil society organizations and individual activists, and would significantly influence national, as well as global, politics.

<sup>4</sup> The complete Article reads as follows: “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”

<sup>5</sup> The rationale for such a model would be analogous to that suggested by the author for a system of nationally weighted voting within the UN General Assembly; cf. Joseph E. Schwartzberg, *Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting*, New York: Institute for Global Policy - World Federalist Movement, 2004, pp. 11-14.

An important function of the WPA in its formative phase would be to establish a set of procedures for carrying out its parliamentary duties. It would institute a system of committees and create a body of norms for interacting with the GA, the UN Secretariat and other components of the UN system. It would, additionally, devise a set of rules on debating and voting.

Despite its many benefits, from a democratic perspective, a WPA created in the manner just described would be far from optimal. While it would enable spokespersons from various parties, including minority parties, to articulate a diversity of ideological positions and put forward specific actionable proposals that their governments might not be willing to put forward in the GA or other global forums, there would still be no guarantee that the decisions taken by parliamentarians beholden to their respective national governments would truly reflect the sentiments of their constituents.

Thus, one might anticipate—based on the developmental trajectory of the European Parliament—that it would be only a matter of time before a growing popular demand would lead to the establishment of a popularly elected and more politically competent WPA. But, before embarking on what would become Stage Two of our journey, it would first be essential to agree upon a set of conditions and institutional arrangements for the holding of free and fair elections conducted in accordance with generally accepted rules (e.g., universal adult franchise, to choose an obvious example). Further, to ensue that the rules were actually followed, it would be necessary to establish a suitably empowered Election Commission with a broad oversight mandate. Among the electoral rules—which we will consider in some detail in Section 9—would be a requirement that elections in multi-member constituencies would be held on the basis of proportional representation. This would hold true in all three anticipated stages of the WPA’s evolution. Nations unready or unwilling to accept these rules should be free *not* to join or *not* to continue their membership in the reconstituted WPA and should not be externally pressured to into doing so. Participation will mean much more when it is freely decided. Better to have the WPA grow slowly than to move forward on a seriously flawed footing.

While countless proposals for apportioning seats in a popularly elected WPA can be envisaged, we shall discuss only two in Stage Two of the Assembly’s evolution. Both embody, to some degree, the European Parliament principle of “degressive proportionality,” whereby the average number of constituents per parliamentarian increases more or less in tandem with increasing national population. But they differ from one another in one essential respect. In one model, all MWP’s would cast votes of equal weight; in the other, the weight of each MWP’s vote would systematically reflect the population size of his/her constituency.

But, whatever the system of apportionment might be, in transitioning from a WPA with appointive membership to one in which MWPs are popularly elected it will be essential to have in place an institutional process. This work puts forward a set of recommendations as to what that process might entail.

The creation and maintenance of a WPA will not be cheap. It is, therefore, necessary that we analyze, as best we can, its costs in comparison to its benefits. Though one cannot be certain about either at this juncture, my firm conclusion is that the recognized benefits will, within a relatively short time span, far outweigh the costs.

Following the presentation of the varying proposals in Stages One and Two, we will compare them in terms of how they apportion WPA seats and—where applicable—weighted votes among nations and indicate how this would influence their relative political acceptability to differing national groups.

Fundamental governance reforms never occur in isolation from the political system within which they are embedded. Thus, we follow our discussion of recommended reforms with a brief set of observations about the concomitant reforms (e.g., in UN financing) that would, if achieved, facilitate the creation of a viable and democratic WPA.

A major point of similarity in the proposals indicated to this point is that all three of them envisage elections within the framework of the existing national boundaries. Each would, as noted, be regulated by individual nations in accordance with an agreed-upon set of rules. This would hold true for both superpowers and microstates. Additionally, elections would not necessarily include the populations—admittedly small—of the world's remaining dependencies. Nor would they include such anomalous, politically exceptional countries as Taiwan, Palestine and Western Sahara. Democracy, however, implies the right of universal participation. That, unfortunately, is not yet the global rule. Further, the one person - one vote principle, should eventually trump the principle of degressive proportionality, assigning, to the degree practicable, equal weight to the votes of all willing citizens of our shared planet. With these thoughts in mind, I would recommend proceeding to Stage Three of our journey, a period in which we break out of our persistent and largely dysfunctional Westphalian straitjacket and organize elections within a set of electoral fields many of which would transcend national boundaries and, in accordance with a system of proportional representation, maximizing the probability that WPA elections will truly reflect the will of the electorate. Because the number of imponderables in advancing to this stage is great, the model recommended for it is illustrated only for the Americas, rather than for the world as a whole, as was done for the models introduced in Stages One and Two.

Our discussion concludes with a reaffirmation of the need for a WPA and an assertion that this work demonstrates that there are no insuperable logistical or political obstacles to its establishment. Although it recognizes that there are multiple paths that might be followed in the creation and later development of a WPA, it argues for adopting an evolutionary strategy similar to that followed by the European Parliament, but going even further to an even more democratic model in which national boundaries are no longer regarded as inviolable in the holding of WPA elections.

Regrettably, our textual analysis specifically discusses no more than a small proportion of the UN's member nations. To compensate in part for this deficiency, the text is supplemented by a set of statistical appendices indicating how each of the UN's 192 members (as of 2010) would fare under each of three of the WPA proposals, assuming it was then actually in effect. For the Stage Three proposal, data are provided only for the Americas. Based on the national data in these appendices, this monograph also presents a set of four maps, each of which provides an overview of what the geographic distribution of electoral power would be under a specific proposal, assuming universal WPA participation.

## 2

### Relevant Constitutional Experience

A review of the constitutional development of some of the world's major legislatures will indicate some instructive precedents for the UN and offer numerous guidelines for the approaches recommended in this monograph.<sup>6</sup>

An often-repeated evolutionary path is that of advancing in gradual stages from less to more democratic institutions. In Great Britain, for example, Parliament was initially the exclusive domain of a body of the nobility represented in what was to become the House of Lords; but, over a period of centuries, the representatives of commoners assumed an ever-more important role, such that today's House of Commons is, by far, the more powerful legislative body. Similarly, in France, the evolution of the Estates-General (États Généraux) of the *ancien régime*, into the modern parliament, places the popularly elected Assemblée Nationale in a role superior to that of the smaller Sénat, whose members are elected by an electoral college consisting of some 150,000 elected local officials. In the United States, neither of the two houses of Congress dominates the other; but, members of the Senate, who were originally elected by the legislatures of their respective states, came increasingly to be popularly elected until 1913, when, pursuant to the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, popular election became universal.

Along with the foregoing developments there was, in the US and many other countries, a gradual expansion of the electorate. Property and literacy requirements for voting were eliminated, as were exclusions (with some exceptions) on the basis of race, "previous condition of servitude," religion, ethnicity and—belatedly—gender.

To varying degrees, the unwritten constitution of the UK and the written Constitutions of the United States and France became the models for most nations that either overthrew monarchical regimes or gained their independ-

<sup>6</sup> The following few paragraphs borrow in part from Robert Sheppard, "Towards a UN World Parliament: UN Reform for the Progressive Evolution of an Elective and Accountable Democratic Parliamentary Process in UN Governance in the New Millennium," *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal*, <http://www.hawaii.edu/apipj>. Details on the composition of the legislatures of all the world's nations will be found in the *Europa World Yearbook*, New York and Oxford: annual.

ence in the 19<sup>th</sup> century or later. More often than not, the lower, or people's, house is on a par with, if not superior in power to, the upper house, which typically represents either instituted political regions (such as states in the United States) or one or more elite classes among the citizenry. Often, as in France and India, members of the upper house are chosen by an electoral college comprised of a limited group of specially privileged (often elected) individuals.

Given the powerful normative character of democracy, even non-democratic states—Russia, contemporary China, and other Marxist or transitional once-Marxist regimes, as well as numerous right-wing, authoritarian governments—find it expedient to maintain a façade of popular rule. Their elections may be a sham; but as a sop to world opinion, electoral exercises are nevertheless periodically held.

A development of particular significance for our purposes is the growing number of multi-national parliamentary assemblies.<sup>7</sup> Among these, none is more important than the European Parliament (EP), one of only two such parliaments that are popularly elected (the only other popularly elected parliamentary body is the Central American Parliament, Parlacen, established in 1991).<sup>8</sup> The EP, acting in concert with the appointed upper chamber of the European legislature, the European Council of Ministers, is currently the only international parliamentary assembly that enjoys genuine legislative authority. Established in 1952 as an appointed 78-member “Common Assembly” of the six-nation European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)—then composed of France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux nations—this body originally enjoyed only consultative powers. When, in 1958, the European Economic Community and Euratom were established, the consultative role of the already existing Assembly was expanded to those agencies as well and the body was renamed the “European Parliamentary Assembly.” Not until 1962, however, was its name changed to the current “European Parliament.”<sup>9</sup>

The size of the EU Parliament increased along with the territorial expansion of the European Community. Denmark, Ireland and the UK were added

<sup>7</sup> Approximately 165 international parliamentary bodies—global, regional and functional—are analyzed comparatively in Claudia Kissling, *The Legal and Political Status of International Parliamentary Institutions*, Berlin: Committee for a Democratic U.N., 2011.

<sup>8</sup> For a good, concise account of the evolution of the Parliament of the European Union, see “European Parliament,” *Wikipedia*, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_Parliament](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Parliament) (accessed on September 4, 2009).

<sup>9</sup> An authoritative and critical account of the political deliberations and outcomes in respect to the allocation of voting power is provided by David Galloway, *The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Realities and Illusions of Power in the EU*, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001.

in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. In 1990, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of East with West Germany brought about further territorial expansion. The year 1995 saw the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden. But the greatest accretion of all came in 2004 when ten new nations were added: three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and four former Soviet satellites or components of dismembered satellites (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), as well as two small Mediterranean republics (Cyprus and Malta, the EU's smallest member). Finally, the admission of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 brought membership up to its present (2012) total of 27. Further additions in Eastern Europe appear likely.

Direct popular elections for the EP were introduced in 1979 and have been held at five-year intervals ever since. Currently, there are 736 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs); but the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, would result in an increase in members to 750 at the next EU election.<sup>10</sup> The numbers per country range from a minimum of five for Malta to a maximum of 99 for Germany.<sup>11</sup> MEPs, however, are not seated as national blocs, but rather according to party affiliation, from left to right, as is the custom in many national parliaments.

EU member nations are also differentially represented in the Council of Ministers. Although there is only one appointed Minister per country, that individual casts a weighted vote more or less in accordance with each country's importance.<sup>12</sup> The current range is from three for Malta to a maximum of 29 for France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Thus, whereas the delegation from a given country in the EP will almost always be split in terms of party affiliation, the entire weighted Council vote of that nation will reflect the will of its then ruling party or coalition, and not necessarily that of a majority of the people.

As the European Community, and later the European Union, expanded, so too did the powers of the European Parliament. In 1970 the EP was granted control over portions of the Community's budget (exclusive of agriculture)

<sup>10</sup> With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, the size of the EU Parliament was temporarily increased to 751; but that number was subsequently adjusted downward to the then statutory maximum of 736, established in the same year.

<sup>11</sup> In 2009, the average number of constituents per MEP was approximately, 639,000, while the range per country varied from a low of roughly 83,000 for Malta to a high of 828,000 for Germany, a ratio of 1:10.

<sup>12</sup> While there is only one Minister per country at any given time, the number of individuals who may serve in that role is not fixed. Although most countries are normally represented by their Ministers of External Affairs, others may serve on an *ad hoc* basis. When, for example, an agricultural issue is being considered, Ministers of Agriculture will most likely represent their respective countries.

and in 1975 over the entire budget. Since the 1980s, it has played a continuing and growing role in drafting treaties for the creation and functioning of the EU and in choosing some of its principal officials. Some of its increased power has come about through the adoption of new treaties and some was derived from the Parliament's successful assertion of rights that it had not been explicitly granted. Of particular importance is the gradual increase in its power of "co-decision" on legislation, together with the more powerful European Council of Ministers. The EU's bicameral legislative system differs from that of many nations, however, in that it lacks the power of initiating legislation. That right is reserved for the European Commission (the EU's appointed executive body, with one Commissioner from each member State).

Over time, the European Parliament has become increasingly proactive and successful in pressing the Commission to propose legislation on a variety of matters. Among its other roles are its power to recommend Commissioners and to suggest an individual to serve as Commission President, to veto appointments, to censure the Commission (which requires a two-thirds majority vote), to supervise the operation of European laws, to make binding recommendations on goals that member nations must work to achieve by means of national legislation, and to pass non-binding recommendations and opinions applicable to particular persons or groups.

The EP, like the EU in general, warrants our attention for a variety of reasons. They indicate the workability of nationally weighted voting and demonstrate conclusively that it is possible for diverse—and once antagonistic—nations to overcome traditional rivalries and animosities in working together for the common good. Additionally, despite the cumbersome nature of the EU governance system within which the EP is embedded, its bicameral legislature provides numerous examples of creative law making, which benefit all Europeans as well as millions of migrant workers from countries outside Europe. Small wonder then that the EP is widely regarded in both Latin America and Africa as a model for regional cooperation and progress.

To what extent the European example can be adapted to the needs of a planet searching for peaceful methods of dealing with common problems remains to be seen. Skeptics will, of course, dismiss the possibility out of hand. They will point out, correctly, that the per capita fiscal resources of Europe are vastly greater than those for the world as a whole and will observe that the pool of administrative and legal talent on which Europe can presently draw dwarfs that of most other world regions. They will note the large share of the EU budget that goes into translating all laws and other documents into the twenty-three languages that enjoy equal status (at least in theory) in the region and assert that the world could not afford a comparable expense. And they will point to the vast differences in culture and level of economic development from one part of the world to the next, differences

that far exceed those within the much more limited space of the EU. They will also highlight, despite remarkable past progress, the recent economic disarray in Europe brought on by the calamitous financial crisis in the period since 2007. They will point to the related rise in xenophobic politics. Finally, they will assert that the EU is a union sustained from above by “faceless bureaucrats” and that it has failed to elicit deep feelings of support from ordinary citizens, most of whom cling tenaciously to their respective national identities and cultural heritages rather than embracing a common European identity.

What the skeptics will fail to acknowledge, however, is the universality of the desire for inclusiveness in the making of political decisions that bear on one’s own economic and social welfare. Nor will they take account of the dizzying speed with which new ideas of democracy and demands for social and economic justice are spreading from one country to another, especially among younger citizens. They will also fail to appreciate the phenomenal and rapidly increasing ability of electronic media to facilitate trans-national political discourse, the concomitant reduction in the cost of communication, the emergence of English as a virtually universal language, and the growing ease and lowered cost of travel, all of which will stimulate demand for a truly global parliamentary body and promote its viability.

### 3

## A Menu of Options

The contemporary parliamentary models referred to in Section 2 may be viewed largely as logical extensions of pre-existing institutions or as regional adaptations of familiar national models to serve increasingly large areas. However, recent proposals for new, more systematic citizen input into global decision-making processes have taken a remarkable variety of forms, some of which diverge sharply from any prior system. Several envisage deliberations in bodies outside the purview of the United Nations, while others presume the establishment of some formal UN tie. Some see whatever institution might be created as playing a purely consultative role, while others advocate their participation in a formal legislative process, if not immediately, then after some initial consultative trial period. In what follows I shall not attempt to summarize all of the dozen or so proposals of which I am aware, but will limit my discussion to four basic types that have been relatively widely discussed. Relevant summaries will be found in *A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals*, an anthology published by the Center for UN Reform Education in 2003.<sup>13</sup> Since the appearance of that publication, however, several of the proposals presented therein, including the World Parliamentary Assembly (alternatively UN Parliamentary Assembly, or UNPA) approach advocated, *inter alia*, by the present author, have been significantly refined and expanded.

### Working Through the Inter-Parliamentary Union<sup>14</sup>

Founded in 1889, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), with offices in New York and Geneva, is the sole global organization representing the legislative branch of the governments of sovereign states. Its membership (as of 2011)

<sup>13</sup> Saul H. Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker (editors), *A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals*, Wayne, NJ: Center for U.N. Reform Education, 2003.

<sup>14</sup> Discussed by Anders B. Johnsson, Secretary-General Inter-Parliamentary Union, in Mendlovitz and Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-29; supplemented by <http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm>; and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter-Parliamentary-Union/Members>, accessed on July 26, 2011 and last modified on June 19, 2011.

consists of the parliaments of some 143 nations (not including the US) as full members, with associate membership for seven regional parliamentary assemblies.<sup>15</sup> Some of these—contrary to the organization’s stated ideal—cannot credibly claim to have been democratically elected. In 2002, responding to a series of IPU overtures initiated in 1995, the UN granted the IPU “special observer status” (greater than that accorded to other NGOs accredited to ECOSOC). This entitles the IPU to publish and distribute its official documents to the General Assembly and to arrange hearings before invited members of that body. The IPU organizes biannual, thematically based assemblies at differing venues around the world at which problems of global concern are discussed. IPU outreach to the GA has been entrusted to three elected Standing Committees: one on peace and security, another on democracy and human rights, and the third on sustainable development, finance and trade. Although there has been and still is substantial sentiment within the IPU to institutionalize a parliamentary dimension within the GA, that is not yet the prevalent view. Rather, the chosen path was to build:

a reciprocal relationship between the IPU and the multinational [including regional] institutions starting with the United Nations; a relationship that does not alter the fact that both institutions *are and should remain independent of one another* [emphasis added]. The overall objective of this two-way relationship is to bring the voice of the people to the multilateral negotiating fora and to engage parliamentarians more directly in the work of these institutions.<sup>16</sup>

Though this approach would appear to have considerable merit if it were pursued earnestly by large groups of influential parliamentarians, there is, thus far, little persuasive evidence that such is the case and even less reason to believe that there is yet much in the way of a two-way information flow between the UN, via the IPU, to and from the constituencies that parliamentarians were elected to serve.<sup>17</sup> This inadequacy, however, is correctible; and there is reason to hope that IPU-UN ties will not only become stronger in the

<sup>15</sup> Prior to 2001 parliamentarians could also join in an individual capacity.

<sup>16</sup> Johnsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29. Oddly, in contrast to its relatively reserved position in respect to the UN, the IPU was much more forthcoming in its advocacy of a parliamentary dimension in the WTO, noting that the latter body, in contrast to the GA, possessed genuine *binding* powers comparable to that of national legislatures, but without the democratic input and accountability to which such legislatures are normatively subject.

<sup>17</sup> For a persuasive critique of the IPU position see Andreas Bummel, “The Establishment of a UN Parliamentary Assembly and the Role of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,” [Berlin]: Committee for a Democratic U.N., Background, October 2008, 8 pp.

years ahead but also, hopefully, help pave the way toward some more robust institutional change.<sup>18</sup>

### **An E-Parliament<sup>19</sup>**

The e-Parliament concept owes its birth to discussions in the UK in 2001 between Nicholas Dunlop, a former New Zealand MP and the first Secretary-General of Parliamentarians for Global Action, and Harvard Professor William Ury, author of the highly acclaimed book, *Getting to Yes*. Reflecting on the disconnect between rampant *economic* globalization on the one hand and the almost total absence of *democratic* globalization on the other, they recognized the extraordinary potential of the Internet as the medium through which the latter could become possible. The “e-Parliament” which they then envisaged was:

to build a new kind of democratic global institution. By linking up into a global forum the members of Parliament and Congress that we have already elected, creating an online ‘voting’ system and a loose committee structure through which they could meet face-to-face and work on issues of shared interest, it would be possible to create a kind of virtual, informal world parliament—an e-Parliament.<sup>20</sup>

Although this new entity would have no formal powers—at least for the foreseeable future—and would leave law making to national legislatures, it would enable parliamentarians to benefit from inputs, via the Internet, of information and opinion from civil society organizations as well as individual citizens and would thereby contribute to better decision-making at the national level, in regional parliaments (such as those in Europe, Africa and Latin America), and even in the UN General Assembly.

<sup>18</sup> For a perspective on the IPU at variance with that of Johnsson, see Senator Douglas Roche [of Canada], “The Case for A United Nations Parliamentary Assembly,” in Mendlovitz and Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-53, esp. pp. 40-45.

<sup>19</sup> An excellent summary of the principal elements of this proposal appears in Robert Johansen, “An E-Parliament to Democratize Globalization,” in Mendlovitz and Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-118. A more detailed presentation will be found in Robert Johansen, “The E-Parliament: Global Governance to Serve the Human Interest,” *Widener Law Review*, vol. 13, 2007, 319-345. The E-Parliament website, <http://eparl.net/eparliament/general.do?action>, provides much additional up-to-date information.

<sup>20</sup> <http://eparl.net/eparliament/general.do?action>, “History,” page 1.

Incorporated as a non-profit organization in both the UK and the US, the e-Parliament is governed by a twenty-six member Council (as of 2009), consisting almost entirely of present and former MPs or members of Congress (including two from the United States), drawn from almost as many countries throughout the world. (A parallel Citizens' Council, with some two or three dozen members, is also planned.) The e-Parliament has created a database enabling it to make electronic contact with some 18,000 democratically elected legislators (out of a world total of perhaps 25,000, though this pool changes constantly, depending on the outcomes of national elections). Further, it has established a small Secretariat, including a data management team in Manila.

Since its inception, the e-Parliament movement has succeeded in attracting considerable interest in governance circles. It has sponsored various workshops to explore ways by which it might best function and has organized annual conferences for parliamentarians from numerous countries around the world since 2007.<sup>21</sup> The 2009 conference, hosted over a three-day period by the US House of Representatives, was co-sponsored by the United Nations, the IPU, and the Global Centre for Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) in Parliament.<sup>22</sup>

Despite its auspicious beginning, it is obvious that many logistical problems would have to be solved before the e-Parliament could be viewed as a dependable guide to the wishes of the people of any country—much less of a majority within the world as a whole—in respect to any issue coming before the UN. Because it relies on the Internet, it entails a built-in bias in favor of citizens who are relatively affluent and educated and who enjoy discretionary leisure time in which to express their political opinions. Further, polling methods and message-processing techniques that might work well for a relatively small group—of, say, several hundred actors—are likely to break down in gridlock when expanded to a larger body—say tens, or even hundreds, of thousands—of users. How to prioritize issues, how to distinguish between well-informed arguments and crank communications, when and how to impose closure on discussion, how to deal equitably with communications in a wide diversity of languages (in particular, how to avoid an Anglophone bias) are matters that will require much trial-and-error experimentation before a workable *modus operandi* can be evolved.

<sup>21</sup> Conferences have thus far been held in Geneva (2007), Brussels (2008), Washington (2009) and Arusha, Tanzania (2010).

<sup>22</sup> “World e-Parliament Conference 2009,” <http://www.ictparliament.org/wepec2009/-index.htm>, and Global Centre for ICT in Parliament, <http://www.ictparliament.org>, both accessed on November 23, 2009.

## An Assembly Outside the UN initiated through Civil Society<sup>23</sup>

A global parliamentary body established independently from the UN has been championed by two distinguished professors of international law, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss. Their proposal is predicated on the generation of a coordinated and powerful global initiative to establish such an entity, with support from progressive NGOs, INGOs, multi-national corporations and other elements of civil society. Falk and Strauss point to previously successful coalitions advocating the creation of the International Criminal Court, a treaty banning land mines, and adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases—among others—as precedents for their own approach. Obviously, the interaction envisaged would rely heavily on the Internet; but the goal would not be the creation of a *virtual* parliament. Rather, it would be the establishment of a global assembly enabling live *face-to-face* debate among popularly elected delegates.

To impart legitimacy to the proposed body, Falk and Strauss argue, it would have to be backed by a certain number of enlightened, democratic states—perhaps as few as twenty or thirty—representing differing regions of the world. Such states could enter a treaty-based organization comparable to the original European Coal and Steel Community; but an assembly could also be formed even in the absence of such a treaty, leaving the matter of treaty backing to some later date. Of these two possibilities, Falk and Strauss have shifted from an initial preference for a non-treaty-based approach to one favoring establishing the assembly via an international treaty.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Sources for this section have all been anthologized in Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, *A Global Parliament: Essays and Articles*, with a foreword by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Berlin: Committee for a Democratic U.N., 2011. Works therein are grouped topically under the following rubrics: 1. On Globalization, Democracy and the Need for a GPA; 2. On the Establishment and Incremental Development of a GPA; 3. On How a GPA Would Help Overcome the Dysfunction in the Current Law-Making System; 4. On a GPA as an Alternative to US Hegemony; 5. On Terrorism and the Need for a GPA; 6. On the GPA as a Practical Political Project; and 7. Development Towards Global Democracy in a Changing World Order. The following articles, with citations to the works as originally published, are of particular value: Strauss, “Overcoming the Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a People’s Assembly,” *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol. 9, Fall 1999, pp. 1-23; Falk and Strauss, “On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty,” *Stanford Journal of International Law*,” vol. 36, no. 2, 2000, pp. 1-29. Falk and Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.1, January/February 2001 (also in Mendlovitz and Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-19); pp. 212-220; and Falk, “What Comes After Westphalia? The Democratic Challenge,” *Widener Law Review*, vol 13, Issue 2, 2007. Among the works cited here, the most widely known and most frequently cited is the 2001 article in *Foreign Affairs*.

<sup>24</sup> Falk and Strauss, “*A Global Parliament, ...*,” (*Ibid.*), pp. 15-16.

Once formed and actively engaged in and influencing the global political dialogue, the parliament would, allegedly, automatically attract new member nations and additional backers. And, since only nations capable of holding democratic elections would be eligible to join, the parliament would, presumably, help foster global democratization.

While a number of progressive states might, in the foreseeable future, be expected to formally endorse the proposed assembly, the authority of that body would come not from those states, but directly from the citizens of the world; and delegates would be seated, as in the Parliament of the EU, according to party affiliation, rather than by the states from which they were elected.

Initially, the assembly would have no legal authority to legislate and would be independent of the United Nations. But, as in Europe, it might evolve into a body with law-making capability. It might also, in the fullness of time, develop a formal relationship with the UN.

Though the voluntarism and progressive nature of the Falk-Strauss proposal are appealing, the proposal has, so far as I am aware, not yet gained much support among globally minded political activists or sitting parliamentarians. There are simply too many practical details that the proposal fails to address. To name just a few: Who would conduct elections and ensure and certify their fairness? How would electoral constituencies be defined and by whom? How would one guard against claims by small, relatively elite groups of voters to speak for a majority of the populations of their respective constituencies? How long would the assembly be in session and where? What would be the assembly's working language(s)? How and by whom would the assembly be financed and what emoluments would the MPs receive? How would one guard against pressures to gain political influence in return for financial support? Finally, one must ask: how could a body outside the UN system effectively assume an oversight function in respect to UN-related institutions?

Notwithstanding the doubts just expressed, I believe that the arguments for some sort of GPA so painstakingly advanced by Falk and Strauss do carry considerable weight. But most of those arguments would, in my opinion, be no less valid for an assembly functioning within the ambit of the UN system—to be discussed below—than they would be in any political arena outside that system. Furthermore, I do not see how a GPA of the type advocated by Falk and Strauss could enjoy as great a claim to legitimacy as an assembly created under a UN imprimatur.

## **A World Parliamentary Assembly within the UN**

Of the various routes proposed for the creation of a global people's assembly, the one that presently has, by far, the greatest degree of support is an elected World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA), alternatively designated as a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). A very persuasive case for such an assembly was put forward in an eloquently written paper by Dieter Heinrich, a Canadian world federalist, in 1992.<sup>25</sup> It has since been argued, *inter alia*, by Douglas Roche, a former Canadian Senator and cabinet minister, and—no less persuasively, though in less detail—by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the sixth Secretary-General of the UN.<sup>26</sup>

A Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly was formally launched in 2007, under the leadership of Andreas Bummel, a relatively young German activist, with events in a dozen or so countries on four continents.<sup>27</sup> The initiative quickly gathered support through resolutions in the parliaments of the European Union,<sup>28</sup> the Council of Europe, the African Union, Parlatino (the South American parliament), both houses of the Argentine Congress, more than a thousand individual members of national legislative bodies (of whom more than 800 were serving in late 2011) in more than a hundred countries (though only one from the United States), as well as numerous distinguished global personalities, including several Nobel laureates.<sup>29</sup>

Roche stipulated two methods by which the desired assembly could be brought into being. The first would be for existing parliaments, acting through the IPU, to elect delegates from all member countries. This method would have several obvious advantages. It would make effective use of a respected and well-organized body and would, from its very inception, be able to draw upon a large pool of experienced legislators. Additionally, it would entail very little cost. Finally, Roche persuasively argues,

<sup>25</sup> Dieter Heinrich, *The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly*, Amsterdam and New York: World Federalist Movement, 1992.

<sup>26</sup> Senator Douglas Roche, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *op. cit.* For additional strongly supportive proposals, see Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System*, Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994, pp. 176-181.

<sup>27</sup> Bummel's initiative goes back even further. His case is persuasively put forward in Andreas Bummel, *Internationale Demokratie entwickeln: Für eine Parlamentarische Versammlung bei den Vereinten Nationen / Developing International Democracy: For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations*, Stuttgart: Horizonte Verlag (for the Komitee für eine demokratische UNO / Committee for a Democratic U.N.), 2005, 127 pp.

<sup>28</sup> The EU Parliament had, in fact, also supported the idea even earlier, in 1994.

<sup>29</sup> Progress is recorded in numerous postings by the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, [www.unpacampaign.org](http://www.unpacampaign.org). Information on the number of Parliamentary endorsements is as of December 17, 2011.

A UNPA comprising national parliamentarians would provide an interesting proving ground and transmission belt for parliamentary practices back to the national level. This would particularly be the case where domestic conditions would perhaps not provide material or political resources conducive to good democratic practice. In short, a national parliamentarian might find that being a member of the UNPA would make them [*sic*] better domestic MPs.<sup>30</sup>

There would, however, be several significant drawbacks in the IPU scenario. To begin with, it would be more difficult for members of existing national parliaments than for parliamentarians elected at large to endorse UN positions contrary to those of their own government, since they would then have to return to their respective legislatures and deal with the displeasure of their colleagues in those bodies. Further, because *national* legislators are normally full-time servants of their respective constituents and are engaged with issues of primarily national concern, they could not be expected to focus sufficiently on the issues likely to be addressed in a *global* parliament. Finally, the schedules of most parliamentarians would, in all likelihood, enable them to be available at the UN for no more than two or three weeks per year (probably just before or just after the convening of the General Assembly in September), and, in many cases, not even that.

In light of the foregoing considerations and despite the costs and considerable logistic difficulties entailed, Roche favors a *popularly elected* assembly. He approvingly cites the example of the European Union and clearly believes in the feasibility of a comparable year-round institution on a global scale and that such decision-making would maximize democratic accountability and transparency. Like Falk and Strauss, Roche provides few details in regard to assembly size, manner of election, terms of office and the like. He does note, however, the necessity of a permanent international Secretariat, an Assembly President (or Speaker), a system of committees, and regularized formal reporting by the WPA (or UNPA) to the UN General Assembly, which would become and remain the UN's sole legislative branch. In most respects I would endorse Roche's and Boutros-Ghali's vision and will attempt below to flesh out many practical organizational details omitted from their analyses.

<sup>30</sup> Roche, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

## 4

### Difficulties to Be Overcome with the WPA Option

There is, as we have noted, no dearth of published proposals for representation in a World Parliamentary Assembly.<sup>31</sup> But every one of them must grapple with significant empirical problems. These problems are noted briefly in the following paragraphs and will be addressed in greater detail as our study proceeds:

- a) First, we must note the large number of nations to be represented, presently 193, and the prospect of significant expansion of that number when and if the more than two dozen remaining dependencies (e.g., Bermuda, the Dutch West Indies, Greenland, New Caledonia, and Puerto Rico) gain their independence and as new countries (e.g., Kosovo) and disputed areas (e.g., Palestine, Western Sahara) emerge through independence movements, especially in Africa and Asia.
- b) The size of the world's population (now past the 7 billion mark) means that even if there were an assembly with as many as a thousand seats, a MWP would, on average, have more than 7 million constituents. The

<sup>31</sup> Among many relevant publications, we note the following: Carol Barrett and Hannah Newcombe, *Weighted Voting in International Organizations*, a special number of *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. 2, no. 2, April 1968, Dundas, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute; Hannah Newcombe, "Voting Systems in the United Nations," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, no. 1, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970, 70-80; and Hannah Newcombe, *Design for a Better World*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983. Additional analytic studies include: Robert K. Morrow, *Proposal for a More Equitable General Assembly Voting Structure*, Washington, DC: Center for UN Reform Education, Monograph No. 5, 1989; Walter Hoffman (ed.), *A New World Order: Can It Bring Peace to the World's People? Essays on Restructuring the United Nations*, Washington, DC: World Federalist Association, 1991; and Paul C. Szasz, *Alternative Voting Systems in International Organizations and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve U.N. General Assembly Decision-Taking*, Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, Monograph No. 17, 2001. These studies, in which several dozen plans are discussed, are both theoretically and empirically rich. Although their emphasis is on various methods of *weighted voting* in the General Assembly, which would then increasingly assume the role of a legislative body, there is no reason why the sets of weights proposed for the votes of *single national representatives* could not be translated into integer values indicating the *number of people's representatives* to be elected from each UN member nation.

closest approach, thus far, to such a figure is in the case of the Indian Lok Sabha (House of the People), in which there are 552 seats, for a population of 1.173 billion (as of 2011), or an average of 2.125 million per seat. How large an assembly can function effectively is moot. The British House of Commons has 650 seats, while the obsolescent House of Lords has 788. However, unlike the UN, those houses use only one official language and no more than a small fraction of the members of the House of Lords is likely to participate at any given time.

- c) The distribution of nations according to population size is exceedingly skewed. This problem will be considered more deeply in Section I; but suffice it to say at this point that the population of the UN's largest member, China (1.346 billion as of 2010) is greater than the combined populations of the 159 least populous member nations! And China and India together account for 37.0% of the total for all the UN's members combined. The ratio of the populations of the demographically largest and smallest countries, China and Nauru (a mere 9,300 for the latter) is roughly 145,000:1. No other parliament has ever had to deal with a comparable situation during its formative process.
- d) The world is presently divided among more or less democratic polities, in which there are reasonably good chances of holding free and fair WPA elections, and autocracies, in which the prospect of free and fair elections will likely remain dim for the foreseeable future. Additionally, stable multi-party political systems simply do not exist in many of the world's nations. (For most of the analysis that follows, I shall proceed as if this problem will not prove insurmountable but will address the issue in detail elsewhere in this essay.)<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Many commentators on proposals for a WPA have asserted that one cannot have an Assembly containing representatives from relatively democratic and relatively autocratic nations, forgetting that the legislature of the world's oldest continuing federation, the United States, was composed of representatives from both free and slave states. Obviously, that problem posed a serious danger, as the Civil War made clear; but learning from the American experience, one should be able to establish appropriate safeguards in designing a WPA. These are discussed later in this essay. The argument about the incompatibility of democratic and autocratic states is hardly new and is addressed in a number of radical recommendations for reform of the present system of global governance. Many of those who attach great importance to this problem hark back to the seminal recommendation of the journalist, Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. Publication of this influential work resulted in the establishment of an organization known as Federal Union and, in 1949, of a sister organization, The Atlantic Union Committee, which played a significant role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1985 Federal Union was renamed the Association to Unite the Democracies, which was, in turn, succeeded in 2004 by the Streit

In light of the foregoing observations, one would have to conclude that in considering the composition of a viable future WPA, it will be necessary to learn not only from existing parliamentary systems, such as those of the USA, the EU, or other complex political entities such as India, but should also consider new and unorthodox approaches. It is high time to think “outside the box.”

Council for a Union of Democracies (<http://www.streitcouncil.org>). Numerous permutations of Streit’s original thesis have subsequently appeared. A particularly well-written, self-published monograph is that of Christopher Hamer, *A Global Parliament: Principles of World Federation*, Sydney, Australia: 1998 (used for a course, “Nuclear Arms and the New World Order,” at the University of New South Wales and available through Amazon, Create Space).

## 5

### Desiderata

Before designing any model for a World Parliamentary Assembly within the UN system, one should first be clear about the principles and goals to be embodied in such an entity. The following desiderata are relevant and should serve as touchstones in evaluating my own and other proposals:

- A set of clear rules should be established to determine eligibility for representation in the WPA.
- The WPA must be open to participation by representatives from all countries, including dependencies, provided they are elected in conformity with the established rules.
- No country should be required to participate in the WPA if it deems that doing so would not be in its best interest.
- An adequately resourced Election Commission, led by highly respected public figures, will be required to ascertain whether election rules have, in fact, been followed and to recommend corrective action where they have been breached.
- The number of seats in the WPA should be great enough to provide a voice for all significant political ideologies, parties and factions, yet small enough to be manageable.
- If members of the WPA (MWP) cast votes of equal weight, country-wise differences in the number of constituents per representative should, over time, be progressively diminished.
- If MWPs cast weighted votes, the weight of such votes should closely reflect the relative numbers of their constituents.
- Elections should, to the extent feasible, be conducted according to some system of proportional representation within a system of electoral fields each of which would elect multiple MWPs.
- The decision-making system should incorporate an appropriate system of checks and balances.
- Representatives must *be* and *feel* able to express their views freely and without fear of retribution from their home government or any other government for opinions deemed to be politically unacceptable.

- Transparency and accountability in decision-making should be maximized.
- Simultaneous translation and other provisions should be made to facilitate comprehension of debates and reports in languages different from the mother tongues of individual parliamentarians.
- Decisions should require varying qualified super-majorities, depending on the subject being deliberated.
- The WPA must be authorized to determine its own rules of procedure and to create a system of committees in support of its work.
- The WPA must receive adequate financial and logistical support from the UN Secretariat and must also have its own Secretariat.
- MWPs should be given staff support while resident among their respective constituencies, with additional logistic assistance to ensure ongoing communication between parliamentarians and their constituents.
- Provision must be made to facilitate continuity of debate and programs from one parliamentary session to the next.
- The perceived benefits of the WPA should, within a reasonable time frame, exceed the substantial costs of its creation and maintenance.

The foregoing list will undoubtedly strike some readers as excessively detailed and over-ambitious; but there is no reason in principle why all of its provisions cannot be adopted, even if it should turn out that perfect compliance would not always prove possible. At the outset, when dealing with a WPA with only advisory and consultative powers and composed of MWPs selected by their respective national governments, some of the desiderata might not be applicable and adherence to others might be somewhat compromised because of the obduracy of some governments. But, when the WPA becomes a popularly elected body and assumes a genuine law-making role, the bar of compliance would have to be raised. Particularly crucial, as has been noted, will be the creation of a powerful and respected Election Commission. Since no country would be obliged to take part in the WPA, it should not be too much to expect that, once the decision to participate is freely made, playing by a fair and uniformly applied set of rules would become a country's moral and diplomatic obligation.

## 6

### Preparatory Measures

Obtaining agreement within the UN that a WPA is needed will not be easy; and it is unlikely to come about without substantial and persistent pressure by civil society on the governments of progressive member nations. Those nations, in turn, would have to take the lead in promoting the WPA idea within the General Assembly, whose assent, by a two-thirds majority, would be essential. Fortunately, as previously noted, Article 22 of the UN Charter stipulates: “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” The WPA could, thus, be declared such a “subsidiary organ.” A GA vote calling for its establishment could not be blocked by a veto by any of the permanent members of the Security Council, or, for that matter, by any other Security Council action. Nevertheless, a campaign for a WPA within the General Assembly, once seriously launched, would, almost certainly, require at least a few years to come to fruition. But, given the growing need and the steadily increasing demand, within and outside the UN, it would surely be an achievable goal.

Once the requisite GA resolution is adopted, devising the institutional architecture for a WPA would require considerable diplomatic finesse and would benefit from the input of administrative experts from most, if not all, major regions and cultures of the world. Absent such input, the legitimacy of the new Assembly would be called into question. What appears, then, to be needed is some sort of expert panel analogous to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, established under Kofi Annan in late 2003 to deal with UN reform in general prior to the 2005 General Assembly summit. That 16-member panel, however, had only a year of intermittent meetings in which to do its work and had to deal with an excessively, if not impossibly, large agenda, including, *inter alia*, such sensitive and highly contentious issues as reform of the Security Council and of ECOSOC, peace-

keeping, the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission, and the lack of credibility of the UN's human rights regime.<sup>33</sup>

As matters turned out, relatively few of the High-level Panel's sweeping array of recommendations were adopted. This failure was not because the proposed reforms were lacking in merit, but rather—in my view—because of institutional inertia, an insufficient sense of urgency, and, most importantly, a lack of strong backing—if not outright opposition—by major powers, especially the United States, fearful that a strengthened UN would somehow infringe upon national sovereignty and excessively constrain the political behavior of the mighty.

What is needed with respect to a WPA panel is a group with a much more focused agenda than that of the High-level Panel of 2004. There is also need for greater emphasis on technical expertise and for a longer, open-ended period of deliberation. These measures should enable the crafting of a broadly acceptable proposal to present to the General Assembly for approval and the necessary funding.

I do not presume that the proposals that might eventually be put forward by the suggested panel will closely mirror those advanced in this monograph. Nevertheless, I offer several sets of detailed recommendations with the conviction that they provide viable, increasingly democratic guidelines suitable for successive stages in the systemic evolution of our system of global governance. Other models are certainly possible; and all should—and undoubtedly will—contend for acceptance in the global marketplace of ideas.

Apart from designing some system of apportionment for and general configuration of a WPA, there is also a need for suggesting a body of rules on the conduct of WPA business and on the holding of WPA elections. All of these matters will be treated in subsequent sections of this monograph.

<sup>33</sup> *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, UN General Assembly, a/59/565, 29 November 2004. The Panel met as a group over five sessions totaling only 18 meeting days. Additionally, there were eighteen regional sessions and issue workshops conducted over a total working period of 87 days.

## 7

# Stage One: An Advisory Body with Universal Membership (Model A)

### Method of Apportionment

Taking into consideration the generally conservative attitudes of most UN member nations in matters relating to UN reform, the substantial organizational problems that the establishment of a WPA would entail, lingering doubts about the very need for such a body, and the lessons imparted by the sometimes negative parliamentary experience of the European Union, I suggest in what follows that the WPA be developed incrementally, starting modestly with a body with only advisory and consultative powers. This body would consist of parliamentarians elected by the legislatures of their respective states, or—where a legislature is lacking or dysfunctional—by individuals selected by the national executive. The timing and nature of the shift to a more democratic, popularly elected body with some degree of legislative competence would depend on the experience derived from the initial body. The subsequent evolution of that body into a maximally democratic legislative organ would probably take place in discrete stages over a period of several decades.

The principal problem to be resolved in the initial, as well as in later, stages of the proposed WPA is the manner of representation. In principle, many would argue, democracy demands adherence to the concept of “one person - one vote.”<sup>34</sup> This would suggest that the number of representatives from China would vastly exceed that of any other nation, apart from India, and be more than four times as great as that of the United States.<sup>35</sup> However, China is not yet a democracy. The great mass of its people have little, if any, influence on the country’s policies; and it is presently inconceivable that the United States would consent to membership in a body in which it would be so greatly outvoted by China or, for that matter, even by a democratic India.

<sup>34</sup> Literature on the subject still adheres, for the most part, to “one *man* - one vote;” but in this essay I have altered to phrase to the gender-neutral “one *person* - one vote.”

<sup>35</sup> Demographers anticipate that India’s population will surpass that of China sometime around the year 2030.

Nor can one imagine that many other wealthy democracies of the global North would consent to a WPA in which their collective votes would be far fewer than those of parliamentarians from nations that are desperately poor or ruled by authoritarian regimes or both. Finally, there is no reason to suppose that the demographically small—and, for the most part, poor—nations, which account for a great majority of the UN's membership, would voluntarily surrender to a handful of demographic giants the political clout they presently enjoy under the GA's current one nation - one vote system.<sup>36</sup> The small, but weak, nations can, of course, carry the day on any GA vote; but their victories will prove to be pyrrhic and ineffectual—as has so often been the case in the past—since GA resolutions, with few exceptions, are non-binding and states that find a given resolution unpalatable will simply opt to ignore it.

The problem is essentially the same as the one discussed at length by the author in a previous monograph in regard to establishing a system of weighted voting for making decisions in the General Assembly.<sup>37</sup> In the near-term, a politically expedient solution to the representation problem should be along similar lines. It would employ one or more objective mathematical formulae that embody a compromise among three relevant principles: the demographic/democratic principle, the economic/contributions principle, and the legal principle of the sovereign equality of nations. Applying this reasoning to the present situation, two simple formulae are here proposed:

The first formula is the one proposed for determining country weights in voting on substantive matters in the UN General Assembly, namely:

$$W = (P + C + M) / 3$$

Here **W**, a nation's weight would be the average of three terms: **P**, its population as a percentage of the total for all member nations; **C**, its contributions (counting only those paid on time) to the regular UN budget (here assumed to be in strict proportion to its Gross National Income [GNI]) as a percentage of the total;<sup>38</sup> and **M**, its membership as a percentage of the total membership (1/192 or 0.5208% as of 2010).<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Presently, it takes only six countries to constitute a majority of the world's people. On the other hand, some 93 members of the UN each have populations less than 0.1% of the world's total. Of these, roughly 40 have populations of less than a million and 13 less than 100,000.

<sup>37</sup> Joseph E. Schwartzberg, *Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting*, New York and The Hague: Institute for Global Policy, World Federalist Movement, 2004, pp. 13-16. The ideas developed in that work are more fully developed in Chapter 6 of the author's forthcoming book, *Transforming*, cited in note 3.

<sup>38</sup> The reasons for presuming that contributions should be in proportion to GNI, rather than in strict conformity to the somewhat arbitrary assessment levels determined by the

The second formula provides a simple means of translating individual national weights into integer values to specify the number of WPA seats to which each nation will be entitled:

$$S = W / D$$


In this formula, **S** signifies the number of seats for a given nation, rounded off to the nearest integer; **W** represents the national weight as determined by the previous formula; and **D** is a lowest common denominator, namely the minimum weight of any UN member nation, which presently is 0.1738%, the weight registered by both Tuvalu and Nauru.<sup>40</sup> In short, the number of seats to which each UN member would be entitled would be its weight as a multiple of the weight of Tuvalu rounded to the nearest integer. All nations with weights up to 0.2607% (1.5 times 0.1738%) would have one seat. For a nation to have two seats, its weight would have to be in the range 0.2608%-0.4345% (i.e., 1.5 to 2.5 times Tuvalu's weight). For three seats the inclusive weights would be 0.4346%-0.6083%. And so forth.

This method of apportionment would, as of 2010, result in a global total of 564 seats, distributed by nations as shown on Map 1. Of these, 57 (10.1% of the total) would go to the United States, 55 to China, 39 to India, 20 to

General Assembly are spelled out in detail in Schwartzberg, *Transforming . . .* (*supra*, note 36, Chapter 6). The choice, however, would not greatly affect this analysis and need not be argued here. In general, the use of GNI as a determinant of contribution levels would enhance the voting power of the poorer countries of the world, which are presently assessed at much lower per capita rates than the world's more affluent nations. (As of 2010 no fewer than 55, mainly small, nations were each assessed at the arbitrarily established minimum rate of 0.001% of the regular budget of the UN.) The only relatively affluent nation assessed at a lower percentage rate than that of its share of the world's total GNI is the United States, which accounts for roughly 27% of total GNI, while being assessed only 22% of the regular budget. It should be noted, however, that the formula proposed here would relate not to amounts *assessed*, but rather to assessments actually *paid* (and paid *on time*). Thus, any threat by the United States or other nations to withhold payments as a means of influencing UN policy would prove to be counter-productive in that the actual withholding of assessed payments would automatically result in a diminution of the voting power of the nation indulging in such a practice. Implementation of the proposed formula, in both the GA and the WPA, would, then, have a very salutary effect in minimizing a chronic source of funding uncertainty in the functioning of the UN.

<sup>39</sup> As this analysis was carried out prior to South Sudan's attainment of independence in 2011, that country is not included in any of the models put forth in this essay.

<sup>40</sup> Tuvalu (population 11,000) is the world's lowest-scoring nation. Nauru, the UN's least populous member (population 9,300), has a marginally higher weight because of its substantially greater GNI.



Map 1. Model A: Proposed Apportionment of Seats in Stage One of a Hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly

MM 3/12

Table 1. *Shares of UN Member Nations, Seats and Population (2010), in a World Parliamentary Assembly with Selection of Parliamentarians by National Governments (Model A), by Groups Based on Number of Seats per Nation*

Seats per Nation	Nations Number (%)		Seats Number (%)		Population Millions (%)		Av. Population per Seat Millions
1	114	(59.4)	114	(20.2)	462.8	(6.8)	5.509
2-3	51	(26.6)	117	(20.7)	1,253.1	(18.4)	10.710
4-7	16	(8.3)	84	(14.9)	1,295.4	(19.0)	15.421
9-15	7	(3.7)	78	(13.8)	835.8	(12.3)	10.703 <sup>41</sup>
20-57	4	(2.1)	171	(30.3)	2,956.2	(43.5)	17.288
Total	192	(100.0)	564	(100.0)	6,802	(100.0)	12.061

Japan, 15 to Germany, etc.<sup>42</sup> A complete set of national data appears in Appendix II and summary data are presented in Table 1.

A striking feature of Table 1 is that no fewer than 114 nations (59.4% of the total membership) would have only one seat. But the system would, nevertheless, be strongly biased in their favor. Collectively, those 114 nations contain only 6.8% of the total world population, yet would account for a total of 20.2% of all the seats. In general, the less populous the state, the greater the bias in its favor and vice versa. China, for example, with 19.8% of the world's people would (if the system were presently in place) be given only 9.8% of all seats.<sup>43</sup> And its 55 MWP's would, on average, each represent some 24.5 million constituents. At the opposite extreme, the delegate from Nauru would represent a mere 9,300!

Apart from the bias in favor of demographically small states, the inclusion of the contributions term in the weighting equation would also result in a bias favoring wealthy nations, however large or small they might be. The justification for this—though only in the initial stage in the development of the WPA—is pragmatic; without such a formulation, wealthy nations would have insufficient incentive to take part in the system and poor nations would be denied the benefits to which a WPA would lead.

<sup>41</sup> The reason for the seeming anomaly that the seven nations with seat totals in the 9-15 range have many fewer constituents per seat holder than the 16 nations in the 4-7 range is that the former group happens to be, on average, much wealthier than the latter, thereby driving up their weights as determined by our first apportionment equation. For details, see Appendix II.

<sup>42</sup> Country and world totals would, of course, be periodically adjusted in light of changing demographic and economic realities.

<sup>43</sup> However (assuming the system were actually adopted and universal in membership), China would likely pull ahead of the United States in number of seats within the next decade.

In considering power within a WPA, one should not suppose that it is derived solely from the number of seats to which individual countries or blocs of nations are entitled. One should never discount the power of ideas. Personalities recognized for their high moral standing, charismatic orators, and MWPers with carefully formulated arguments for specific policy recommendations, whether coming from large or from small countries, would be able to exercise an influence in decision-making out of all proportion to the single votes that they cast.<sup>44</sup> This would be especially true in an assembly in which MWPers are expected to act independently and follow the dictates of their own conscience.

### Functioning

In filling WPA seats the legislatures of the UN members with two or more seats would be enjoined to assign seats, to the extent feasible, in proportion to the breakdown by parties within the legislatures themselves. Thus, for nations with two seats, the ruling and the leading opposition party would each be likely to have one seat. (There would, however, be situations in which the leading opposition party trailed the ruling party by so wide a margin, that the latter would be entitled to a monopoly of the nation's allotted seats.) For the United States, with its strongly entrenched two-party system, there would also typically be an approximation of equality between Democrats and Republicans.<sup>45</sup> For countries with a multiplicity of significant parties the breakdown would be more complex. For example, given the party breakdown following the 2009 elections to the German Bundestag, 6 of that nation's 15 seats would go to Christian Democrats, 3 to Social Democrats,

<sup>44</sup> As an example of how a single diplomat from a tiny country could exercise an enduring influence on UN thinking and the development of world law, one may cite the speech made in 1967 by the Maltese Ambassador, Arvid Pardo, in which he called on the General Assembly "to pronounce the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as 'the common heritage of mankind.'" The common heritage principle was very influential in getting the GA to convene negotiations for UNCLOS III, from which emerged the path-breaking UN Comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty. The principle came in time to be extended to outer space, including the moon and other heavenly bodies; and many would like to see it apply also to portions of our terrestrial environment. Although Pardo did not play a leading role in the UNCLOS negotiations, Ambassador Tommy Koh, of Singapore, another small state, provided outstanding leadership in the treaty-drafting process. For further particulars, see Nico Schrijver, "Natural Resource Management and Sustainable Development," in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 592-610, quotation on p. 599.

<sup>45</sup> This could, of course, change over time, especially if elections were to be held on the basis of proportional representation (as will be discussed below).

and 2 each to the Free Democrats, the Left Bloc, and the Green Alliance.<sup>46</sup> Apart from party proportionality, parliaments in populous countries would also be urged to allocate WPA seats on a regionally fair basis and with due regard to gender balance so as to increase the overall sense of inclusiveness in the WPA venture.

Although the *number* of seats would be assigned by nations, the actual *seating* of delegates in the WPA would be by party, more or less along the left-to-right spectrum, in accordance with the already noted custom followed by the EU and many other parliaments.<sup>47</sup> Thus, social democrats (going by various names in different countries) would sit as a bloc, as would conservatives, liberals, and so forth. Given the comparatively minor ideological distinctions between most Democrats and most Republicans in the United States, it is likely that MWPs from those two parties would occupy adjoining banks of seats in the WPA, somewhat to the right of center.

From the perspective of liberal democratic nations, the greatest problem in the proposed system, as has already been suggested, is likely to be the anticipated monolithic representation from China, which, for all practical purposes, remains a one-party state (though that problem seems likely to be significantly mitigated by the time a WPA actually comes into being).<sup>48</sup> Also

<sup>46</sup> “German Bundestag,” official website, [http://www.bundestag.de/htdoc\\_e/](http://www.bundestag.de/htdoc_e/). Proportional party allocations for fifteen selected countries, based on their latest elections and using four different allocation scenarios, are provided by Andreas Bummel for the Committee for a Democratic U.N., “The Composition of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations,” Background paper, March 2010. 59 pages.

<sup>47</sup> This could pose a slight identity problem for parties defined essentially on the basis of religion or ethnicity, rather than in respect to their ideological orientation; but in India, where a great many parliamentarians do belong to such parties, it has not been difficult to negotiate workable accommodations.

<sup>48</sup> Harbingers of political change in China are legion, despite continuing and often severe official government repression of dissent. Of particular importance, in the author’s view, is the degree to which Chinese have become connected with and influenced by the outside world via the Internet. In 2009, there were some 384 million Internet users in China, as opposed to 240 million in the United States. Notwithstanding frequent government interference with the free flow of information, the Internet provides a much-used vehicle for collective protest. In a review of recent developments, a Chinese government white paper is quoted as follows: “The authorities attach great importance to social conditions and public opinion as reflected on the Internet, which has become a bridge facilitating direct communication between the government and the public.” This quotation is from Guobin Yang, “Technology and Its Contents: Issues in the Study of the Chinese Internet,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 70, no. 4, November 2011, pp. 1043-1050. What holds true for China is also true, to varying degrees, in other parts of the world living under repressive regimes and, as has often been observed, goes far towards explaining the wide and rapid spread of protests collectively known as the “Arab Spring” and similar mass movements in the non-Arab world, not to mention the “Occupy Wall Street” and spin-off movements in the United States and other relatively affluent countries.

objectionable from the perspective of liberal democratic regimes would be the substantial representation of other more-or-less-authoritarian states, very likely including Russia, with 9 seats. Cumulatively, however, the total of such questionably allocated seats would not be especially great (probably less than a fourth of the total). In any event, since the WPA would serve initially only in an advisory capacity and would presumably employ open voting, the General Assembly, to which it would report, would be well aware of the sources and political context of particular WPA votes and treat them with appropriate circumspection. So, too, would well-informed—and increasingly influential—members of civil society.

On the positive side of the question of representation, we should recognize the importance of potentially engaging all parties in WPA discussions and exposing MWP's from non-democratic regimes, as well as from fledgling democracies, to dialogues on issues of global importance, thereby providing them with a template of how a system of democratic governance might function domestically. This would, in all likelihood, go a long way toward the promotion of democratic governance in states where it is presently lacking and help smooth and hasten the transition to a more truly democratic system. Additionally, to the extent that WPA debates were publicized by the mass media, they would play a much needed, salutary educative role in exposing concerned individuals around the world to viewpoints held by MWP's from countries other than their own.

The manner of choosing MWP's would be left to each participating nation; and nations would, as previously noted, be absolutely free not to join if that was their wish. The terms of office (perhaps three years), however, would be uniform. So too, would be the salaries (preferably modest), working conditions and official perquisites. Provisions would be made for support from a WPA Secretariat, including simultaneous translations in each of the UN's six official languages.<sup>49</sup> There would also be payments for staff assis-

<sup>49</sup> Thought should also be given to the trial adoption, say for a period of fifteen-years, of Esperanto as one of the official languages, if not of the United Nations as a whole, then at least for the WPA. While many diplomats, professional staffers, and scholars fluent in one or more of the six official UN languages would undoubtedly find such a recommendation far-fetched and impractical, given the small number of persons worldwide who are presently proficient in Esperanto, most, I would suggest, fail to appreciate the difficulty of gaining true proficiency in English (especially for persons whose first language is not of the Indo-European language family), as compared with mastering the grammatically simple, wholly regular constructions of Esperanto. Since one may anticipate that a substantial number of MWP's will come from more humble backgrounds than those of most UN employees and be less well educated, it might serve the interests of that group to read reports (possibly only the *pro forma* "executive summaries") published in Esperanto or follow simultaneously translated debates in that language. Additionally, the optional use of Esperanto would be an investment in good will and would go far towards reducing the widespread and understandable perception

tance in the home country of each MWP to manage the anticipated two-way flow of information and opinion between representatives and their constituents: ordinary citizens as well as civil society activists. The basic expenses for the WPA should be borne by the UN, rather than by individual countries, though there would be no bar to supplemental logistical (not personal) support from official or private sources, subject to strict requirements for public disclosure of payments made wherever applicable.

The WPA would normally meet for a period of, say, two or three weeks at the UN immediately prior to and possibly overlapping the beginning of the General Assembly sessions in September.<sup>50</sup> At the outset of this period it would elect its President and one or more Vice-presidents and form needed committees. If the President were to be selected from a country of the global North, it would be understood that the [First] Vice-president would be selected from the global South and vice-versa. Additionally, the opening plenary session would be used by the WPA to decide upon its agenda for the course of the year and to engage in general discussion of matters brought to its attention by the GA and other components of the UN system. To encourage maximum freedom of discussion, there would have to be a UN guarantee of sanctuary, if needed, in some friendly nation for MWPs who had the temerity to speak in ways deemed politically unacceptable to the nations they represented.

Since it is likely that relatively little of substance could be settled in the brief period of the WPA's plenary sessions, much of its work would have to be handled by committees. While the number and scope of the committees would be left to the determination of the WPA itself, one might anticipate such committee foci as human rights, security, disarmament, international trade, finance, economic development, the environment, democratization, international migration, etc. In forming committees due regard would have to be paid to regional and gender balance. Each MWP would be expected to belong to at least one committee; and there would be no bar to the holding of

of Anglophone hegemonism in the global governance system. After all, the European Union has seen fit to make no fewer than 23 European languages official (including such minor languages as Maltese, Irish and Estonian) and spends a large part of its budget on translations into each of them. Proportionally, the extension of official status to Esperanto, even if only in the WPA, would require only a very modest increment to the overall UN budget. For brief, but cogent, arguments in support of Esperanto, see Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity's Most Pressing Problem*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, 2001, pp. 197 and 216.

<sup>50</sup> A longer session would probably be necessary following the convening of the WPA's first term to allow time for deciding upon the Assembly's rules of procedure. The IPU, which would continue to enjoy its present special observer status at the UN, could provide needed help in this and other respects, especially during the WPA's formative period.

multiple memberships. Each committee would elect a *core group* of MWPs, including a Chair, charged with establishing the committee's agenda and the means by which its work would be accomplished, especially during the period when the WPA was not in session. A Vice-Chair would also be elected to act in place of the Chair in the event that the Chair was unable, for any reason, to fulfill the duties of that office. Core members would remain at UN headquarters, in either New York or Geneva, for as long as necessary following the close of the WPA plenary sessions and could reconvene, at UN expense, if and when necessary.

Whether MWPs should be eligible for reelection is a moot question. While there is much to be said for the value of continuity, the exceedingly large number of constituents represented per MWP, together with the political, economic, social and cultural diversity that would characterize most constituencies, suggests a need for limited terms. This would facilitate a broader range of representation over time by various interest groups, heighten the sense of WPA inclusiveness and undergird the WPA's legitimacy. On the other hand, there is a need for maintaining institutional memory in that debate on many issues would be carried over from one WPA term to another. Thus, a compromise solution would be to allow the reelection of up to one-half of the core group within each WPA committee, but only for a second term. MWPs not serving in a core group would be ineligible for immediate re-election, but would be eligible for re-election after a stipulated period out of WPA office. These measures, taken together with modest, but adequate, salary structures, would minimize the likelihood of self-serving MWP careerism and reduce susceptibility to corrupt practices.

During the initial WPA period just described MWPs from around the world—a significant number of whom are likely to be relative newcomers to politics—would learn how to work together in a substantially more democratic milieu than that of the present UNGA. It is even conceivable during this period that some reform-minded national parliaments would go so far as to authorize the popular election of their nations' MWPs, rather than retaining that privilege for themselves. Outside the UN, this formative phase of the WPA would, presumably, also witness the spread of democratic institutions to more and more countries presently subject to authoritarian regimes. If these suppositions prove to be correct, the stage would gradually be set for a new phase in the WPA's development, a phase in which all MWPs are popularly elected and in which the WPA is accorded increasing legislative authority.

After a predetermined and clearly stipulated period (not to exceed 25 or so years), the Model A WPA, in conjunction with the General Assembly, would be obliged to draw up a plan for a more democratic, popularly elected successor assembly (Model B.1 or Model B.2—to be described below—or

some other broadly acceptable proposal), possibly even skipping directly to proposals for a more radical new body (Model C, described in Section 11). Key elements of the plan would be the establishment of an Election Commission and the adoption of a set of Rules of Fairness, to maximize the likelihood that elections to the revamped WPA, whatever form it might take, would be conducted fairly and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the new body. We turn now to a consideration of what that might entail.

## 8

### An Electoral Commission, Rules of Fairness and Gender Equity<sup>51</sup>

To ensure that popular elections to a WPA are carried out, to the maximum possible extent, on a level playing field, it will be essential for the UN to establish an impartial, expert, internationally recruited, professional **Election Commission (EC)**, which would ideally serve the following functions:

- It would determine the number of seats per country according to objective, uniformly applied population criteria.
- It would recommend—subject to WPA approval—rules of fairness in respect to who may run for office, acceptable electoral practices and funding, eligibility for voting, etc.
- It would, *prior to* scheduled WPA elections, receive and evaluate reports from all participating countries indicating their measures to ensure that elections will be fairly conducted; and, *following* the elections, reports demonstrating that the elections were, in fact, fairly conducted.
- It would have the authority to determine *in advance* whether fairness criteria were actually being met and to foreclose polling where they were being seriously compromised or ignored.
- It would determine, *subsequent to* polling, whether elections were fairly conducted and, in the event of egregious violation of the established rules, could recommend to the WPA nullification and/or rescheduling of fraudulent elections.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>51</sup> For accounts of UN involvement in the elections held in Member States, see W. Andy Knight. “Democracy and Good Governance,” in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 624-630; and the website of the Electoral Assistance Division of the UN: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/overview.html#Institutional\\_History](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/overview.html#Institutional_History).

<sup>52</sup> This provision may appear excessively ambitious and it would undoubtedly be costly; but it follows a precedent established and not infrequently employed by the Electoral

The Electoral Commission would be guided by the following universally applicable **rules of fairness**:

- The franchise will be universal and may not be abridged on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, age (above a stipulated minimum), property qualifications, wealth, literacy or education, occupation, previous condition of servitude, race, language, religion, place of birth, ideology, or political affiliation.
- The criteria for voting eligibility will also apply to eligibility to run for political office, subject only to the limitation indicated immediately below. (Suggestions for promoting greater gender equity in representation appear on pages 53-55.)
- To be eligible to run for office one would have to obtain a certain minimum number of signatures to establish that one is a seriously regarded candidate. A reasonable figure might be 25,000 or one percent of the electorate, whichever is lower.
- For an election to be deemed fair, it would have to be *genuinely contested* by two or more candidates.
- Strict—and modest—limits on election financing would be mandatory.
- In countries with only one WPA seat, the winning candidate would have to receive an *absolute majority* of all valid votes. In elections contested by more than two candidates, this implies the use of some system of *ranked preference* ballots and the instant run-off method of determining a winner.
- The use of intentionally libelous campaign rhetoric or literature could disqualify a WPA candidate at the discretion of the Electoral Commission.
- In countries allotted more than a single seat in the assembly, elections would be held on the basis of *proportional representation* (see below).
- To ensure that an election cannot be determined by a small group from among the politically empowered elite, no election would be regarded as valid if fewer than a specified percentage of the electorate cast bal-

Commission of the Republic of India in respect to elections for the lower house of the Indian Parliament as well as the legislative assemblies of India's states. It should also be noted that the United Nations already has considerable experience in facilitating and monitoring elections, beginning with the organization of the first elections held in Namibia in 1989. Since 1992, its electoral activities have been carried out mainly under the aegis of the Electoral Assistance Division established that year within the Secretariat by General Assembly resolution A/Res/46/137. Between 1989 and 2005 the UN received 363 requests for electoral assistance and was able to respond positively to most of them. The peak years for assistance provided during that period were 1992 and 2005, with 29 and 27 cases respectively.

lots. This percentage might initially be set as low as 10% or 15% and could be increased over the course of time.

- A reasonable and more or less uniform period of time for campaigning would be required between the selection of candidates and the date of elections. For logistical reasons, given the broad territorial extent of many constituencies, campaigning would likely be mainly via the Internet or by UN-subsidized TV. (This observation is predicated on the continued exponential development and spread of electronic messaging technology and a narrowing of the present North-South gap in access to the available media.)
- Balloting by mail and electronic methods would be encouraged, but not to the exclusion of more traditional means.
- Elections would, as nearly as feasible, be held within a narrow time frame—say one or two weeks—throughout the world, preferably in the northern hemisphere spring, which would allow successful candidates several months in which to prepare themselves for assuming their new duties in September. To preclude the possibility of early returns influencing the voting in areas with relatively late polling dates, the counting of ballots and the announcement of results would not be permitted until all voting had come to an end.
- To ensure that candidates and MWPs could act without fear of political reprisal for expressing views unfavorable to particular regimes or political factions, countries holding WPA elections would first have to grant all such individuals immunity from punishment for whatever they might say in seeking or in holding office. Additionally, since such immunity could not be ensured in the event of a change of regime, all such individuals would be guaranteed the right of political asylum should the need arise.

As is well documented, despite much lofty rhetoric in respect to gender equity and the nearly universal accession to the UN Treaty on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), women are woefully under-represented in virtually all national legislative bodies, as well as in most entities comprising the United Nations system. Correcting this unfortunate bias should be high on the global social agenda; and the WPA would provide an excellent venue for addressing the problem. The following gender-neutral recommendations indicate some ways of doing so.

To ensure a better gender balance among WPA candidates and elected MWPs, I would suggest that, in drawing up slates of nominees, political parties would be obliged to ensure that not less than one-third, nor more than two-thirds of the candidates listed on the party slate be either males or females. Further, in ranked party lists of candidates for the WPA in electoral

fields comprising three or more seats, neither male nor female candidates can be listed in three consecutive ranks.

To illustrate how this system would work, let us assume that elections are held on the basis of proportional representation in countries with varying numbers of seats from two to ten. The following ratios would then be prescribed for each contesting party:

- For a party with two candidates, there would have to be one from each sex.
- For three candidates, there would be two of a given sex and one from the opposite sex.
- For four candidates, there would be two from each sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.
- For five candidates, there would be three from one sex and two from the opposite sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.
- For six candidates, there would either be three from each sex or four from one sex and two from the opposite sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.
- For seven candidates, there would be four from one sex and three from the opposite sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.
- For eight candidates, there would either be four from each sex or five from one sex and three from the opposite sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.
- For nine candidates, there would either be five from one sex and four from the opposite sex or six from one sex and three from the opposite sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.
- For ten candidates, there would either be five from each sex or six from one sex and four from the opposite sex, with no more than two of a given sex sequentially listed.

For reasons to be explained later in this essay there would never be more than ten candidates from a given party on a WPA ballot. In the relatively small number of countries with more than ten WPA seats, the country would be divided into electoral fields each of which would, depending on its population, elect from four to ten MWP. Countries with eight to ten seats would have the option either of having all their seats elected from a single at-large constituency or establishing two electoral fields, each with from four to six seats. If, within a given electoral field, there were more eligible candidates from a given party than there were seats to be filled, then those with the

smallest numbers of qualifying signatures would be sequentially eliminated until the list was pared sufficiently to equal the number of seats.

Independent candidates for MWP seats would be able to get their names on WPA ballots without reference to a party list. Thus, the rules of gender balance would not be applicable to them. They would, however, have to meet the requirements for eligibility indicated above in order to be regarded as serious candidates. For those countries in which sexual mores pose a serious problem of compliance with the stipulated gender balance rules, this exemption provision might provide an escape mechanism that would facilitate the country's participation in the WPA; but it is anticipated that, with worldwide growth of party-based politics, the gender-based independent candidacy expedient would be used with decreasing frequency with the passage of time.

## 9

# Stage Two: A Popularly Elected Assembly

### Background

The suggested Stage Two of the WPA's development would, presumably, be marked not only by the popular election of all MWPs, but also by the gradual empowerment of the Assembly to participate, in conjunction with the General Assembly, in the framing of binding global legislation in important matters of unquestionably global or wide international concern, as opposed, say, to questions relating to only a single state or to essentially bilateral or regional issues. What would properly be considered an admissible issue in respect to legislative action would, of course, evolve over time and the acceptance of each incremental power would undoubtedly be subject to vigorous debate. This work, however, makes no attempt to deal with that question in depth. Rather, I shall merely cite, approvingly, the recommendation of the late Paul C. Szasz, whose career included more than forty years of service to the UN and related agencies. In Szasz's view, a UN legislative body might be empowered to legislate with respect to the following:

the high seas, Antarctica, outer space, weapons of mass destruction, the international trade in weapons, international trade and commerce, trans-boundary environmental matters, human rights (though that might be considered too broad a subject), and humanitarian rules of warfare;<sup>53</sup>

Among the items on Szasz's list, I would anticipate that "trans-boundary environmental matters" would receive greater attention than any other.

As in Stage One, the question of WPA representation would remain a crucial issue in Stage Two. The possibilities are numerous. (In fact, they are

<sup>53</sup> Paul C. Szasz, *Alternative Voting Systems in International Organization and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve General Assembly Decision-Taking*, Wayne, New Jersey: Center for U.N. Reform Education, Monograph # 17, 2001, pp.44-47. Admittedly, the passage quoted refers only to the General Assembly, rather than to a bicameral assembly including a WPA; and it is not certain whether Szasz would have included all the matters in his list within the purview of a people's assembly, at least at its inception.

theoretically infinite.) A key factor in judging the desirability of a given method is the degree to which one subscribes, on the one hand, to the democratic principle of “one person - one vote” (OPOV), as for example, in the US House of Representatives (USHR) or, on the other hand, whether one favors the politically more expedient principle of “degressive proportionality,” as used in elections to the European Parliament (EP). But there are also radically different, yet intellectually respectable, alternatives, one of which, the so-called Penrose method, would allocate power in proportion to the square root of national populations in millions. In my judgment, neither the USHR nor the EP nor the Penrose method, in its present form, would prove optimal at the global level. Evidence in support of this assertion is presented in Graphs 1-3 on the following page.

As Graphs 1-3 reveal, there are great differences in the degree of inequality in the distribution of population among the constituent units of each of the three entities under consideration. The most skewed distribution, by far, is that of the UN. There, the 64 nations comprising the bottom third of all members collectively account for a mere 0.9% (!) of the total population of all UN members combined, as opposed to 4.5% of the EU population for the bottom 9 out of 27 member nations, and 7.3% of the US population for the 17 least populous states.

Proceeding to the lowest two-thirds in membership, we find a similar pattern. The 128 least populous UN member nations account for only 8.2% of the membership, as opposed to 19.8% for the 18 nations in lowest two-thirds of the EU, and the 29.8% for the 34 least populous of the US's 50 states.

In respect to the most populous members of the three bodies, it requires no more than six nations (3.0% of the total)—China, India, the USA, Indonesia, Brazil and Pakistan—to make up a majority (50.6%) of the UN's total population. In the EU, the equivalent number is four (14.8% of the EU membership)—Germany, France, the UK and Italy—collectively constituting a 52.4% majority. In the United States, some 9 states (18% of the total) are needed for a 51.4% majority. The ratios of the populations of the largest and smallest nations/states are even more strikingly disparate: roughly 145,000:1 in the case of the UN, 198:1 in the case of the EU,<sup>54</sup> and 56:1 among states of the US.

<sup>54</sup> It is noteworthy that the EU has not seen fit to include in its membership a number of microstates that do enjoy membership in the UN. If the smallest of these, San Marino, were in the EU, the population ratio of the EU's most and least populous members would rise to more than 2,600:1.


**Graphs 1-3. Degrees of Inequality in Distribution of 2010 Population among UN Member Nations, EU Member Nations and US States**

Graph 1.

Point A. indicates that the 64 least populous UN member nations, one-third the total, collectively contain only 0.9% of the worlds total population.

Point B indicates that the 128 least populous nations, two-thirds the total, contain 8.2% of the world's population.

Point C indicates that the 6 most populous states, 3.1% of the total, contain 50.6% of the world's population.




Graph 2.

Point A. indicates that the 9 least populous EU member nations, one-third the total, collectively contain only 4.2% of the EU's total population

Point B indicates that the 18 least populous nations, two-thirds the total, collectively contain 19.8% of the total EU population.

Point C indicates that the 4 most populous E.U. nations, 14.8% of the total, contain 53.4% of the E.U.'s population.




Graph 3.

Point A indicates that the 17 least populous states, roughly one-third the total, contain only 7.3% of the US's population.

Point B indicates that the 33 lest populous states, roughly two-thirds the total, collectively contain 29.8% of the total US population.

Point C indicates that the 9 most populous states, 18% of the total, contain 51.4% of the total US population.



In light of these figures, it is understandable that the United States has, on the whole, remained comfortable with its time-tested method of apportioning seats for the House of Representatives.<sup>55</sup> And, while support in the US for a WPA presently appears to be slight, it seems probable, given the nation's history and its own large population, that many globally minded Americans would lean toward a one person - one vote system, when WPA proposals eventually do gain traction in the US. For reasons of self-interest, the same would, of course, would hold true for China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria and a few other very populous nations.

In principle, the USHR system, as practiced in the United States, is quite simple. The process entails several steps.<sup>56</sup> First, it is necessary to derive the mean number of constituents per House seat, a figure designated as the [national] "quota." This figure is obtained by dividing the total cohort to be represented (i.e., the population of the US minus that of the District of Columbia) by the number 435, the legally mandated number of House seats. As of the 2000 census—citing the 2001 study on which this account is based—the national quota came to 645,632. The national quota was then divided into the population of each of the nation's fifty states, to derive a set of state quotas, expressed as multiples of the national quota. Quotas for some 46 state quotas were then above the mean and only four below. (States in the latter group, no matter how low their quota might have been, were constitutionally entitled to a single seat.) The national range was from 0.788, for Wyoming, to 52.450 for California. States with quotas in excess of one were then guaranteed the total number of seats indicated by the *whole numbers* of their respective quotas (figures to the left of the decimal point in each state quota). Finally, *remainders* (figures to the right of the decimal point) were rounded

<sup>55</sup> When the US Constitution was written, the disparity between the populations of Virginia and Delaware (slaves included) was less than 13:1. It seems reasonable to ask whether the vital "Connecticut compromise" on representation in a bicameral legislature could ever have been reached if the ratio had been as great as, say, 100:1. This compromise, reached at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, called for a legislature in which one house, the Senate, would have equal representation (two Senators) for all the then existing and future states, while the House of Representatives would have representation in proportion to population. Establishing the latter form of representation, however, entailed a second political bargain, the so-called "three-fifths compromise," whereby a slave was to be counted as the equivalent of three-fifths of a free person. Shameful as that expedient now appears, the three-fifths compromise is widely regarded as a *sine qua non* for launching the new federation.

<sup>56</sup> The U.S. system is thoroughly analyzed in David C. Huckabee, "The House of Representatives Apportionment Formula: An Analysis of Proposals for Change and Their Impact on States," Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, August 10, 2001. Using data from the 2000 census, Huckabee analyzed six apportionment formulae and noted that many more are possible. While each provides results slightly different from the others, the differences tend to be small.

up or down, as needed, to determine adjusted integer values, totaling 435.<sup>57</sup> Over the years, no fewer than six rounding methods have either been employed or strongly advocated to convert state quotas into integer values; but, for the most part, the method in question would have had only a minor effect on the final apportionment.<sup>58</sup>

As it happens, it would prove impossible to apply the USHR system strictly to apportion seats in a 1,000-seat WPA, with the UN membership and population as of 2010. With a global quota of 6.802 million (one-thousandth of the total UN population), no fewer than 923 seats would be apportioned among 97 nations with populations in excess of the quota, while another 95 seats would go to the 95 nations with populations of less than 6.802 million. The total, 1,018, would exceed the predetermined total of 1,000.

But what if we were to choose a WPA with only 800 seats? In this case, the quota would come to 8.503 million (6,802 million / 800). The 89 nations with populations above this figure would receive a total 723, while the 103 nations with lower populations would each receive the minimum of one seat. The total for the two groups would come to 826 seats, a figure even more in excess of the stipulated total than in the case of a 1,000-seat WPA. Clearly, then, if one wishes to employ an OPOV formula to apportion seats in a WPA, one would have to depart from the method used for the USHR.

In a study first published in 2002, I applied a variant of the OPOV system to apportioning seats in a hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly of a thousand seats.<sup>59</sup> The world's population at that time was roughly 6.1 billion

<sup>57</sup> In 2000, 27 state quotas were rounded upward and 23 downward; but that was the chance outcome of the census enumeration; and the figures could just as easily been different, say 23 upward and 27 downward. Constituents per seat ranged from a minimum of 495,304 for Wyoming to a maximum of 905,316 for Montana, the most populous among the seven states awarded only one seat.

<sup>58</sup> The differences among these methods are, for the most part, subtle and need not concern us here; but Huckabee (*op. cit.*), provides tables indicating the number of seats per state under each system and shows that in 34 out of 50 states the number of seats (as of 1960) would have been *identical* under all six methods. Of the five methods studied—in addition to the one actually used—one method yielded exactly the same seat totals in all 50 states, while the other four resulted in differences in 2, 3, 10 and 11 states. The spread in seat numbers exceeded one in only four populous states. Among these, the maximum range was for California, which received as few as 50 seats by one method and as many as 55 by another. Its actual total was 53.

<sup>59</sup> Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly," *The Federalist Debate*, vol. XV, no. 3. November 2002, New Series, pp. 10-16. This study was anthologized, with some editing, in Mendlovitz and Walker (eds.), *supra*, note 13, pp. 80-92, under the title, "Overcoming Practical Difficulties in Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA). As the latter study contains several significant editorial lapses, reference to the former is recommended.

people, which yielded an average of 6.1 million constituents per seat holder, a figure one could regard as the analogue of the quota noted above for the United States. But, to keep the total number of seats from going over 1,000 and to preclude egregious over-representation for very small nations, my proposal did not award individual seats to nations with populations less than half the global quota (i.e.,  $< 3.05$  million). Rather, all such nations were either clubbed with neighboring nations (e.g., Monaco with France) or regionally grouped (e.g., the small Caribbean states) to form electoral entities with populations of 3.05 million or more.<sup>60</sup> The upper population limit for nations with only one seat was fixed at roughly 9.15 million ( $1.5 \times 6.1$  million). In all, these decisions yielded some 62 nations or groups of nations with one seat each. Their combined population, 317 million, made for an average of roughly 5.1 million constituents per seat. Entitlement to two seats would have required a population between 1.5 and 2.5 times the quota, and so forth. At the upper extreme were China and India, which garnered 213 and 159 seats respectively. The United States followed with 44. A sample of seat totals for other nations would include: Russia, 23; Brazil, 22; Japan, 20; Nigeria 20; Germany, 13; Mexico, 12; Egypt, 11; U.K., 10; South Africa, 7; Canada, 5; Australia, 3; and Sweden, 1. A significant drawback of the system—among several others based solely on population—is that they would allocate only a single seat to some of the world's most progressive nations.

Demographically, the situation has not changed dramatically in the decade since publication of the author's 2002 study. While the world population has since increased by approximately one billion, the proportions of the current total held by individual countries are, with few exceptions, not so very different today from what they were at the turn of the century. One might, then suppose, that I continue to support the approach that I advocated a decade ago. In fact, I now deem it questionable as a Stage Two solution. Given the tenacity and political importance of the Westphalian state system—problem-ridden though it undoubtedly is—and the persistent need to recognize the integrity of existing states, this monograph suggests below two rather different apportionment methods (Models B.1 and B.2) in which that integrity is, for better or worse, upheld. Only for Stage Three of our journey will I argue the case for an electoral system that transcends national borders, as did my 2002 study.

In marked contrast to the United States, the EU has found it desirable to devise a system of degressive proportionality, thereby enhancing the political

<sup>60</sup> The apportionment proposal also provided for representation of the populations of all remaining dependencies and disputed territories. Among the dependencies only one, Puerto Rico, was sufficiently populous to merit its own seat; all other dependencies were grouped with regionally proximate states.

weight of Europe's smaller nations. Even with that concession, however, the four largest EU members (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy—with some 315 seats out of a total of 736—are generally capable of setting the European agenda and determining policy outcomes.

If a system of degressive proportionality similar to the one employed in the EP (and discussed in Section B), were to be used for apportionment in a WPA, assigning at least two seats to every member nation, and if the Assembly contained 1,000 seats, then the 95 nations with fewer than 6.802 million inhabitants (1/1,000 of the UN total) would have a total of 190 seats (19%) for a cohort of nations with only 3.2% of the world's population.<sup>61</sup> Is this not excessive? But, in all likelihood, the allocation of seats in excess of the proportion warranted on the basis of population would not be limited solely to the bottom 95. How far up the demographic ladder the practice would extend is, of course, moot and would vary from one proposal to another.<sup>62</sup> In any event, the more populous member nations—say the fifteen with populations of 80 million or more—with a total of not quite two-thirds of the world's inhabitants (and a substantially larger share of the world's wealth) would be commensurately under-represented.

Not included in the preceding discussion is the question of the process by which the apportionment of seats would be carried out. What mathematical formula(e), if any, would be employed? In the relatively homogeneous EU, it was possible to reach accord through difficult—sometimes rancorous—diplomatic negotiation, without resorting to a uniformly applied formula. But would such a delicate diplomatic exercise be feasible for almost 200 nations at the global level? I doubt that it would. And, even if it could be, who would be the arbiters?

Whether following an apportionment system based primarily on OPOV representation or one with degressive proportionality, so long as one adheres to the notion that each nation will have at least two seats, it would be highly likely—to use a hypothetical example—that a minority party polling more than a million votes in a WPA election in a populous country—let's call it country X—would fail to win a single seat, while a seat in some microstate—country Y, with a total population of less than 100,000—would be won by fewer than 10,000 voters for a second party with a radically different ide-

<sup>61</sup> In Bummel's view (cf. fn. 46), the maximum number of seats in a viable UNPA would be about 800. In 2010 that figure would, as previously noted, make for an average of roughly 8.5 million constituents per seat. In a system with a minimum of two seats per member country, some 102 countries would then account for 204 seats, 25.5% of the total, for countries collectively accounting for only 4.4% of the world's population.

<sup>62</sup> For an analysis of four relevant proposals see Andreas Bummel, *supra*. Fn. 46.

ology (or with no ideology at all).<sup>63</sup> This manifestly unfair situation may be rationalized on the basis of political expediency if—as in the case of Model A—one attaches importance to the representation of *nations*; but the whole point of building a progressively more democratic WPA is to shift the subject of concern to *people*, as well as to the more or less *ideologically defined parties* that some groups of people choose to form, irrespective of their citizenship, to represent their respective interests. Further, one must bear in mind that, even if a party with a particular ideology fails to garner a seat in some small country, there will likely be other adherents to that ideology from other countries eager to represent the party's interests in the WPA.

### **Apportionment via a System of Degressive Proportionality, in Which MWPs Cast Equal Votes (Model B.1)**

It should, by now, be obvious that the maximum workable size for a WPA—whatever the manner of choosing its members might be—is anything but self-evident. Most proposals thus far put forward range from about 600 to 1,000 seats.<sup>64</sup> In Stage One (Model A), however, the actual number, based on the proposed allocation formulae, came to only 564. Given the world's total population of roughly 6.8 billion (as of 2010), that works out, as previously noted, to an unprecedentedly high average of almost 12.1 million constituents per MWP. While so high a figure might be regarded as acceptable in a WPA comprised of parliamentarians chosen by and reporting to their respective *governments*, I would suggest that a popularly elected assembly, whose MWPs would report directly to their *constituents*, ought to be of a substantially greater size. Nevertheless, there has to be some limit beyond which institutional entropy will make effective action all but impossible. In the absence of empirical data on what that limit might be, I am— somewhat

<sup>63</sup> What many observers from countries with vigorous party systems fail to realize is that parties in many other countries, especially those recently freed from colonial rule, are often nothing more than relatively small power-seeking cliques, united only in their allegiance to some local magnate or common membership in a particular ethnic or linguistic group, tribe, or clan. Ideology has little, if any, relevance. Under such circumstances, great solicitude for the representation of second-ranking parties seems ill-advised.

<sup>64</sup> In the four scenarios indicated in the Committee for a Democratic U.N. study cited in note 46, the figure ranged from 675 to 809. In each of the scenarios in question no country, however small, would have fewer than two seats. This results in a substantial—and, to my mind, unacceptably undemocratic—diminution in the apportionment for countries accounting for the vast majority of the world's population and would preclude representation in the UNPA by many minority parties in those countries.

arbitrarily—suggesting a total membership of 1,000. (In fact, I am aware of no proposal calling for a higher total.)

With a WPA membership of 1,000, the average number of constituents per MWP would come to just over 6.8 million. That figure, though substantially lower than the Model A average, is still far greater than in any existing or past parliament. However, resort to electronic media and the use of new sampling and polling techniques (based in part, on the experience now being accumulated by the already existing e-Parliament), would facilitate communication between MWPs and their politically engaged constituents. It would also enable continuing interaction among WPA committees (described in Section 7), as well as among individual MWPs, during periods the WPA was not in session.

More important than the *number* of seats in a WPA, in my view, is the manner of their apportionment. Particularly vexatious in this regard, as we have repeatedly noted, is the exceptionally large number of very small UN member nations, many of them microstates. In all, 95 nations, just short of half the UN's total membership, have populations below 6.8 million (one-thousandth the UN total). Among this cohort are sixty-five nations with populations ranging from a mere 9,300, in the case of Nauru, to 3.4 million, one-two thousandth the UN total. (Of these, 39 have populations of less than one million each.) Collectively, the population of these 65 states comes to 67.2 million people, not quite one per cent of the world total. However, given their sovereign status and the fact that, from a *legal* perspective, their UN membership counts as much as that of China, the US, or any other nation, in the various entities constituting the UN system, it is difficult at this juncture to make the case that they should be denied a WPA seat. On the other hand, given their meager population, it is even more difficult, in my view, to make a persuasive case for giving them *two* seats.

But what of the thirty nations in the population range from 3.401 million to 6.802 million? As it happens, this group includes many of the UN's staunchest supporters, as well as some of the world's most socially and politically progressive members: Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and Norway among others. It is hard to imagine that there would be strong objection to giving them—and inevitably others in their population bracket—a second seat.

The best way to manage this perplexing situation, I would suggest, would be to give all of the UN's 192 member nations, no matter how large or small, an *initial single seat* in recognition of their equally sovereign status and then—using data as of 2010<sup>65</sup>—to apportion the *remaining* 808 seats among

<sup>65</sup> The exclusion of South Sudan from this exercise is regretted. But that nation became independent and joined the UN only in 2011, a year later than our reference date of 2010.

the 127 UN members with populations above 3.4 million by some objective, uniformly applied, population-based mathematical formula.

The system suggested would be *iterative*, employing successive applications of a mathematical formula to establish increasingly large population brackets for nations with increasingly large seat entitlements. The formula is as follows:

$$\mathbf{Mn} = (\mathbf{Pu} / \mathbf{Su}) \times \mathbf{N}$$

in which **Mn** is the *maximum* population for a country with **N** seats *in addition to* the one initially granted to all UN member nations; **Pu** is the total member population as yet unallocated; **Su** is the number of seats as yet unallocated; and **N** is the sequential number of seats allocated per country, within successive, mathematically determined population brackets. For full details of how this formula would work in practice, the reader should refer to Appendix III.

At the outset, where **N** = one, **Pu** would be the total population to be apportioned, 6,735.0 million (6,802 million minus the total of 67.2 million for nations with populations below 3.401 million); and **Su** would be 808. Therefore, **M1**, the maximum population for countries with only one extra seat (two seats in all), would be 6,735.0 million divided by 808, which comes to 8.335 million, multiplied by one. A total of 36 UN members (named in ascending order of population in cell 2 of Appendix III) would fall within the range from 3.4 01 and 8.335 million. Their collective total population would come to 197.2 million.

All UN members with populations greater than 8.335 million would then be entitled to two or more seats (in addition to their initial universal one-seat allocation). For countries with two extra seats (**M2**), the second application of the formula would be as follows:

- **Pu** would be 6,537.8 million (6,735.0 million minus 197.2 million);
- **Su** would be 772 (808 minus 36); **Pu / Su** would be 8.469 million;
- **N** would be 2; and **(Pu / Su) x N** would be 16.937 million (8.469 million x 2).

Thereby, 33 nations with populations ranging from 8.335 million to 16.937 million would each have two extra seats. These nations, with a total population of 393.4 million, would account for 66 seats.

For countries with three extra seats (**M3**):

- **Pu** would be 6,144.4 million (6,537.8 million minus 393.4 million);
- **Su** would be 706 (772 minus 66); **Pu / Su** would be 8.703 million;
- **N** would be 3; and **(Pu / Su) x N** would be 26.109 million (8.703 million x 3).

This iteration of the allocation process would yield a group of 13 nations with populations between 16.937 million and 26.109 million, each of which would have three extra seats. These nations, with a total population of 286.5 million, would account for 39 seats.


Repeating the process when  $N = 4$  and higher, we would derive a set of 10 middle-range countries with 4 extra seats each, 7 with 5 extra sets, 5 with 6 extra seats, and 2 with 7 extra seats. In higher ranges, some 11 countries would have from 8 to 12 extra seats each. Finally, a total of 444 extra seats would go to the ten most populous countries, with from 16 to 146 extra seats each. In ascending order, these countries (and their seat totals) are as follows: Japan (15 seats), Russia (16), Bangladesh and Nigeria (18 each), Pakistan (21), Brazil (22). Indonesia (26), USA (34), India (128), and China (146). Table 2 provides additional summary data.<sup>66</sup>

The geographic distribution of seats (including the initial universal allocation of one) is indicated on Map 2. In this model, in contrast to Model B.2, it is assumed that the weight of the vote of all seat-holders is equal. It is also assumed that all UN members would participate. But the seat apportionment would not be affected by the non-participation of some nations. The apportioned seats for the holdouts would simply be held in reserve until such time as they chose to join the club. Additional summary data appear in Table 2.

As table 2 makes clear, the average number of constituents per seat increases in tandem with increases in the number of seats per country, though the rate of increase slows markedly in the upper population ranges. Small nations, in particular, continue to be highly favored. Only the 26 largest countries would have more than the world average number of constituents per seat.

Though one might suppose that the degressive proportionality built into the system would result in a substantial reduction in the power of the most populous countries, the reductions are, in fact, not especially great. Comparing the totals of Model B.1, with the figures that would be derived from a strict one person - one vote system, we note the following differences: China, down from 198 seats to 147; India, from 172 to 129; USA from 46 to 35; and Indonesia, from 34 to 27. (Importantly, however, the total for China and India combined would be 276, a figure sufficiently below one-third to preclude the

<sup>66</sup> From 12 extra seats onward, some  $N$  values provide no additional countries; thus one skips from Mexico's 12 extra seats to Japan's 15. The null iterations are omitted from Appendix III.



Map 2. Model B.1: Proposed Apportionment of Seats in Stage Two of a Hypothetical 1,000-Seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members of Parliament Cast Equal Votes

Table 2. *Shares of UN Member Nations, Seats and Population (2010) in a Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly, with Apportionment Based on a System of Degressive Proportionality (Model B.1), by Groups Based on Number of Seats per Nation*

Seats per Nation	Nations Number (%)		Seats Number (%)		Population Millions (%)		Av. Population per Seat Millions
1	65	(33.9)	65	(6.5)	67.2	(1.0)	1.034
2-3	69	(35.9)	171	(17.1)	590.6	(8.7)	3.454
4-7	35	(18.2)	179	(17.9)	1,117.7	(16.4)	6.244
8-35	21	(10.9)	309	(30.9)	2,511.2	(36.9)	8.127
129-147	2	(1.0)	276	(27.6)	2,518.8	(37.0)	9.126
Total	192	(100.0)	1,000	(100.0)	6,802	(100.0)	6.802

likelihood of collusion to obtain an effective veto in actions calling for two-thirds majority votes.)<sup>67</sup>

Given the differing total numbers of seats on Maps 1 and 2, comparisons between them are not easy. Nevertheless, one may note that the latter indicates a substantially lower *proportion* of seats allocated to countries of the global North, including not a few of the world’s most progressive states. In the case of the United States, the discrepancy is especially large: from 57 seats, 10.1% of the Map 1 total, to 35, or 3.5% of the total on Map 2. This diminution stems from the fact that—in keeping with a democratic ethos—there would no longer be an economic term in the apportionment equation used for Model B.1. Moreover, the global share of the North is likely to continue to decline as a consequence of the low—and frequently negative—rates of population growth among their relatively prosperous constituent countries and the commensurate increase in the proportion of the population of the South. This trend—which would be unavoidable in *any* allocation process aspiring to be democratic—will, naturally, be of concern to political leaders in the world’s wealthier nations.

<sup>67</sup> In a trial exercise using a slight modification of the previously discussed one person – one vote (USHR) system, the author obtained seat totals of 160 and 139 for China and India respectively. In this exercise, all 192 UN member nations, irrespective of population size, were initially allocated one seat out of a predetermined total of 1,000 and the remaining 808 seats were then apportioned according to a world “quota” of 8.419 million (6802.2 million divided by 808). Apportionment by whole numbers accounted for 731 of the 808 seats, leaving 77 to be apportioned by upward rounding of all remainders greater than 0.468. In comparison to Model B.1, this experiment favored 10 of the world’s most populous nations (especially China and India), while providing one less seat for some 38 nations toward the lower end of the population spectrum. In all, some 65 nations would have received only one seat.

There would, however, be some major compensating factors. As noted in our discussion of an Election Commission and “rules of fairness” (Section 8), a condition for participation in the WPA, would be the establishment of a reasonably functional democracy, at least in regard to WPA participation. In three of the parliamentary systems envisaged in this monograph (Models B.1, B.2 and C), there would be no place for autocratic regimes or despotic leaders. They could stay out of the system if they so choose, but only at the cost of being politically isolated and of (further) tarnishing their tainted global reputation. But, by encouraging the nations and peoples of the global South to obtain the voice that is nothing more than their democratic due, the proposed system would bring about a much healthier climate for mutually beneficial North-South cooperation and thereby greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the conditions that breed terrorism, civil strife and even, at times, out-right war.

### **Apportionment via a System in Which MWPs Cast Weighted Votes (Model B.2)**

Workable though Model B.1 would be, several objections to it are in order. First, some would argue—contrary to my own position—that a WPA with as many as a thousand parliamentarians would be too large to be workable. Second, given the relatively small populations of many of the world’s most democratic and progressive states, their low seat numbers in Model B.1 would excessively lower the strength in the WPA of important democratic nations. Third, an argument is put forward by many game theorists, including not a few academics, that the voting power of each nation in a world assembly should be in accordance with the *square root* of each nation’s population in millions.<sup>68</sup> The logic underlying this counter-intuitive proposition—that of the aforementioned “Penrose method”—calls for analysis.

The basis for support for the Penrose method lies in the valid recognition that, in a wide variety of decision-making settings (in weighted voting games, in board meetings of share-holding directors of many corporations, and in a handful of US state legislatures in which the representatives of counties cast weighted votes based on their county’s population), the ratio be-

<sup>68</sup> Lionel S. Penrose, “The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting,” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 109, no. 1, 1946, 53-57. Also L.S. Penrose, “Equitable Voting in the United Nations,” *Proceedings of the Medical Association for the Prevention of War*, No. 4, July 1966, pp. 12-19. and John F. Banzhaf, “Multi-Member Electoral Districts: Do They Violate the ‘One Man, One Vote’ Principle? *The Yale Law Journal*, vol. 75, no. 8, July 2005, pp. 1309-1338.

tween the *actual voting powers* of any two participants—i.e., their ability to become part of a winning combination of players or voters or, conversely, of a coalition that could prevent what they believe to be an undesirable decision—is not directly proportional to the weight of their votes, as classic democratic theory would have us believe. Rather, that capability increases disproportionately as differences in voting power increase. Thus, it is argued, fairness would demand reduction in the assigned weight of the more powerful players. From a mathematical perspective the most appropriate reduction, it is alleged, would result from weighting in accordance with the square root of the relevant variable (population [in millions], number of shares of stock held, etc.).<sup>69</sup> Were the Penrose method to be adopted for a WPA today, it would apportion seats, to the nearest integer, as follows: 37 for China, 34 for India, 18 for the US, 15 for Indonesia, 14 each for Brazil and Pakistan, 13 each for Nigeria and Bangladesh, 12 for Russia, 11 for Japan, and so forth. (For a complete list see column d of Appendix IV.) To take some examples from among relatively small, but influential states, Switzerland, with a population of 7.807 million (square root = 2.794), would be given an integer weight of 3, while Norway, with a population of 4.888 million (square root = 2.211), would be given a weight of 2. The threshold population separating countries with two seats from those with but a single seat would be 2.25 million (1.5 squared). All 56 UN member nations with populations below that figure (using 2010 data) would, however, be apportioned one seat each, even if the square root of their population was less than 0.5.

As in the case of Model B.1, the seat numbers *apportioned* (as opposed to those actually *held*) would be the same whether or not certain nations chose to participate in the WPA. The laggard nations would simply assume their predetermined seat entitlements whenever they decided to enter into the system.

The Penrose method, in my estimation, was conceived and promoted essentially on theoretical grounds, with little regard to the actual global distribution of political power among nations. Its advocates have failed, to the best

<sup>69</sup> The literature on the subject is substantial; and the mathematics underlying the arguments is complicated. The methods followed yield various indices of the probability of determining an outcome. The most widely used measure, the so-called Banzhaf power index (or Penrose-Banzhaf index), is explained in, *inter alia*, in John F. Banzhaf, "Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis," *Rutgers Law Review*, 19, 1965, 317-343. The power of the index is greatest in voting systems that require only simple majorities and declines in systems requiring super-majorities (e.g., two thirds in either the GA or the proposed WPA). Additionally, the power of the index is greatest in systems with relatively few players and declines as the number of players increases. In a body as large as the WPA would be, it seems doubtful that the Penrose method, in its pure form, would add much to the fairness of decision-making.

of my knowledge, to put forward any body of persuasive empirical evidence indicating why one should use the *square* root of the population in millions, rather than, let us say, the 1.8<sup>th</sup> root, or the 2.4<sup>th</sup>, or any other root, in apportioning weights and/or seats. Further, there is a substantial difference between applying the Penrose method in a WPA, where each MWP is presumed to be an *independent decision maker*, and using the method for apportioning voting weights in a General Assembly, in which each nation's representative casts a single *indivisible vote*. To be sure, occasions would undoubtedly arise when all, or virtually all, MWPs from a given populous nation would choose to vote *en bloc*; but there is no reason to suppose that that would be the norm. In short, while the reasoning behind the Penrose method does contain more than a germ of validity, overall the method does not merit the canonical status that some of its advocates claim it deserves.

Moreover, in the form proposed by its author, the Penrose method would, in practice, prove to be highly discriminatory. It rules, in effect, that, for purposes of representation, a population increase of 75 million Chinese (the difference between 1.369 billion [37 squared] and 1.444 billion [38 squared]) would yield only *one* additional Chinese seat, and would count for no more than a small nation's increase from a one- to a two-seat entitlement in crossing the aforementioned population threshold of 2.25 million for qualifying for the higher figure. While a fairly strong—though thus far unsuccessful—case has been made for adoption of the Penrose method for apportioning seats in the European Parliament—an organization in which all nations are democratic and in which differences in total national population and per capita income are much less than in the world as whole—the requisite conditions for its full-blown application in a WPA are clearly lacking.<sup>70</sup>

Yet, despite the reservations just expressed, I do believe that one could employ square roots to arrive at workable *numbers of seat holders*, provided that one then assigned *politically acceptable weights* to the votes that each seat holder would cast. Obviously, however, any number of weighting formulae may be devised; and each UN member nation would be inclined to support the formula that appeared most favorable to its own national interests. The demographically largest nations would argue, on traditional democratic principles, for a method approaching a one person - one vote system. Most small nations, on the other hand, would presumably support some formula embodying the principle of degressive proportionality. Is a workable and relatively simple *via media* then possible? I believe that it is and would

<sup>70</sup> Karol Zyczkowski and Wojciech Slomczynski, *Voting in the European Union: The Square Root System of Penrose and a Critical Point*, Krakow, Poland: privately published, 2004, 26 pages. The proposal is especially favored by Spain and Poland each of which would, if it were adopted, approach voting parity with France, the UK, and Italy.

suggest the following system, the understanding of which will be helped by reference to Appendix IV and Map 3.

Let us begin by accepting the Penrose proposition that the *number of seats* for each member nation will be determined by the square root of its population. The relevant mathematical formula is quite simple

$$\mathbf{SD} = \sqrt{\mathbf{P}}$$

in which **SD** represents the “seat determinant” and **P** a nation’s population in millions. The values of **SD** will then be rounded up or down to the nearest integer to arrive at the number of a nation’s seats, **S**. A set of national data for all countries with populations in excess of one million is provided in columns b-d of Appendix IV.

With respect to *weights per seat* and total *national vote*, the extreme one person - one vote position would be to weight each seat holder’s vote by multiplying it by the mean population, in millions, represented per seat (column g), so that the nation’s total weight would closely approximate the nation’s total population. In the case of China, the weight per seat would then be 36.4. That figure, multiplied by 37, the number of Chinese seats, would yield a total of 1,347, or 19.8% of the world total (which is virtually identical to China’s share of the world’s population). At the opposite extreme, with *no* weighting of individual votes, China’s total votes would be identical to the number of its seats, 37, out of a world total of 758. This yields what, from a Chinese perspective, would surely be an unacceptably low share of only 4.9%.

Now, let us suppose, in accordance with the logic of the Penrose method, that we set the *weight of the vote* cast by each nation’s seat holders in accordance with *the square root of* the previously derived seat determinant. In this case, the formulae would be:


$$\mathbf{WD} = \sqrt{\mathbf{SD}}$$

in which **WD** would be the weighting determinant and **SD** would be the seat determinant derived via the previous equation.

Next, to derive the *total weight of a nation’s votes*, **NW**, one would multiply the weight per seat, by the number of seats. The formula would be:

$$\mathbf{NW} = \mathbf{WD} \times \mathbf{S}$$

The relevant national data are presented in columns c to f of Appendix IV. To continue with the case of China, the calculation would be **6.057 [WD] x 37 [S] = 222.2**, which comes to 10.8% of the world total of 2,053 (last line of Appendix IV). This weight is quite close to the so-called “golden mean” between the two extreme positions indicated above (i.e. 4.9%:10.8 is not very far from 10.8%:19.8%). As in Method B.1, China would be followed by



Map 3. Model B.2: Proposed Apportionment of Seats and Seat Weights in Stage Two of a Hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members of Parliament Cast Weighted Votes

India, with 200.4 votes (9.8% of the total), and the United States, with 73.9 votes (3.6%). The ratio of total weight between China and the USA would still be quite large, 3:1, but the disparity would be substantially less than the 4.2:1 ratio of Model B.1.

Towards the low end of the population spectrum, there would be a significant increase in the share of all seats apportioned to the 65 nations that would have received only one seat each under Model B.1. Though their numbers would decline from 65 to 58, their share of the seat total would rise from 6.5% to 7.8%.

Unconventional though the proposed method may appear, it does yield a rather nuanced set of weights per seat and per nation (columns e and f of Appendix IV), especially in the lower population ranges, and provides a distribution of electoral power that I believe most countries would be willing to accept.<sup>71</sup>

As has been noted, Model B.2—in contrast to Model B.1—does not specify a predetermined total number of WPA seats. While the total number, 758—derived by assuming that the WPA were in existence in 2010 and that it enjoyed universal membership—is substantially less than the 1,000 specified for Model B.1, that number would undoubtedly rise as national populations increase, as most will, over the next two or three generations, until such time as the world reaches a state of net zero population growth. It must be noted, however, that the use of a square root formula—rather than one based on simple addition—for determining seat numbers would likely cause the WPA to increase in size more slowly than would world population as a whole. Presumably, the assembly's size would begin to diminish even before the end of the current century. Based on a set of projections of national populations to the year 2050, I would estimate that the number of WPA seats in that year would—assuming no great augmentation in UN membership—fall in the range from 900 to 925.<sup>72</sup> Of that total, about 42 would go to India, 38 to China, 21 to the United States and 19 to Indonesia. Approximately 50 nations would still have but a single seat. Whether continuing population growth would ever drive the seat total above the one thousand mark is moot. But should that happen, a simple means of dealing with the problem would be to round all seat numbers *downward* to the nearest integer—though with the proviso that every nation would have at least one seat—, rather than *either upward or downward*, depending on the fractional remainder in the square root calculation. Given the large number of nations with a single seat,

<sup>71</sup> The author experimented with many weighting multipliers and concluded that the one recommended here yielded results more likely to be more widely acceptable than any other.

<sup>72</sup> Projections were from the *World Population Data Sheet, 2009*, Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2009.

Table 3. *Shares of UN Member Nations, Seats and Population (2010) in a Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly, with Apportionment According to the Square Root of Each Nation's Population in Millions and with Weights Attached to the Vote of Each Seat Holder, by Groups Based on Number of Seats per Nation (Model B.2)*

Seats per Nation	Nations		Seats		Total Votes		Population		Av. Pop. per Seat Millions
	Number	(%)	Number	(%)	Number	(%)	Millions	(%)	
1	56	(29.2)	56	(7.4)	63.4	(3.1)	44.1	(0.6)	0.788
2-3	65	(33.9)	160	(21.1)	261.6	(12.7)	425.0	(6.2)	2.656
4-7	48	(25.0)	247	(32.6)	564.5	(27.5)	1,311.3	(19.3)	5.309
8-18	21	(10.9)	224	(29.6)	740.9	(36.1)	2,507.8	(36.9)	10.951
34-37	2	(1.0)	71	(9.4)	422.6	(20.6)	2,518.0	(37.0)	35.465
Total	192	(100.0)	758	(100.0)	2,053.0	(100.0)	6,830.7	(100.0)	8.974

and a future UN with, say, 200 members, the suggested downward rounding measure would probably result in a saving of roughly 75 seats.

### Proportional Representation

Under Model B.2, some 136 nations would have two or more seats; the corresponding figure under Model B.1 would be 127. In either scenario, as was the case in Model A, those countries would be enjoined to allocate their seats by political parties, using a system of proportional representation. But, whereas the allocation in Model A would, to the extent feasible, reflect the distribution of seats in the respective national *parliaments*, the distributions in Models B.1 and B.2 would be in accordance with *popular voting* in UNPA elections. Such a system would substantially increase the probability that minority views and interests would be fairly represented. It would not matter whether a particular minority was ideological, occupational, racial, religious, linguistic, or otherwise defined. The essential point is that democratic governance should seek to ensure that all views have a reasonably good chance of being heard and that minorities can play meaningful roles in matters that deeply concern them.

The argument against geographically delimited *single-member electoral districts* may, I believe, best be made with reference to the hypothetical case of India. There, as of the Census of 2001, 16.2% of the population were members of “scheduled castes” (politically marginalized ex-untouchables),

8.2% “scheduled tribes” (indigenous peoples), 13.4% Muslims, and 6.1% of other religious minorities.<sup>73</sup> Although there is some overlap among these groups (for example, many tribals are Christians), their combined population in 2010 would come to approximately 475 million.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, with single-member constituencies, it is conceivable that not a single member of these minorities would be elected. With proportional representation, however, they should collectively be able to elect substantial proportions of India’s total cohort of MWPs in any popularly elected assembly. Obviously, this likelihood would be significantly greater if India had 129 seats, as in Model B.1, rather than the 34 it would receive under Model B.2. But in either model minorities would fare much better than they would under the British and American (and Indian) system of first-past-the-post elections in single-member constituencies. By way of contrast, in the relatively much more homogeneous nation of China, the difference between the two systems would be considerably less important.

Although electoral opportunities comparable to those just noted for India might not be available to the largely indigenous populations of relatively small countries such as Guatemala or Laos, it is reasonably certain that indigenous MWPs from more populous countries, such as Mexico or India, would be sympathetic to their concerns in WPA debates. Similarly, a “Green” MWP from Germany, let us say, would tend to promote the interests of otherwise unrepresented “greens” wherever they might reside. And a Conservative from the United Kingdom, let us say, might very well champion causes advocated by otherwise unrepresented conservatives in other parts of the world. This sort of advocacy would not likely occur to any significant degree in single-member constituencies, especially those in which candidates backed by economic power and a well-entrenched political base would enjoy an inordinately great advantage in a first-past-the-post system.

In countries with up to eight, nine, or possibly even as many as ten, WPA seats, a single nation-wide slate of candidates might be presented to the voters. A benefit of such a system is that it would eliminate substantial costs and political haggling in the territorial delimitation of single-member constituencies. Additionally, it would preclude the pernicious practice of electoral gerrymandering. Each political party in a given race would be entitled to nomi-

<sup>73</sup> “Demographics of India,” *Wikipedia*, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics\\_of\\_India](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_India), 10 pages, accessed on December 4, 2009. Relevant data from 2011 Census were not yet available at this writing.

<sup>74</sup> Author’s estimate based on differential growth rates among the communities cited, which are significantly higher, on average, for the groups cited than for the population as a whole.

**Table 4. *Range in Number of Electoral Fields for World Parliamentary Assembly Elections for the World's Most Populous Nations under Two Model Scenarios, 2010***

Nation	Model B.1			Model B.2		
	Number of Seats	Number of fields		Number of Seats	Number of fields	
		Mini- mum	Maxi- mum		Mini- mum	Maxi- mum
China	147	15	36	37	4	9
India	129	13	32	34	4	8
United States	35	4	8	18	2	4
Indonesia	27	3	6	15	2	3
Brazil	23	3	5	14	2	3
Pakistan	22	3	5	14	2	3
Nigeria	19	2	4	13	2	3
Bangladesh	19	2	4	13	2	3
Russia	17	2	4	12	2	3
Japan	16	2	4	11	2	2
Mexico	13	2	3	10	-	2
Philippines	12	2	3	10	-	2
Vietnam	11	2	2	9	-	2
Egypt	11	2	2	9	-	2
Germany	11	2	2	9	-	2
Ethiopia	10	-	2	9	-	2
Iran	10	-	2	9	-	2
Turkey	10	-	2	9	-	2
Congo, D. R. of	9	-	2	8	-	2
Thailand	9	-	2	8	-	2
France	9	-	2	8	-	2
U.K.	8	-	2	8	-	2
Italy	8	-	2	8	-	2

**Assumption:** Each electoral field shall have at least four and not more than ten seats.

**Note:** A dash signifies that no division of nation into electoral fields would be necessary.

nate as many candidates as there are seats to be filled, subject to the rules of fairness previously stipulated.

But in most of the countries projected to have eight or more seats in our scenarios for Models B.1 and B.2, a single slate of candidates would probably confront many voters with an excessively difficult set of choices. In such cases, the country could be divided into two or more broad regions, or “electoral fields,” each accounting for no fewer than four and no more than ten seats, and each with its own party slates of candidates. Wherever eleven or more seats were to be filled, division into two or more electoral fields would

become *mandatory*. Table 4 indicates the possibilities for some 24 countries likely to be affected, if the above recommendations were to go into effect.

The territorial delimitation of electoral fields would normally be the responsibility of the nation participating in WPA elections. Any such nation, however, would have the option of turning over the task to the Election Commission if it felt that doing so would be to its advantage (perhaps to prevent divisive political wrangling), or, perhaps, if it felt it lacked the requisite expertise. In the most populous countries, one might anticipate, under Model B.1, that the number of fields created would be roughly midway between the stated maxima and minima, with six to eight seats contested in most fields. For examples of how the system might work in respect to the United States, Brazil and Mexico, the reader may look ahead to Map 4 and Appendix V. (Though that map and appendix were prepared primarily in respect to an electoral system, Model C, which is yet to be discussed, for the three countries just noted, they are also relevant at this juncture.) In general, the establishment of electoral fields could be accomplished within the existing frame of first-order administrative subdivisions (states, provinces, *Länder*, etc.); but in three countries—China, India and Pakistan—one or more such territorial units are so populous, that they would have to be divided into two or more fields in order to keep the seats per field within the specified maximum of ten.<sup>75</sup>

### **Assembly Procedures and Qualified Majority Voting**

Most of the organizational and procedural recommendations relating to Stage One (Model A) of the evolution of the WPA—in respect to scheduling of sessions, agenda setting, committee structure, terms of office, discussing reports from other organs of the UN system, and, in turn, rendering opinions and offering advice to those same organs—would also be applicable for the larger assembly envisaged for either of the two proposals suggested for Stage Two (Models B.1 and B.2). The main difference, however, apart from the already discussed popular elections, would be the gradually increasing role

<sup>75</sup> The units in question, with their populations (c. 2010) to the nearest million, are as follows. In China: Guangdong, 95; Hebei, 70; Henan, 94; Jiangsu, 77; Shandong, 94; and Sichuan, 81. In India: Andhra Pradesh, 82; Bihar, 94; Madhya Pradesh, 69; Maharashtra, 107; Uttar Pradesh, 191; and West Bengal, 88. In Pakistan: Punjab, 94. Note that the population of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh is, in itself, greater than that of all but the five most populous countries in the world.

that the WPA might play, in conjunction with the UN General Assembly, in framing legislation on matters of truly global importance.<sup>76</sup>

The pace, nature and extent of change would, of course, be negotiable. But some degree of budgetary oversight would seem appropriate fairly early in the evolution of Stage Two. Later, in keeping with the general need for checks and balances within a democratic polity, it would also be desirable to provide for a WPA check against dubious decisions in the Security Council, the General Assembly and other entities within the UN system. This would, in effect, establish, in extreme situations, the principle of a non-binding, though politically potent, *people's veto*. Whether such a veto could somehow eventually be made legally binding is a matter for future debate.

As in the case of the EP, the WPA would function best through a system with "qualified majority" voting, that is, voting that calls for specified super-majorities. Such votes, however, would, in my judgment, have to be in relation to apportionments for the entire UN membership, rather than merely in regard to those countries electing to participate in the WPA. This distinction is important since it will not, as a rule, serve the long-term interest of the planet to have unrepresented minorities governed by a legislative body of which they were not a part. This would not necessarily mean, however, that binding legislation would be impossible with a less than fully representative WPA. If, for example, there were to be a 700 to 200 vote in favor of a given resolution in a Model B.1 WPA to which nations with only 900 out of 1,000 seats had acceded, the 700 vote majority would have constituted more than the required two thirds of the total, even if all nations had participated. Logically, there would be no reason not to accept such a vote as binding.

The requisite size of super-majorities would depend on the issue under consideration. Votes on procedural issues would require no more than a simple majority (50% + one). Other votes, those with no more than an *advisory intent*, might also be passed by simple majorities. Though they would not be binding, they could potentially exert considerable political and moral influence. On a specified set of substantive issues, however, two-thirds majorities would be in order; and decisions so taken—concurrently in both the WPA and UNGA—should be both legally binding and enforceable, subject to the caveat put forward in the preceding paragraph. Another set of issues—for example, with respect to the imposition of economic sanctions—might require a three-fourths majority. Finally, a vote to nullify a decision of the Security Council (which, obviously, could not happen without major UN Charter revision) might require a four-fifths majority. Detailed recommendations

<sup>76</sup> The evolution here would be analogous to that previously noted in respect to the European Parliament and the European Council of Ministers.

on these complex and contentious issues are, however, beyond the purview of this work.

### **Institutional Process**

In order for the second stage of the WPA—Model B.1, B.2, or any other—to be launched and regarded as legitimate, it would be necessary to obtain prior UN agreement on an *institutional process*. This agreement might include the following conditions (though all the numbers in square brackets would be negotiable):

- a) At least [50%] of the UN's member nations would have to agree to the conditions established for the WPA. This group of nations would have to include UN members from at least [four] continents.
- b) The participating nations would have to account for at least [50%] of the world's population.
- c) The participating nations would have to account for at least [50%] of the regular UN budget. The second stage of the WPA would not commence until [ten] years after the date when the previously noted conditions were met. Additional nations would undoubtedly elect to accede to the WPA accord during this period. No nation, however, would be required to accede.
- d) Within a period of [ten] years, beginning with the date of a country's declaration of intent to join the WPA, the country would have to provide credible evidence of its ability to fulfill the conditions for participation, including the holding of at least two successive national parliamentary elections judged to be fair by the Election Commission.
- e) A nation would be declared eligible to elect members to the WPA immediately on certification that it had met the specified conditions and could, within a year of its eligibility, elect the number of representatives to which it was entitled under whatever apportionment system was then in use.
- f) The requisite funding (see below) would have to be sanctioned by the UNGA.

Several of the above conditions might have to be changed if a substantial proportion of the countries acceding to the WPA were to do so as members of *federal unions* of the type envisaged by, for example, European federalists.

One may anticipate that, once the specified accession thresholds for launching Stage Two of the WPA are in place, popular movements in many initially reluctant, but democratic, nations would, acting largely through NGOs, pressure their respective governments to participate and that additional nations would do so in large numbers so as not to be excluded from a key component of the newly emerging global decision-making process. Further, once the utility of the UNPA were to be demonstrated, the accession process would almost surely gain momentum. Thus, the period from the initial establishment of Stage Two of the UNPA to one in which it approaches universal membership might prove to be much shorter than most advocates of radical reform in global governance now believe to be possible.

### **Costs**

By UN standards, establishing and maintaining a viable WPA would, at the outset, appear to be rather expensive; and necessary costs would increase significantly in changing from a Stage One assembly to either of the two systems proposed for Stage Two. Among the expenses anticipated are the following:

- Designing, building and maintaining the physical facilities for annual meetings in New York. Building costs, however, might be amortized over a period of up to fifty years.
- Salaries, travel costs, and *per diem* expenses for up to 1,000 MWPs.
- Costs for offices and other infrastructure for MWPs in their home bases. It would be reasonable, however, to pass these costs on to the participating national governments.
- Salaries for support staff, including the WPA Secretariat in New York and aides (at least two per MWP and more for core committee members) in their home bases.
- Support for the WPA Secretariat and UN Secretariat staff functions (simultaneous translation, recording and printing of debates and position papers [even if limited to “Executive Summaries”], etc.).
- Support for the proposed Election Commission, including needed administrative and investigatory staff.

All factors considered, the costs of a Model B.2 WPA, with 758 seats, under a system with weighted voting, would likely be significantly lower than for a Model B.1 WPA with a thousand MWPs. Additional costs in proceeding to Stage Three (to be described in section 11) would, however, probably not be especially great.

The total staff requirements suggested above could scarcely be much less than several thousand—and, quite likely, substantially more—in Stage Two of the WPA (assuming universal membership); and they would presumably increase over time as the scope and depth of WPA activities expanded. It is hard to imagine that an institution of that size could be maintained for the equivalent of less than half a billion dollars per year (in \$US dollars as of 2010). While that figure might seem high in relationship to the current regular budget of the UN (presently roughly \$1.8 billion per year), it is actually remarkably low in comparison to the budgets for the legislatures of a number of the world's leading democracies and probably substantially less than that of one or more states within the United States.<sup>77</sup> Or, to put the matter in a rather different perspective, if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the WPA were to be functioning today, with an annual budget of \$ (US) 700 million to serve a world with 7 billion inhabitants, the WPA's cost would come to only ten cents per person! Expensive? Hardly.

Although the present (2012) fiscal climate, both globally and in respect to the UN system, does not appear favorable, there is no reason to rule out major changes in the future as the growing need for a WPA is recognized and as civil society becomes stronger and more effectively engaged with the reform process. Moreover, the necessary resources should not be hard to come by. There are many eminently sensible proposals for raising needed UN revenue.<sup>78</sup> Among these, the most widely discussed is the so-called Tobin tax, proposed as early as 1972 by the Nobel Laureate in Economics, James Tobin. Such a minimal surcharge (even as little as 0.001%) on speculative financial transactions, which now run literally to trillions of dollars daily, could, in itself generate revenues at least an order of magnitude greater than those presently available to the entire UN system.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> For example, based on data in the website of the California state legislature, the annual budget for that state in 2009-10 should have come to well above \$500 million (author's estimate). Salaries of legislators and their staff alone came to \$269 million, to which figure one would have to add the costs of per diem (\$173 per legislator per day for each of the more than 200 likely days of session) and travel, retirement benefits, building maintenance, utilities, equipment, supplies, legal advice, research, publishing, etc.

<sup>78</sup> These are discussed in the author's forthcoming work, *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World*, Chapter 15, "The Problem of Funding." A good overview of contemporary UN financing is provided by Jeffrey Laurenti, "Financing," in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

<sup>79</sup> Literature on the Tobin tax is quite extensive. The general reader would be well advised to consult "Tobin Tax," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobin\\_tax](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobin_tax) for a good summary of the arguments for and against the proposal.

A much simpler proposal, advocated by the present author, would be to totally scrap the current complex and contentious assessment system and substitute a very low, uniform assessment rate of, say, 0.1% of each member nation's GNI, a rate that even the poorest of countries could easily afford, especially if the global political situation were such that large and unproductive military expenditures were no longer seen as justifiable.<sup>80</sup> Since the total global GNI came to almost \$62 trillion dollars (as of 2010), a uniform UN assessment of 0.1% would yield revenues of roughly \$62 billion. That figure is more than double the current total for the entire UN system: regular budget, peacekeeping budget, budgets for specialized agencies, and budgets for programs funded by voluntary donors (UNICEF, World Food Program, UN Development Program, UN High Commission for Refugees, UNRWA, etc.). Thus, the argument that the world would not be able to afford the establishment of a WPA, at some date in the not distant future, is clearly invalid.

<sup>80</sup> Schwartzberg, *op. cit.*, chapter 15, pp. 15-21.

## 10

### A Comparison of Methods

Whatever WPA apportionment system(s) the UN may eventually adopt, one may be certain that no major change would come about without a period of protracted and, very likely, acrimonious debate. In each of the proposals put forward in this essay, as well as in others that one can envisage, some nations will see themselves as relative winners and others as relative losers, whether in comparison to the rest of the world or in comparison to their principal global and regional rivals (e.g., China vis-à-vis the United States, India vis-à-vis China, Pakistan vis-à-vis India, etc.) The prospect that the *planet as a whole* would benefit enormously from the establishment of a WPA would often be forgotten during the process of bringing needed reforms to fruition.

Since one cannot now know what changes will occur in the world between the present day and the birth of the WPA, it is difficult to speak with confidence about the additional changes likely to be ushered in by the WPA itself and about how various blocs of nations will respond. The following major long-term trends, however, appear highly likely:

- An exponential worldwide increase in Internet communication.
- A steady, though not quite as rapid, increase in the pace of integrating the global economy, with substantial increases in trade, migration and foreign travel.
- A more or less steady enhancement in concern for and action on fundamental human rights.
- A somewhat more fitful, though unstoppable, spread of democratization at the national and regional level.
- Greatly expanded awareness of threats to our shared planetary ecosystem, and heightened civil society action in dealing with those threats.
- Greater advocacy of the position that the ecosystem represents and should be treated as a “global commons.”
- A gradual increase in the willingness—by both large and small powers—to abide by emerging global ethical norms and by new canons of world law.
- Greater use of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and a number of regional and specialized tribunals

and non-judicial mechanisms to deal non-violently with trans-national problems.

In all of these domains, and in others as well, ordinary citizens and civil society organizations may be expected to insist upon obtaining an increasing voice in the formation of policies that will affect their individual and collective well-being. In short, the stage will inexorably be set for the global acceptance of some form of a WPA.

Big powers, however, will continue to use whatever means they can bring to bear to shape major political decisions and influence major trends. That being the case, it is in order to examine how the twenty-five most populous states in the world would fare under each of the three WPA apportionment systems that we have examined thus far, assuming it were in place as of 2010. Relevant data appear in Table 5.

The most important revelation of Table 5 is that all three plans allocate to the 25 most populous states, taken collectively, a substantially smaller share of WPA decision-making power than they would enjoy if the apportionment were in strict proportion to population. In 2010 the 25 states in question contained 75.4% of the world's people; but they would receive only 55.3% of all WPA seats under Model A, 59.9% under Model B.1, and 40.8% under Model B.2. Their share of *votes* under Model B.2, however, would come to 58.6%, a substantially greater proportion than their share of seats.

Comparing Model A with Models B.1 and B.2, one notices that, whereas national shares of total seats and votes inevitably decline steadily with population rank in the latter two models, that is not the case with Model A. In Model A, which included an important economic term in the apportionment formula, six wealthy nations—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy—out of the total list of 25, fare considerably better than their respective populations would suggest.

Models B.1 and B.2 allocate voting power rather differently. The former is much more favorable to the world's demographic giants, especially in respect to the apportionment of *seats* (cf. columns g and i). As one goes down the rankings, however, Model B.1's bias in favor of seats for very large states becomes insignificant around rank 10 and is actually reversed at ranks 12 and lower. The differences in respect to *voting weights* (cf. columns g and k), are lower than they are for seats. The positive B.1 bias is significant only for China and India. For nations ranked 3 and lower, B.2 weights are greater than those of B.1. The proportional differences between the two increase with declining rank, but in no case do they become remarkably high.

Viewed from the perspective of middle-level, small and microstates, those with seven or fewer WPA seats, as shown on Table 6, the differences from one model to another are substantial. Model A, in which economic

Table 5. Comparison of Voting Strength of World's 25 Most Populous Nations under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly

Nations a	Population 2010 (millions)		Model A		Model B.1		Model B.2			
	b	c	Seats d	% of Seats e	Seats f	% of Seats g	Seats h	% of Seats i	Votes j	% of Votes k
1 China	1,345.7	19.8	55	9.8	147	14.7	37	4.9	222.2	10.8
2 India	1,173.1	17.2	39	6.9	129	12.9	34	4.5	200.4	9.8
3 United States	310.1	4.6	57	10.1	35	3.6	18	2.4	73.9	3.6
4 Indonesia	232.5	3.4	9	1.6	27	2.7	15	2.0	59.5	2.9
5 Brazil	193.3	2.8	12	2.1	23	2.3	14	1.8	51.8	2.5
6 Pakistan	184.4	2.7	7	1.2	22	2.2	14	1.8	50.0	2.4
7 Nigeria	158.3	2.3	6	1.1	19	1.9	13	1.7	44.6	2.2
8 Bangladesh	158.1	2.3	6	1.1	19	2.1	13	1.7	44.6	2.2
9 Russia	141.9	2.1	9	1.6	17	1.9	12	1.6	41.1	2.0
10 Japan	127.3	1.9	20	3.5	16	1.6	11	1.5	37.9	1.8
11 Mexico	108.4	1.6	7	1.2	13	1.3	10	1.3	33.6	1.6
12 Philippines	93.6	1.4	4	0.7	12	1.2	10	1.3	30.1	1.5
13 Vietnam	87.1	1.3	4	0.7	11	1.1	9	1.2	28.5	1.4
14 Egypt	84.5	1.2	4	0.7	11	1.1	9	1.2	27.9	1.4
15 Germany	81.6	1.2	15	2.7	11	1.1	9	1.2	27.2	1.3
16 Ethiopia	79.5	1.2	3	0.5	10	1.0	9	1.2	26.6	1.3
17 Iran	73.9	1.1	4	0.7	10	1.0	9	1.2	25.2	1.2
18 Turkey	73.1	1.1	5	0.9	10	1.0	9	1.2	25.0	1.2
19 Congo. D.R. of	67.8	1.0	3	0.5	9	0.9	8	1.1	23.8	1.2
20 Thailand	67.1	1.0	4	0.7	9	0.9	8	1.1	23.4	1.1
21 France	62.8	0.9	12	2.1	9	0.9	8	1.1	22.3	1.1
22 United Kingdom	62.2	0.9	11	2.0	8	0.8	8	1.1	22.2	1.1
23 Italy	60.5	0.9	10	1.8	8	0.8	8	1.1	21.7	1.1
24 Myanmar (Burma)	53.4	0.8	3	0.5	7	0.7	7	0.9	19.8	1.0
25 South Africa	50.0	0.7	3	0.5	7	0.7	7	0.9	18.8	0.9
Total. 1-25	5,130.0	75.4	312	55.3	599	59.9	309	40.8	1,202.1	58.6
World Total	6,802.2	100.0	564	100.0	1,000	100.0	758	100.0	2,053.0	100.0

status is an important factor in the apportionment equation, allocates a relatively large share of power to the cohort of nations with only one or a few seats, largely because of the relative affluence of a number of small states (mainly in Western Europe) and because the demographic weight of the Chinese and Indian giants is largely negated by their relatively low economic

Table 6. *Comparison of Voting Strength of Nations with Seven or Fewer Seats under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly*

Seats per Nation a	Model A		Model B.1		Model B.2			
	Seats d	% of Seats e	Seats f	% of Seats g	Seats h	% of Seats i	Votes j	% of Votes k
7	2.8	5.0	35	3.5	49	6.5	126.8	6.2
6	1.8	3.2	42	4.2	54	7.1	133.5	6.5
5	1.0	1.8	50	5.0	80	10.6	177.8	8.7
4	2.8	5.0	52	5.2	64	8.4	126.4	6.2
3	45.0	7.8	99	9.9	90	11.9	155.5	7.6
2	72.0	12.8	72	7.2	70	9.2	106.1	5.2
1	114.0	20.2	65	6.5	58	7.7	63.4	3.1
Total	315.0	55.8	415	41.5	465	61.4	889.5	43.3
World Total	564.0	100.0	1,000	100	758	100.0	2,053.0	100.0

standing. Model B.2 generally favors small states more than Model B.1 in respect to number of seats apportioned, thereby allowing greater diversity in party representation; but its system of weighting is such that the overall electoral clout that small states can bring to bear is significantly curtailed. In the range of four to seven seats per nation, however, the situation is reversed; Model B.2 would be regarded as the preferable system in respect to the allocation of both seats and voting power.

Table 7, which compares major economic blocs, contains no surprises. Under Model A, the cohort of 33 wealthy nations that are members of the OECD fare remarkably well. Though these nations account for only 18.1% of the world's people (as of 2010), they would be allocated more than twice that proportion of seats, 36.9%. The G-77 group, on the other hand, would receive only 55.7% of the seat total, while accounting for 77.2% of the world's people.<sup>81</sup> In Models B.1 and B.2 for which economic status is not a relevant factor, there is near parity between shares of seats and of voting power on the one hand and proportions of global population on the other.

With respect to how the acceptance of one or another model might affect

<sup>81</sup> Uniquely, Chile is a member of both the OECD and the G-77. This work, however, counted it in only the former bloc.

Table 7. *Comparison of Voting Strength of Major Economic Blocs under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly*

Nations a	Population 2010 (millions) b	% of UN Population c	Model A		Model B.1		Model B.2			
			Seats d	% of Seats e	Seats f	% of Seats g	Seats h	% of Seats i	Votes j	% of Votes k
Total for OECD	1,228.88	18.06	208	36.9	185	18.5	162	21	429.1	20.90
Total for G-77	5,253.04	77.22	314	55.7	745	74.5	524	69.1	1,481.8	72.18
Neither OECD nor G-77	320.24	4.70	42	7.4	70	7.0	72	9.5	142.2	6.93
World Total	6,802.17	100	564	100	1,000	100	758	100	2,051.1	100.0

democratic governance and respect for human rights, we may turn to Table 8, which is based on relevant Freedom House data (for the year 2010). Combining ratings of numerous factors relating to political and civil rights, Freedom House rates each nation of the world annually as “free,” “partially free,” and “not free.”<sup>82</sup> As expected, the seat and weight totals provide a strong showing in favor of free nations in Model A, mainly because of the high correlation globally between wealth and freedom. The nations rated as free collectively have 42.7% of the world’s people, but would be allocated 55.5% of all seats under Model A, as opposed to 42.2% under Model B.1 and only 39.2% of the seats and 40.3% of the votes under Model B.2. The not-free states would receive smaller shares of both seats and votes than their proportional share of population under all three models, but would, not surprisingly, fare least well under Model A.

All things considered, if any of our models could be instituted today, one would expect most demographically large nations, especially those that are not wealthy, to be relatively favorably disposed to Model B.1. Demographically small nations that are not especially wealthy and nations rated as not free would most likely incline towards Model B.2. Wealthy nations, irrespective of population size, and nations deemed to be free would fare best under

<sup>82</sup> Freedom House, a Washington-based NGO, rates all countries of the world annually in respect to political and civil rights on a scale from 1 to 7, and then derives average scores according to which counties are classified as “free” (averages from 1 to 2.5), “partially free” (3 to 5) and “not free” (5.5 to 7). Data were derived from *Freedom in the World, 2010*, Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2010.

*Table 8. Comparison of Voting Strength of Nations Grouped According to Freedom House Ratings under Three Methods of Apportionment in a World Parliamentary Assembly*

Nations a	Population 2010 (millions) b	% of UN Population c	Model A		Model B.1		Model B.2			
			Seats d	% of Seats e	Seats f	% of Seats g	Seats h	% of Seats i	Votes j	% of Votes k
Free	2,902.27	42.66	313	55.5	422	42.2	297	39.2	832.0	40.5
Partly Free	1,477.03	21.71	113	20.0	248	24.8	238	31.4	565.0	27.5
Not Free	2,433.07	35.62	138	24.5	330	33.0	223	29.4	656.0	32.0
Totals	6,812.37	100.00	564	100.0	1,000	100.0	758	100.0	2,053.0	100.0

Model A and many would likely seek to delay the transition to either of the Stage Two models.

However, no analysis based on 2010 data can be regarded as a reliable predictor of political preferences in respect to future global governance reforms. Even the most optimistic observer would probably concede that the world is at least a decade away from establishing a WPA. The world's political and economic landscapes could be dramatically altered—hopefully for the better—between now and the time when some form of WPA actually comes to fruition, even in the manner suggested for Stage One.

Change, of course, is never-ending; and it seems reasonable to anticipate acceleration of the movement towards greater global democracy once a democratically established Stage One institution begins to function. The very existence of a WPA would, predictably, act as a catalyst for new and exciting forms of political, economic and social development. Consequently, the gestation period in transitioning from a Stage Two to a Stage Three system could prove to be much shorter than most analysts would now anticipate. We turn now to Stage Three.

## 11

### Stage Three: Institutionalizing Electoral Fields Worldwide and Maximizing Use of the One Person – One Vote Principle

Although it is possible, on grounds of political expediency, to justify the great differences in the number of constituents per MWP from one country to another that would exist in Stages One and Two of the proposed WPA, those inequities violate a basic tenet of representative democracy, the one person – one vote principle, according to which the franchise of all voters should carry more or less equal weight. That the 9,300 citizens of Nauru, let us say, should be entitled to one WPA seat, while a Chinese MWP would be expected to respond to the needs, on average, of 9.2 million citizens in Model B.1 or to 36.4 million in Model B.2 is hardly just. In a WPA with 1,000 seats and a world population of 6.8 billion, a truly democratic allocation would be one in which each seat represented some approximation of the average of 6.8 million constituents, say within a range of 10% above or below that figure. Or, thinking ahead to the projected population of 9.4 billion in the year 2050, the average would then be 9.4 million per seat. There should, then, come a time when a WPA that purports to represent *people* (and their political *parties*), rather than *nations*, would provide a system of representation in which national boundaries are frequently ignored in order to achieve greater and more universal voting equity.

Given the already discussed merits of proportional representation in deriving a fair system for representing diverse political opinions, I would here suggest a Stage Three WPA in which the entire world, including territorial dependencies (should any then remain) would be divided into a set of “electoral fields” each of which would have from four to ten seats to be filled in accordance with some agreed upon system of proportional representation. Many, but by no means all, such fields would be multi-national. Table 4 noted some 23 nations in which two or more fields might be established *within* the nation, though a number of these countries—those with seven to ten seats each (e.g., France, Thailand or Turkey)—might opt to remain a single nation-wide field. As noted, the delimitation of fields within a given country would ordinarily be the responsibility of the country itself. But, if for

any reason, that country preferred to do so, the task of delimitation could be turned over to the previously discussed Electoral Commission composed of neutral professional experts.


Where electoral fields were to include all or parts of multiple countries, their delimitation and the devising of suitable electoral modalities could be entrusted to regional organizations such as the EU, the AU, the OAS, ASEAN and so forth, wherever such organizations were in place, assuming that they were willing and able to undertake the task. But, if such organizations did not exist or were unable to reach widely acceptable accords within a specified period, the default procedure would be to assign the task to the WPA's Election Commission.

There are, of course, innumerable delimitation possibilities.<sup>83</sup> Given the magnitude and complexity of the undertaking, I shall not attempt to present in this work a schema for the world as a whole. Rather, by way of illustration, I indicate in Map 4 what a set of electoral fields for the Americas might look like if the recommended system of unweighted voting in a 1,000-seat WPA were in place today.

Map 4 shows a total of 19 electoral fields, with populations ranging from roughly 29 million to 70 million people and with four to ten seats per field. Three countries would consist of multiple fields: six are here proposed for the United States, four for Brazil and two for Mexico. (Other configurations, however, would also be possible.) Additional details on the suggested composition of each region are provided in Appendix V. Of note are the figures indicating the average number of constituents per parliamentary seat in each field. These range from a minimum of 6.40 million (93.6% the world average) to a maximum of 7.35 million (107.5% the world average); but most of the deviations from the 6.8 million global mean are substantially smaller.

A few countries, namely Colombia, Venezuela and Canada, could constitute fields in their own right. But, in the case of Canada, a possible radical alternative to the situation illustrated would be to create a nine-seat, non-contiguous field including not only that country, but also Australia and New Zealand and well over a dozen microstates and dependencies of Oceania, many of which are under some form of benign Australian or New Zealand tutelage. This field, which one might designate as the "Westminster League," is comprised of territories almost all of which are parliamentary democracies

<sup>83</sup> This is evident from the widely varying, but generally highly politicized, delimitation exercises indulged in by state legislatures in respect to reorganizing US Congressional districts in the wake of each decennial census. The Electoral Commission should learn from these and other dubious practices and design a default system less prone to electoral abuse.



Map 4. Model C: Hypothetical Apportionment of Seats for the Americas in Proposed 1,000-seat Parliamentary Assembly, by Electoral Fields

and a substantial majority of which use English as an official language.<sup>84</sup> Additionally Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which would account for more than 90% of the League's population, have a similar range of parties and broadly similar histories and cultures. In the event of a decision not to establish the Westminster League, the most promising alternative would be to constitute the whole of Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and the smaller Pacific islands) as a four-seat field in and of itself, while maintaining Canada, as mapped, as a single five-seat field.

Another type of situation arises in dealing with neighboring sets of countries none of which has sufficient population to have an electoral field of its own (i.e., enough inhabitants to warrant at least four seats). The Caribbean region and Central America, each with six seats, are prime examples of this situation.

While Argentina and Peru could each individually meet the four-seat threshold, their neighbors—Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay in the case of Argentina, and Bolivia and Ecuador in the case of Peru—could not. Hence, the proposed groupings designated on Map 4 as the Southern Cone and the Central Andes. But, once again, other configurations are conceivable.

Finally, we must note again that in Stage Three all dependent territories would be incorporated into the system. The few remaining dependencies in the West Indies, as well as Bermuda and French Guiana would be included in the Caribbean field. Greenland would best be assigned to a proposed Nordic European field because of its long-standing and strong ties to Denmark. The Anglophone Falkland Islands would be included with the field for the United Kingdom; and the Francophone islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon would be included in the field for France.<sup>85</sup>

Although I have not had the temerity to present in this monograph a map of electoral fields for the world as a whole. I have conducted the exercise of making such a map—albeit crudely—for my own edification. In doing so, I derived a total of 145 fields. Of these, 86 fields were in Asia (31 in China. 23 in India. and 32 in other countries. exclusive of the Asian portion of Russia). Another 23 were in Africa. The Americas, as shown on Map 4, accounted for 19 fields. Europe (including the whole of Russia) had 16. And Oceania, as

<sup>84</sup> I have also proposed the establishment of the Westminster League in a number of papers on reform of the UN Security Council, the most important of which is Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "Universal Regional Representation as a Basis for Security Council Reform," presented at the Twentieth Anniversary Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center, City University of New York, 6-8 June 2007, 29 pages.

<sup>85</sup> Although I did not do so, there was no reason in principle why all of the world's dependent territories could not have been combined with compatible independent states in Stage Two of the UNPA's evolution.

discussed above, had but one, with only four seats. In delimiting these fields, I seldom found it necessary to divide first-order political divisions (states, provinces, Länder, etc.) to derive areas that met the four- to ten-seat requirement; and in no case did I have to delimit a field whose population deviated by as much as 10% from the mean population per seat of 6.8 million.

## 12

# Conclusions

This essay has sought to demonstrate that creating a World Parliamentary Assembly—whether or not attached to the UN—would be a feasible, even if difficult, undertaking and also that there are multiple ways of attaining such a goal. My own preference is for an Assembly evolving along a path similar to that followed by the Parliament of the European Union and then going somewhat further towards the one person - one vote ideal, transcending existing international borders.<sup>86</sup>

My preferred approach, however, does not imply rejection of the valuable perspectives of those who endorse other proposals of which I am aware. The constructive role of the IPU can and should be continued and that body could—if it so chose—do much to help mentor the WPA during its formative period. Legislators and other forward-thinking activists engaged in the innovative e-Parliament experiment will also have much to contribute in establishing a workable communications infrastructure within the WPA. Strong civil society advocacy of a people's assembly *outside* the UN would continue to lend credibility to the notion that *some* form of assembly is widely regarded as necessary.

In this work I have gone into considerable detail in discussing what the WPA would require at various stages in its development because many advocates of a global assembly suppose—naively in my opinion—that, once the logic of popular representation at the global level is widely accepted, everything else will fall easily into place. Hence, they cavalierly ignore the many practical problems that creating such an institution would entail (establishing an Electoral Commission. devising rules of fairness. agreeing upon electoral modalities. forming a WPA committee system. etc.). Other commentators will concede that the idea may be a good one in theory, but will

<sup>86</sup> Two very useful tables in this regard are provided in Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System*, Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994 (*Development Dialogue*, 1994:1), pp. 178-179. These tables compare the European Experience with what might eventuate in the creation of a WPA: "Development of a UN Parliamentary Assembly," p. 178; and "Functioning of a UN Parliamentary Assembly in Relation to the Existing UN Structure," p. 179.

then incorrectly assert that the act of creation will be too complex, costly and politically sensitive to implement. In the absence of concrete blueprints, advocacy of a WPA will continue to be derided by skeptics as hopelessly utopian.

What this work has not yet adequately demonstrated, one might argue, is that the creation and maintenance of a WPA would be worth the economic costs involved. While one, obviously, cannot quantify the likely benefits of a WPA in monetary terms, I have provided evidence that the answer to the question of its worth is an unequivocal “Yes.” At the same time, I would acknowledge that it could take a number of years before the anticipated benefits became widely apparent.

Our increasingly interdependent world can no longer function without an effective UN system. But, for a variety of reasons—mainly related to the obsolescent mindsets and dubious diplomatic practices of a world still guided mainly by Realpolitik—a large proportion of the human family has lost faith in the UN. People question, with good reason, the organization’s seeming subservience to the will of the great powers (especially those on the anachronistically constituted Security Council), its hypocritical double standards, and its all-too-frequent failure to back noble-sounding rhetoric with concrete action.

Many observers also find fault with the UN’s glaring democratic deficit and its attendant lack of transparency and accountability. A democratically constituted WPA will go far toward correcting these deficiencies and would do much to promote more legitimate, transparent, representative, accountable and responsive governance at the national, as well as at the international, level. With a WPA and other needed reforms in place, we can expect a world in which people from one country will be much more inclined to listen to and learn from others with a different nationality, in which states will be much less prone to armed conflict, and in which a revitalized UN will be better able to focus on meeting the economic and social needs of all of the world’s inhabitants. Providing the diverse strands of humankind, in whose interests the UN was founded, with a meaningful voice in making the decisions that will shape their destiny will do more to legitimize the global organization than any other reform that I can think of.

## — Appendices —

I. Population of UN Member Nations. 2010. and Guide to Their Locations in Appendices II to V. ....	98
II. Model A: Apportionment of Seats in a Hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly Whose Members Are Selected by Their Respective National Governments.....	103
III. Model B.1: Apportionment of Seats in Excess of One per Nation in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected 1,000-seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members of Parliament Cast Equal Votes and in Which Constituencies Are Delimited within Individual Nations.....	111
IV. Model B.2: Apportionment of Seats and Determination of Weighted Votes in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Constituencies Are Delimited within Individual Nations. ....	115
V. Model C: Composition of Proposed Electoral Fields in the Americas and Apportionment of Seats per Field in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected 1,000-seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which the Average Number of Constituents per Seat is More or Less Equal in Each Electoral Field.....	121

### **Assumptions:**

1. In all appendices it is assumed that the World Parliamentary Assembly would have been functioning in the year 2010 and that all 192 members of the UN as of that date would have acceded to that Assembly.
2. In Appendix II it is assumed that all contributions to the regular UN budget would have been paid in direct proportion to the 2009 GNI of the respective UN member nations at the rate of 0.1%.

### **Sources:**

National population and GNI data are from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year. 2011*; state population data for Brazil, Mexico and the United States in Appendix V are from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year 2012*.

## Appendix I. Population of UN Member Nations, 2010, and Guide to Their Location on Appendices II to V.

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Line No. on Appendix II, Model A	Cell No. on Appendix III, Model B.1	Line No. on Appendix IV, Model B.2	Cell No./Nos. on Appendix V, Model Cf
a	b	c	d	e	f
Afghanistan	26.290	63	5	45	
Albania	3.205	134	1	131	
Algeria	35.866	41	6	35	
Andorra	83	173	1		
Angola	18.993	67	4	58	
Antigua & Barbuda	90	178	1		7
Argentina	40.666	31	6	33	12
Armenia	3.090	137	1	133	
Australia	22.403	20	4	51	
Austria	8.382	40	3	91	
Azerbaijan	9.063	93	3	88	
Bahamas, The	347	160	1		7
Bahrain	1.216	143	1	151	
Bangladesh	158.066	17	16	8	
Barbados	276	169	1		
Belarus	9.457	86	3	85	
Belgium	10.868	34	3	75	
Belize	345	172	1		7
Benin	9.050	104	3	89	
Bhutan	721	163	1		
Bolivia	9.947	99	3	82	9
Bosnia & Herzegovina	3.859	126	2	125	
Botswana	2.029	144	1	141	
Brazil	193.253	7	18	5	1 - 4
Brunei	414	156	1		
Bulgaria	7.562	96	2	94	
Burkina Faso	16.287	80	3	62	
Burundi	8.519	108	3	90	
Cambodia	14.414	88	3	66	
Cameroon	19.640	75	4	57	
Canada	34.132	15	5	36	5
Cape Verde	509	168	1		
Central African Rep.	4.845	132	2	116	
Chad	11.594	97	3	72	
Chile	16.746	55	3	59	12
China	1,345.672	2	22	1	

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Line No. on Appendix II, Model A	Cell No. on Appendix III, Model B.1	Line No. on Appendix IV, Model B.2	Cell No./Nos. on Appendix V, Model Cf
a	b	c	d	e	f
Colombia	44.205	32	6	29	6
Comoros	691	167	1		
Congo, Dem.R. of the	67.827	33	9	19	
Congo, Rep. of	3.936	131	2	124	
Costa Rica	4.516	114	2	117	8
Côte d'Ivoire	21.059	73	4	54	
Croatia	4.426	100	2	119	
Cuba	11.239	81	3	74	7
Cyprus	1.085	141	1	153	
Czech Republic	10.526	57	3	77	
Denmark	5.546	48	2	107	
Djibouti	833	162	1		
Dominica	72	187	1		7
Dominican Republic	9.864	90	3	83	7
Ecuador	14.219	77	3	68	9
Egypt	84.474	24	11	14	
El Salvador	6.052	110	2	103	8
Equatorial Guinea	651	155	1		
Eritrea	5.224	130	2	110	
Estonia	1.348	142	1	148	
Ethiopia	79.456	29	10	16	
Fiji	844	158	1		
Finland	5.364	56	2	109	
France	62.762	6	9	21	
Gabon	1.501	148	1	146	
Gambia, The	1.751	152	1	143	
Georgia	4.356	128	2	121	
Germany	81.644	5	11	15	
Ghana	24.340	69	4	47	
Greece	11.329	45	3	73	
Grenada	108	181	1		7
Guatemala	14.377	78	3	67	8
Guinea	10.324	102	3	79	
Guinea-Bissau	1.593	153	1	145	
Guyana	748	164	1		7
Haiti	9.649	103	3	84	7
Honduras	7.616	106	2	93	8
Hungary	10.005	72	3	81	
Iceland	317	151	1		

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Line No. on Appendix II, Model A	Cell No. on Appendix III, Model B.1	Line No. on Appendix IV, Model B.2	Cell No./Nos. on Appendix V, Model Cf
a	b	c	d	e	f
India	1,173.108	3	21	2	
Indonesia	232.517	11	19	4	
Iran	73.887	22	10	17	
Iraq	31.467	52	5	39	
Ireland	4.451	64	2	118	
Israel	7.302	60	2	95	
Italy	60.487	9	8	23	
Jamaica	2.702	136	1	136	7
Japan	127.320	4	14	10	
Jordan	6.046	109	2	104	
Kazakhstan	16.310	61	3	61	
Kenya	40.863	46	6	32	
Kiribati	99	186	1		
Korea, Dem. Rep. of	24.247	65	4	48	
Korea, Rep. of	49.169	18	7	26	
Kuwait	3.529	82	2	127	
Kyrgyzstan	5.141	127	2	112	
Laos	6.258	122	2	101	
Latvia	2.238	129	1	137	
Lebanon	4.125	112	2	122	
Lesotho	1.920	150	1	142	
Liberia	3.763	139	2	126	
Libya	6.546	89	2	99	
Liechtenstein	36	171	1		
Lithuania	3.297	115	1	130	
Luxembourg	506	133	1		
Macedonia	2.051	147	1	139	
Madagascar	20.146	76	4	56	
Malawi	15.448	85	3	64	
Malaysia	28.275	43	5	43	
Maldives	320	174	1		
Mali	15.022	84	3	65	
Malta	413	159	1		
Marshall Islands	54	190	1		
Mauritania	3.205	140	1	132	
Mauritius	1.282	149	1	150	
Mexico	108.396	12	13	11	10 - 11
Micronesia	111	185	1		
Moldova	3.941	135	2	123	

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Line No. on Appendix II, Model A	Cell No. on Appendix III, Model B.1	Line No. on Appendix IV, Model B.2	Cell No./Nos. on Appendix V, Model Cf
a	b	c	d	e	f
Monaco	35	166	1		
Mongolia	2.763	146	1	135	
Montenegro	633	161	1		
Morocco	31.627	51	5	38	
Mozambique	22.426	74	4	50	
Myanmar (Burma)	53.414	39	7	24	
Namibia	2.212	145	1	138	
Nauru	9	189	1		
Nepal	28.952	59	5	42	
Netherlands, The	16.602	23	3	60	
New Zealand	4.367	79	2	120	
Nicaragua	5.822	123	2	106	8
Niger	15.678	83	3	63	
Nigeria	158.259	16	16	7	
Norway	4.888	42	2	115	
Oman	2.968	107	1	134	
Pakistan	184.405	14	17	6	
Palau	21	191	1		
Panama	3.328	125	1	129	8
Papua New Guinea	6.065	119	2	102	
Paraguay	6.376	111	2	100	12
Peru	29.244	49	5	40	9
Philippines	93.617	21	12	12	
Poland	38.183	27	6	34	
Portugal	10.643	53	3	76	
Qatar	1.697	113	1	144	
Romania	21.444	50	4	53	
Russia	141.892	10	15	9	
Rwanda	10.277	101	3	80	
Samoa	183	177	1		
San Marino	31	179	1		
São Tomé & Príncipe	176	180	1		
Saudi Arabia	25.732	30	4	46	
Senegal	12.323	94	3	71	
Serbia	7.293	98	2	96	
Seychelles	88	183	1		
Sierra Leone	5.836	124	2	105	
Singapore	5.093	66	2	113	
Slovakia	5.431	87	2	108	

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Line No. on Appendix II, Model A	Cell No. on Appendix III, Model B.1	Line No. on Appendix IV, Model B.2	Cell No./Nos. on Appendix V, Model Cf
a	b	c	d	e	f
Slovenia	2.051	117	1	140	
Solomon Islands	536	170	1		
Somalia	9.359	105	3	87	
South Africa	49.991	28	7	25	
Spain	46.508	13	7	27	
Sri Lanka	20.410	71	4	55	
St. Kitts & Nevis	50	188	1		7
St. Lucia	174	176	1		7
St. Vin. & Grenadines	101	182	1		7
Sudan. The	43.940	44	6	30	
Suriname	524	165	1		7
Swaziland	1.354	154	1	147	
Sweden	9.380	36	3	86	
Switzerland	7.807	38	2	92	
Syria	22.141	62	4	52	
Tajikistan	7.075	116	2	97	
Tanzania	41.893	47	6	31	
Thailand	67.090	26	9	20	
Timor-Leste	1.143	157	1	152	
Togo	6.587	121	2	98	
Tonga	103	184	1		
Trinidad & Tobago	1.312	138	1	149	7
Tunisia	10.374	92	3	78	
Turkey	73.085	19	10	18	
Turkmenistan	4.941	120	2	114	
Tuvalu	11	192	1		
Uganda	33.793	54	5	37	
Ukraine	45.858	37	7	28	
United Arab Emirates	5.188	70	2	111	
United Kingdom	62.227	8	8	22	
United States	310.062	1	20	3	13 - 18
Uruguay	3.372	118	1	128	12
Uzbekistan	27.866	58	5	44	
Vanuatu	251	175	1		
Venezuela	29.094	35	5	41	19
Vietnam	87.117	25	11	13	
Yemen	23.494	68	4	49	
Zambia	13.460	91	3	69	
Zimbabwe	12.644	95	3	70	

## Appendix II. Model A: Allocation of Seats in Hypothetical World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Parliamentarians Are Selected by the Governments of UN Member Nations

### Notes:

1. Percentages in columns c, e, and f relate to total for all UN members as of 2010.
2. Assuming that all nations contribute at the rate of 0.1% of their GNI.
3. Determined by the formula:  $W = (P + C + M) / 3$ , in which W = weight, P = population (as per column c), C = contributions to UN budget (as per column e), and M = equal UN membership (as per column f).
4. National weight (W) divided by lowest common denominator (D), 0.174 (the weight of Tuvalu).
5. Weight rounded to nearest integer.

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	
1 United States	310.062	4.558	14,502.60	24.728	0.5208	9.936	57.102	57	5.440	
2 China	1,345.672	19.783	5,053.10	8.616	0.5208	9.640	55.402	55	24.467	
3 India	1,173.108	17.246	1,368.70	2.334	0.5208	6.700	38.507	39	30.080	
4 Japan	127.320	1.872	4,830.30	8.236	0.5208	3.543	20.361	20	6.366	
5 Germany	81.644	1.200	3,484.70	5.942	0.5208	2.554	14.680	15	5.443	
6 France	62.762	0.923	2,754.60	4.697	0.5208	2.047	11.763	12	5.230	
7 Brazil	193.253	2.841	1,557.20	2.655	0.5208	2.006	11.527	12	16.104	
8 United Kingdom	62.227	0.915	2,567.50	4.378	0.5208	1.938	11.137	11	5.657	
9 Italy	60.487	0.889	2,112.50	3.602	0.5208	1.671	9.602	10	6.049	
11 Indonesia	232.517	3.418	513.40	0.875	0.5208	1.605	9.223	9	25.835	
10 Russia	141.892	2.086	1,329.70	2.267	0.5208	1.625	9.337	9	15.766	
12 Mexico	108.396	1.594	958.80	1.635	0.5208	1.250	7.182	7	15.485	
13 Spain	46.508	0.684	1,464.70	2.497	0.5208	1.234	7.092	7	6.644	
14 Pakistan	184.405	2.711	172.90	0.295	0.5208	1.176	6.756	7	26.344	
15 Canada	34.132	0.502	1,423.00	2.426	0.5208	1.150	6.607	7	4.876	
16 Nigeria	158.259	2.327	175.80	0.300	0.5208	1.049	6.029	6	26.377	

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	
17	Bangladesh	158.066	2.324	95.40	0.163	0.5208	1.002	5.761	6	26.344
18	Korea, Rep. of	49.169	0.723	966.60	1.648	0.5208	0.964	5.540	6	8.195
19	Turkey	73.085	1.074	653.10	1.114	0.5208	0.903	5.189	5	14.617
20	Australia	22.403	0.329	957.50	1.633	0.5208	0.828	4.756	5	4.481
21	Philippines	93.617	1.376	164.50	0.280	0.5208	0.726	4.172	4	23.404
22	Iran	73.887	1.086	330.60	0.564	0.5208	0.724	4.159	4	18.472
23	Netherlands, The	16.602	0.244	815.80	1.391	0.5208	0.719	4.130	4	4.151
24	Egypt	84.474	1.242	172.00	0.293	0.5208	0.685	3.939	4	21.119
25	Vietnam	87.117	1.281	88.00	0.150	0.5208	0.651	3.739	4	21.779
26	Thailand	67.090	0.986	254.70	0.434	0.5208	0.647	3.719	4	16.773
27	Poland	38.183	0.561	467.50	0.797	0.5208	0.626	3.600	4	9.546
28	South Africa	49.991	0.735	284.50	0.485	0.5208	0.580	3.335	3	16.664
29	Ethiopia	79.456	1.168	27.00	0.046	0.5208	0.578	3.324	3	26.485
30	Saudi Arabia	25.732	0.378	439.00	0.749	0.5208	0.549	3.156	3	8.577
31	Argentina	40.666	0.598	304.70	0.520	0.5208	0.546	3.138	3	13.555
32	Colombia	44.205	0.650	225.20	0.384	0.5208	0.518	2.978	3	14.735
33	Congo, Dem. Rep. of	67.827	0.997	6.70	0.011	0.5208	0.510	2.930	3	22.609
34	Belgium	10.868	0.160	488.80	0.833	0.5208	0.505	2.900	3	3.623
35	Venezuela	29.094	0.428	288.10	0.491	0.5208	0.480	2.758	3	9.698
36	Sweden	9.380	0.138	455.20	0.776	0.5208	0.478	2.749	3	3.127
37	Ukraine	45.858	0.674	128.80	0.220	0.5208	0.472	2.710	3	15.286
38	Switzerland	7.807	0.115	431.10	0.735	0.5208	0.457	2.626	3	2.602
39	Myanmar (Burma)	53.414	0.785	13.60	0.023	0.5208	0.443	2.546	3	17.805
40	Austria	8.382	0.123	391.80	0.668	0.5208	0.437	2.514	3	2.794
41	Algeria	35.866	0.527	154.20	0.263	0.5208	0.437	2.512	3	11.955
42	Norway	4.888	0.072	417.30	0.712	0.5208	0.435	2.499	3	1.629
43	Malaysia	28.275	0.416	198.70	0.339	0.5208	0.425	2.443	2	14.138
44	Sudan, The	43.940	0.646	51.60	0.088	0.5208	0.418	2.404	2	21.970

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
45 Greece	11.329	0.167	323.10	0.551	0.5208	0.413	2.372	2	5.665
46 Kenya	40.863	0.601	30.70	0.052	0.5208	0.391	2.249	2	20.432
47 Tanzania	41.893	0.616	21.30	0.036	0.5208	0.391	2.247	2	20.947
48 Denmark	5.546	0.082	325.80	0.556	0.5208	0.386	2.218	2	2.773
49 Peru	29.244	0.430	120.90	0.206	0.5208	0.386	2.216	2	14.622
50 Romania	21.444	0.315	178.90	0.305	0.5208	0.380	2.186	2	10.722
51 Morocco	31.627	0.465	90.70	0.155	0.5208	0.380	2.185	2	15.814
52 Iraq	31.467	0.463	69.70	0.119	0.5208	0.367	2.112	2	15.734
53 Portugal	10.643	0.156	222.60	0.380	0.5208	0.352	2.025	2	5.322
54 Uganda	33.793	0.497	15.00	0.026	0.5208	0.348	1.998	2	16.897
55 Chile	16.746	0.246	159.90	0.273	0.5208	0.347	1.992	2	8.373
56 Finland	5.364	0.079	243.90	0.416	0.5208	0.339	1.946	2	2.682
57 Czech Republic	10.526	0.155	181.50	0.309	0.5208	0.328	1.887	2	5.263
58 Uzbekistan	27.866	0.410	30.50	0.052	0.5208	0.328	1.882	2	13.933
59 Nepal	28.952	0.426	13.00	0.022	0.5208	0.323	1.856	2	14.476
60 Israel	7.302	0.107	191.60	0.327	0.5208	0.318	1.829	2	3.651
61 Kazakhstan	16.310	0.240	107.10	0.183	0.5208	0.314	1.807	2	8.155
62 Syria	22.141	0.325	50.90	0.087	0.5208	0.311	1.788	2	11.071
63 Afghanistan	26.290	0.386	10.60	0.018	0.5208	0.308	1.773	2	13.145
64 Ireland	4.451	0.065	197.20	0.336	0.5208	0.308	1.767	2	2.226
65 Korea, Dem. Rep. of	24.247	0.356	25.60	0.044	0.5208	0.307	1.764	2	12.124
66 Singapore	5.093	0.075	185.70	0.317	0.5208	0.304	1.748	2	2.547
67 Angola	18.993	0.279	64.50	0.110	0.5208	0.303	1.743	2	9.497
68 Yemen	23.494	0.345	25.00	0.043	0.5208	0.303	1.741	2	11.747
69 Ghana	24.340	0.358	16.60	0.028	0.5208	0.302	1.737	2	12.170
70 United Arab Emirates	5.188	0.076	174.50	0.298	0.5208	0.298	1.714	2	2.594
71 Sri Lanka	20.410	0.300	40.40	0.069	0.5208	0.297	1.705	2	10.205
72 Hungary	10.005	0.147	130.10	0.222	0.5208	0.297	1.705	2	5.003

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
73	Côte d'Ivoire	21.059	22.40	0.038	0.5208	0.290	1.664	2	10.530
74	Mozambique	22.426	10.00	0.017	0.5208	0.289	1.662	2	11.213
75	Cameroon	19.640	22.80	0.039	0.5208	0.283	1.625	2	9.820
76	Madagascar	20.146	7.90	0.013	0.5208	0.277	1.591	2	10.073
77	Ecuador	14.219	53.40	0.091	0.5208	0.274	1.573	2	7.110
78	Guatemala	14.377	36.80	0.063	0.5208	0.265	1.523	2	7.189
79	New Zealand	4.367	114.50	0.195	0.5208	0.260	1.495	1	4.367
80	Burkina Faso	16.287	8.00	0.014	0.5208	0.258	1.483	1	16.287
81	Cuba	11.239	51.50	0.088	0.5208	0.258	1.483	1	11.239
82	Kuwait	3.529	117.00	0.199	0.5208	0.257	1.479	1	3.529
83	Niger	15.678	5.20	0.009	0.5208	0.253	1.456	1	15.678
84	Mali	15.022	8.90	0.015	0.5208	0.252	1.450	1	15.022
85	Malawi	15.448	4.20	0.007	0.5208	0.252	1.447	1	15.448
86	Belarus	9.457	53.50	0.091	0.5208	0.250	1.439	1	9.457
87	Slovakia	5.431	87.40	0.149	0.5208	0.250	1.436	1	5.431
88	Cambodia	14.414	9.70	0.017	0.5208	0.250	1.435	1	14.414
89	Libya	6.546	77.20	0.132	0.5208	0.250	1.434	1	6.546
90	Dominican Republic	9.864	45.50	0.078	0.5208	0.248	1.424	1	9.864
91	Zambia	13.460	12.60	0.021	0.5208	0.247	1.418	1	13.460
92	Tunisia	10.374	38.80	0.066	0.5208	0.247	1.417	1	10.374
93	Azerbaijan	9.063	42.50	0.072	0.5208	0.242	1.392	1	9.063
94	Senegal	12.323	12.90	0.022	0.5208	0.241	1.387	1	12.323
95	Zimbabwe	12.644	1.70	0.003	0.5208	0.237	1.359	1	12.644
96	Bulgaria	7.562	43.70	0.075	0.5208	0.236	1.353	1	7.562
97	Chad	11.594	6.90	0.012	0.5208	0.234	1.347	1	11.594
98	Serbia	7.293	43.80	0.075	0.5208	0.234	1.346	1	7.293
99	Bolivia	9.947	16.00	0.027	0.5208	0.231	1.330	1	9.947
100	Croatia	4.426	61.20	0.104	0.5208	0.230	1.322	1	4.426

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	
101	Rwanda	10.277	0.151	4.60	0.008	0.5208	0.227	1.302	1	10.277
102	Guinea	10.324	0.152	3.80	0.006	0.5208	0.226	1.301	1	10.324
103	Haiti	9.649	0.142	4.60	0.008	0.5208	0.224	1.285	1	9.649
104	Benin	9.050	0.133	6.70	0.011	0.5208	0.222	1.275	1	9.050
105	Somalia	9.359	0.138	2.30	0.004	0.5208	0.221	1.269	1	9.359
106	Honduras	7.616	0.112	13.60	0.023	0.5208	0.219	1.257	1	7.616
107	Oman	2.968	0.044	49.80	0.085	0.5208	0.216	1.244	1	2.968
108	Burundi	8.519	0.125	1.20	0.002	0.5208	0.216	1.242	1	8.519
109	Jordan	6.046	0.089	22.30	0.038	0.5208	0.216	1.241	1	6.046
110	El Salvador	6.052	0.089	20.80	0.035	0.5208	0.215	1.236	1	6.052
111	Paraguay	6.376	0.094	14.40	0.025	0.5208	0.213	1.224	1	6.376
112	Lebanon	4.125	0.061	33.60	0.057	0.5208	0.213	1.224	1	4.125
113	Qatar	1.697	0.025	54.30	0.093	0.5208	0.213	1.223	1	1.697
114	Costa Rica	4.516	0.066	28.50	0.049	0.5208	0.212	1.218	1	4.516
115	Lithuania	3.297	0.048	38.10	0.065	0.5208	0.211	1.215	1	3.297
116	Tajikistan	7.075	0.104	4.80	0.008	0.5208	0.211	1.213	1	7.075
117	Slovenia	2.051	0.030	48.10	0.082	0.5208	0.211	1.213	1	2.051
118	Uruguay	3.372	0.050	31.30	0.053	0.5208	0.208	1.195	1	3.372
119	Papua New Guinea	6.065	0.089	7.90	0.013	0.5208	0.208	1.194	1	6.065
120	Turkmenistan	4.941	0.073	17.50	0.030	0.5208	0.208	1.194	1	4.941
121	Togo	6.587	0.097	2.90	0.005	0.5208	0.208	1.193	1	6.587
122	Laos	6.258	0.092	5.60	0.010	0.5208	0.207	1.192	1	6.258
123	Nicaragua	5.822	0.086	5.80	0.010	0.5208	0.205	1.181	1	5.822
124	Sierra Leone	5.836	0.086	1.90	0.003	0.5208	0.203	1.168	1	5.836
125	Panama	3.328	0.049	23.20	0.040	0.5208	0.203	1.167	1	3.328
126	Bosnia & Herzegovina	3.859	0.057	17.70	0.030	0.5208	0.203	1.164	1	3.859
127	Kyrgyzstan	5.141	0.076	4.60	0.008	0.5208	0.201	1.158	1	5.141
128	Georgia	4.356	0.064	11.10	0.019	0.5208	0.201	1.157	1	4.356

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	
129	Latvia	2.238	0.033	27.90	0.048	0.5208	0.200	1.152	1	2.238
130	Eritrea	5.224	0.077	1.50	0.003	0.5208	0.200	1.150	1	5.224
131	Congo, Rep. Of	3.936	0.058	10.70	0.018	0.5208	0.199	1.144	1	3.936
132	Central African Rep.	4.845	0.071	2.00	0.003	0.5208	0.198	1.141	1	4.845
133	Luxembourg	506	0.007	37.10	0.063	0.5208	0.197	1.133	1	0.506
134	Albania	3.205	0.047	12.50	0.021	0.5208	0.196	1.129	1	3.205
135	Moldova	3.941	0.058	5.70	0.010	0.5208	0.196	1.127	1	3.941
136	Jamaica	2.702	0.040	13.50	0.023	0.5208	0.195	1.118	1	2.702
137	Armenia	3.090	0.045	9.50	0.016	0.5208	0.194	1.116	1	3.090
138	Trinidad & Tobago	1.312	0.019	22.10	0.038	0.5208	0.193	1.107	1	1.312
139	Liberia	3.763	0.055	0.60	0.001	0.5208	0.192	1.106	1	3.763
140	Mauritania	3.205	0.047	3.20	0.005	0.5208	0.191	1.098	1	3.205
141	Cyprus	1.085	0.016	21.40	0.036	0.5208	0.191	1.098	1	1.085
142	Estonia	1.348	0.020	18.80	0.032	0.5208	0.191	1.097	1	1.348
143	Bahrain	1.216	0.018	19.70	0.034	0.5208	0.191	1.096	1	1.216
144	Botswana	2.029	0.030	12.20	0.021	0.5208	0.190	1.095	1	2.029
145	Namibia	2.212	0.033	9.30	0.016	0.5208	0.190	1.090	1	2.212
146	Mongolia	2.763	0.041	4.40	0.008	0.5208	0.190	1.090	1	2.763
147	Macedonia	2.051	0.030	9.00	0.015	0.5208	0.189	1.085	1	2.051
148	Gabon	1.501	0.022	10.90	0.019	0.5208	0.187	1.076	1	1.501
149	Mauritius	1.282	0.019	9.20	0.016	0.5208	0.185	1.064	1	1.282
150	Lesotho	1.920	0.028	2.10	0.004	0.5208	0.184	1.059	1	1.920
151	Iceland	317	0.005	13.80	0.024	0.5208	0.183	1.052	1	0.317
152	Gambia, The	1.751	0.026	0.70	0.001	0.5208	0.183	1.049	1	1.751
153	Guinea-Bissau	1.593	0.023	0.80	0.001	0.5208	0.182	1.045	1	1.593
154	Swaziland	1.354	0.020	2.80	0.005	0.5208	0.182	1.045	1	1.354
155	Equatorial Guinea	651	0.010	8.40	0.014	0.5208	0.182	1.044	1	0.651
156	Brunei	414	0.006	10.20	0.017	0.5208	0.181	1.043	1	0.414

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
157 Timor-Leste	1.143	0.017	2.70	0.005	0.5208	0.181	1.039	1	1.143
158 Fiji	844	0.012	3.40	0.006	0.5208	0.180	1.033	1	0.844
159 Malta	413	0.006	6.80	0.012	0.5208	0.179	1.032	1	0.413
160 Bahamas, The	347	0.005	7.10	0.012	0.5208	0.179	1.031	1	0.347
161 Montenegro	633	0.009	4.10	0.007	0.5208	0.179	1.029	1	0.633
162 Djibouti	833	0.012	1.10	0.002	0.5208	0.178	1.025	1	0.833
163 Bhutan	721	0.011	1.40	0.002	0.5208	0.178	1.023	1	0.721
164 Guyana	748	0.011	1.10	0.002	0.5208	0.178	1.022	1	0.748
165 Suriname	524	0.008	2.50	0.004	0.5208	0.178	1.021	1	0.524
166 Monaco	35	0.001	6.70	0.011	0.5208	0.178	1.021	1	0.035
167 Comoros	691	0.010	0.60	0.001	0.5208	0.177	1.019	1	0.691
168 Cape Verde	509	0.007	1.50	0.003	0.5208	0.177	1.017	1	0.509
169 Barbados	276	0.004	3.30	0.006	0.5208	0.177	1.016	1	0.276
170 Solomon Islands	536	0.008	0.50	0.001	0.5208	0.177	1.014	1	0.536
171 Liechtenstein	36	0.001	4.00	0.007	0.5208	0.176	1.012	1	0.036
172 Belize	345	0.005	1.20	0.002	0.5208	0.176	1.011	1	0.345
173 Andorra	83	0.001	3.40	0.006	0.5208	0.176	1.011	1	0.083
174 Maldives	320	0.005	1.20	0.002	0.5208	0.176	1.011	1	0.320
175 Vanuatu	251	0.004	0.60	0.001	0.5208	0.175	1.007	1	0.251
176 St. Lucia	174	0.003	0.90	0.002	0.5208	0.175	1.006	1	0.174
177 Samoa	183	0.003	0.50	0.001	0.5208	0.175	1.005	1	0.183
178 Antigua & Barbuda	90	0.001	1.10	0.002	0.5208	0.175	1.004	1	0.090
179 San Marino	31	0.000	1.60	0.003	0.5208	0.175	1.004	1	0.031
180 São Tomé & Príncipe	176	0.003	0.20	0.000	0.5208	0.175	1.003	1	0.176
181 Grenada	108	0.002	0.60	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.003	1	0.108
182 St. Vincent & Grenadines	101	0.001	0.60	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.003	1	0.101
183 Seychelles	88	0.001	0.70	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.003	1	0.088
184 Tonga	103	0.002	0.30	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.002	1	0.103

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Contributions 2009, \$US (billions) <sup>2</sup>	(%) <sup>1</sup>	Member- ship % <sup>1</sup>	National Weight <sup>3</sup>	W / D <sup>4</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>5</sup>	Constit- uents per Seat (millions)
a		b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
185	Micronesia	111	0.002	0.20	0.000	0.5208	0.174	1.002	1	0.111
186	Kiribati	99	0.001	0.20	0.000	0.5208	0.174	1.001	1	0.099
187	Dominica	72	0.001	0.40	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.001	1	0.072
188	St. Kitts & Nevis	50	0.001	0.50	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.001	1	0.050
189	Nauru	9	0.000	0.80	0.001	0.5208	0.174	1.001	1	0.009
190	Marshall Islands	54	0.001	0.20	0.000	0.5208	0.174	1.000	1	0.054
191	Palau	21	0.000	0.20	0.000	0.5208	0.174	0.999	1	0.021
192	Tuvalu	11	0.000	0.03	0.000	0.5208	0.174	0.998	1	0.011
<b>Totals</b>		6,802.173	100.000	58,648.03	100.000	100.000	100.000	575	564	12,060.590

### Appendix III. Model B.1: Apportionment of 808 Seats in Excess of One per Nation in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected 1,000-seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Members Cast Equal Votes and in Which Constituencies Are Delimited within Individual Nations

**Notes:**

1. Apportionment is determined iteratively by the formula  $Mn = (Pu / Sn) \times N$  in which Mn (column f) indicates the maximum population for a country with N seats (in a given cell), Pu is the total population of UN member nations as yet unallocated, and Su is the total number of seats as yet unallocated.
2. Within each cell nations are named in ascending order of population.

Country Group		Pu	Su	Pu / Su	N	Mn
		(unallocated population, millions)	(unallocated seats)	(millions)	(additional seats per nation)	col e x col.d (millions)
Cell	a	b	c	d	e	f
1	<b>Nations with population below 3.401 m., receiving no additional seats</b> Nauru, Tuvalu, Palau, San Marino, Monaco, Liechtenstein, St. Kitts & Nevis, Marshall Islands, Dominica, Andorra, Seychelles, Antigua & Barbuda, Kiribati, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Tonga, Grenada, Micronesia, St. Lucia, São Tomé & Príncipe, Samoa, Vanuatu, Barbados, Iceland, Maldives, Belize, The Bahamas, Malta, Brunei, Luxembourg, Cape Verde, Suriname, Solomon Islands, Montenegro, Equatorial Guinea, Comoros, Bhutan, Guyana, Djibouti, Fiji, Cyprus, Timor-Leste, Bahrain, Mauritius, Trinidad & Tobago, Swaziland, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Qatar, Gambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Macedonia, Slovenia, Namibia, Latvia, Jamaica, Mongolia, Oman, Armenia, Albania, Mauritania, Lithuania, Panama, Uruguay. (65 nations, 67.2 m. total population)					

Country Group						
Cell	a	Pu (unallocated population, millions)	Su (unallocated seats)	Pu / Su (millions)	N (additional seats per nation)	Mn col e x col.d (millions)
		b	c	d	e	f
2	Nations with 1 additional seat, population up to 8.335 m. Kuwait, Liberia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Rep. of the Congo, Moldova, Lebanon, Georgia, New Zealand, Croatia, Ireland, Costa Rica, Central African Republic, Norway, Turkmenistan, Singapore, Kyrgyzstan, United Arab Emirates, Eritrea, Finland, Slovakia, Denmark, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Jordan, El Salvador, Papua New Guinea, Laos, Paraguay, Libya, Togo, Tajikistan, Serbia, Israel, Bulgaria, Honduras, Switzerland (36 nations, 197.2 total population, 36 additional seats)	6,735.0	808	8.335	1	8,335
3	Nations with 2 additional seats, population up to 16.937 m. Austria, Burundi, Benin, Azerbaijan, Somalia, Sweden, Belarus, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Hungary, Rwanda, Guinea, Tunisia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Belgium, Cuba, Greece, Chad, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Cambodia, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Burkina Faso, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Chile (33 nations, 393.4 m. total poulation, 66 additional seats)	6,537.8	772	8.469	2	16,937
4	Nations with 3 additional seats, population up to 26.109 m. Angola, Cameroon, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Côte d'Ivoire, Romania, Syria, Australia, Mozambique, Yemen, Dem. Rep. of Korea, Ghana, Saudi Arabia (13 nations, 286.5 m. total population, 39 additional seats)	6,144.4	706	8.703	3	26,109
5	Nations with 4 additional seats, population up to 35.130 m. Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Nepal, Venezuela, Peru, Iraq, Morocco, Uganda, Canada (10 nations, 300.7 m. total population, 40 additional seats)	5,857.9	667	8.782	4	35,130

Cell	Country Group	Pu (unallocated population, millions)	Su (unallocated seats)	Pu / Su (millions)	N (additional seats per nation)	Mn col e x col.d (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	
6	<b>Nations with 5 additional seats, population up to 44.316 m.</b> Algeria, Poland, Argentina, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Colombia (7 nations, 285.6 m. total population, 35 additional seats)	5,557.2	627	8.863	5	44,316
7	<b>Nations with 6 additional seats, population up to 53.428 m.</b> Ukraine, Spain, Rep. of Korea, South Africa, Myanmar (5 nations, 244.9 m. total population, 30 additional seats)	5,271.6	592	8.905	6	53,428
8	<b>Nations with 7 additional seats, population up to 62.610 m.</b> Italy, United Kingdom, (2 nations, 122.7 m. total population, 14 additional seats)	5,026.7	562	8.944	7	62,610
9	<b>Nations with 8 additional seats, population up to 71.591 m.</b> France, Thailand, Dem. Rep of Congo (3 nations, 197.7 m. total population, 24 additional seats)	4,904.0	548	8.949	8	71,591
10	<b>Nations with 9 additional seats, population up to 80.833 m.</b> Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia (3 nations, 226.4 m. total population, 27 additional seats)	4,706.3	524	8.981	9	80,833
11	<b>Nations with 10 additional seats, pop. up to 90.139 m.</b> Germany, Egypt, Vietnam (3 nations, 253.2 m. total population, 30 additional seats)	4,479.9	497	9.014	10	90,139
12	<b>Nation with 11 additional seats, pop. below 99.558 m.</b> Philippine Islands (93.6 m. population, 11 additional seats)	4,226.7	467	9.051	11	99,558
13	<b>Nation with 12 additional seats, pop. below 108.766 m.</b> Mexico (108.3 m. population, 12 additional seats)	4,133.1	456	9.064	12	108,766

Country Group		Pu	Su	Pu / Su	N	Mn
Cell	a	(unallocated population, millions)	(unallocated seats)	(millions)	(additional seats per nation)	col e x col.d (millions)
14	Nation with 15 additional seats, pop. below 135.973 m. Japan (127.3 m. population, 15 additional seats)	4,024.8	444	9.065	15	135.973
15	Nation with 16 additional seats, pop. below 145.361 m. Russia (141.9 m. population, 16 additional seats)	3,897.5	429	9.085	16	145.361
16	Nations with 18 additional seats, pop. below 163.682 m. Bangladesh and Nigeria 2 nations (316.3 m. total population, 36 additional seats)	3,755.6	413	9.093	18	163.682
17	Nation with 21 additional seats, pop. below 191.579 m. Pakistan (184.4 m. population, 21 additional seats)	3,439.3	377	9.123	21	191.579
18	Nation with 22 additional seats, pop. below 210.146 m. Brazil (193.3 m. population, 22 additional seats)	3,254.9	356	9.143	22	201.146
19	Nation with 26 additional seats, pop. below 238.328 m. Indonesia (232.5 m. population, 26 additional seats)	3,061.6	334	9.166	26	238.328
20	Nation with 34 additional seats, pop. below 312.303 m. United States (310.1 m. population, 34 additional seats)	2,829.1	308	9.185	34	312.303
21	Nation with 128 add. seats, pop. below 1,176.759 m. India (1,173.1 m. population, 128 additional seats)	2,519.0	274	9.193	128	1.176.759
22	Nation with 146 add. seats, pop. below 1,345.900 m. China (1,345.6 m. population, 146 additional seats)	1,345.9	146	9.218	146	1.345.900

# **Appendix IV. Model B.2: Apportionment of Seats and Determinations of Weighted Votes in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected World Parliamentary Assembly in Which Constituencies Are Delimited within Individual Nations**

**Notes:**

1. Column d is column c rounded to the nearest integer.
2. Weights in column e are square roots of figures in column c.
3. Total votes in column f are weights in column e multiplied by number of seats in column d.

Nations		Population	Seat Determinant	Seats	Weight	Total	Population	Population
a		2010 (millions)	(SD): $\sqrt{\text{col. b}}$ (millions)	c	Determinant: (WD): $\sqrt{\text{SD}}$	Votes: SD x WD	per seat (millions)	per vote (millions)
		b		d	e	f	g	h
1	China	1,345.672	36.683	37	6.057	222.2	36.370	6.057
2	India	1,173.108	34.251	34	5.852	200.4	34.503	5.852
3	United States	310.062	17.609	18	4.196	73.9	17.226	4.196
4	Indonesia	232.517	15.249	15	3.905	59.5	15.501	3.905
5	Brazil	193.253	13.902	14	3.728	51.8	13.804	3.728
6	Pakistan	184.405	13.580	14	3.685	50.0	13.172	3.685
7	Nigeria	158.259	12.580	13	3.547	44.6	12.174	3.547
8	Bangladesh	158.066	12.572	13	3.546	44.6	12.159	3.546
9	Russia	141.892	11.912	12	3.451	41.1	11.824	3.451
10	Japan	127.320	11.284	11	3.359	37.9	11.575	3.359
11	Mexico	108.396	10.411	10	3.227	33.6	10.840	3.227
12	Philippines	93.617	9.676	10	3.111	30.1	9.362	3.111
13	Vietnam	87.117	9.334	9	3.055	28.5	9.680	3.055
14	Egypt	84.474	9.191	9	3.032	27.9	9.386	3.032
15	Germany	81.644	9.036	9	3.006	27.2	9.072	3.006
16	Ethiopia	79.456	8.914	9	2.986	26.6	8.828	2.986
17	Iran	73.887	8.596	9	2.932	25.2	8.210	2.932
18	Turkey	73.085	8.549	9	2.924	25.0	8.121	2.924

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	Seat Determinant (SD): $\sqrt{\text{col. b}}$ (millions)	Seats	Weight Determinant: (WD): $\sqrt{\text{SD}}$	Total Votes: SD x WD	Population per seat (millions)	Population per vote (millions)
a		b	c	d	e	f	g	h
19	Congo, Dem. Rep. of	67.827	8.236	8	2.870	23.6	8.478	2.870
20	Thailand	67.090	8.191	8	2.862	23.4	8.386	2.862
21	France	62.762	7.922	8	2.815	22.3	7.845	2.815
22	United Kingdom	62.227	7.888	8	2.809	22.2	7.778	2.809
23	Italy	60.487	7.777	8	2.789	21.7	7.561	2.789
24	Myanmar (Burma)	53.414	7.308	7	2.703	19.8	7.631	2.703
25	South Africa	49.991	7.070	7	2.659	18.8	7.142	2.659
26	Korea, Rep. of	49.169	7.012	7	2.648	18.6	7.024	2.648
27	Spain	46.508	6.820	7	2.611	17.8	6.644	2.611
28	Ukraine	45.858	6.772	7	2.602	17.6	6.551	2.602
29	Colombia	44.205	6.649	7	2.579	17.1	6.315	2.579
30	Sudan, The	43.940	6.629	7	2.575	17.1	6.277	2.575
31	Tanzania	41.893	6.472	6	2.544	16.5	6.982	2.544
32	Kenya	40.863	6.392	6	2.528	16.2	6.811	2.528
33	Argentina	40.666	6.377	6	2.525	16.1	6.778	2.525
34	Poland	38.183	6.179	6	2.486	15.4	6.364	2.486
35	Algeria	35.866	5.989	6	2.447	14.7	5.978	2.447
36	Canada	34.132	5.842	6	2.417	14.1	5.689	2.417
37	Uganda	33.793	5.813	6	2.411	14.0	5.632	2.411
38	Morocco	31.627	5.624	6	2.371	13.3	5.271	2.371
39	Iraq	31.467	5.610	6	2.368	13.3	5.245	2.368
40	Peru	29.244	5.408	5	2.325	12.6	5.849	2.325
41	Venezuela	29.094	5.394	5	2.322	12.5	5.819	2.322
42	Nepal	28.952	5.381	5	2.320	12.5	5.790	2.320
43	Malaysia	28.275	5.317	5	2.306	12.3	5.655	2.306
44	Uzbekistan	27.866	5.279	5	2.298	12.1	5.573	2.298
45	Afghanistan	26.290	5.127	5	2.264	11.6	5.258	2.264
46	Saudi Arabia	25.732	5.073	5	2.252	11.4	5.146	2.252
47	Ghana	24.340	4.934	5	2.221	11.0	4.868	2.221

	Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Seat Determinant (SD): $\sqrt{\text{col. b}}$ (millions)	Seats	Weight Determinant: (WD): $\sqrt{\text{SD}}$	Total Votes: SD x WD	Population per seat (millions)	Population per vote (millions)
a		b	c	d	e	f	g	h
48	Korea, Dem. Rep. of	24.247	4.924	5	2.219	10.9	4.849	2.219
49	Yemen	23.494	4.847	5	2.202	10.7	4.699	2.202
50	Mozambique	22.426	4.736	5	2.176	10.3	4.485	2.176
51	Australia	22.403	4.733	5	2.176	10.3	4.481	2.176
52	Syria	22.141	4.705	5	2.169	10.2	4.428	2.169
53	Romania	21.444	4.631	5	2.152	10.0	4.289	2.152
54	Côte d'Ivoire	21.059	4.589	5	2.142	9.8	4.212	2.142
55	Sri Lanka	20.410	4.518	5	2.125	9.6	4.082	2.125
56	Madagascar	20.146	4.488	4	2.119	9.5	5.037	2.119
57	Cameroon	19.640	4.432	4	2.105	9.3	4.910	2.105
58	Angola	18.993	4.358	4	2.088	9.1	4.748	2.088
59	Chile	16.746	4.092	4	2.023	8.3	4.187	2.023
60	Netherlands, The	16.602	4.075	4	2.019	8.2	4.151	2.019
61	Kazakhstan	16.310	4.039	4	2.010	8.1	4.078	2.010
62	Burkina Faso	16.287	4.036	4	2.009	8.1	4.072	2.009
63	Niger	15.678	3.960	4	1.990	7.9	3.920	1.990
64	Malawi	15.448	3.930	4	1.983	7.8	3.862	1.983
65	Mali	15.022	3.876	4	1.969	7.6	3.756	1.969
66	Cambodia	14.414	3.797	4	1.948	7.4	3.604	1.948
67	Guatemala	14.377	3.792	4	1.947	7.4	3.594	1.947
68	Ecuador	14.219	3.771	4	1.942	7.3	3.555	1.942
69	Zambia	13.460	3.669	4	1.915	7.0	3.365	1.915
70	Zimbabwe	12.644	3.556	4	1.886	6.7	3.161	1.886
71	Senegal	12.323	3.510	4	1.874	6.6	3.081	1.874
72	Chad	11.594	3.405	3	1.845	6.3	3.865	1.845
73	Greece	11.329	3.366	3	1.835	6.2	3.776	1.835
74	Cuba	11.239	3.352	3	1.831	6.1	3.746	1.831
75	Belgium	10.868	3.297	3	1.816	6.0	3.623	1.816
76	Portugal	10.643	3.262	3	1.806	5.9	3.548	1.806

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	Seat Determinant (SD): $\sqrt{\text{col. b}}$ (millions)	Seats	Weight Determinant: (WD): $\sqrt{\text{SD}}$	Total Votes: SD x WD	Population per seat (millions)	Population per vote (millions)
a		b	c	d	e	f	g	h
77	Czech Republic	10.526	3.244	3	1.801	5.8	3.509	1.801
78	Tunisia	10.374	3.221	3	1.795	5.8	3.458	1.795
79	Guinea	10.324	3.213	3	1.793	5.8	3.441	1.793
80	Rwanda	10.277	3.206	3	1.790	5.7	3.426	1.790
81	Hungary	10.005	3.163	3	1.779	5.6	3.335	1.779
82	Bolivia	9.947	3.154	3	1.776	5.6	3.316	1.776
83	Dominican Republic	9.864	3.141	3	1.772	5.6	3.288	1.772
84	Haiti	9.649	3.106	3	1.762	5.5	3.216	1.762
85	Belarus	9.457	3.075	3	1.754	5.4	3.152	1.754
86	Sweden	9.380	3.063	3	1.750	5.4	3.127	1.750
87	Somalia	9.359	3.059	3	1.749	5.4	3.120	1.749
88	Azerbaijan	9.063	3.010	3	1.735	5.2	3.021	1.735
89	Benin	9.050	3.008	3	1.734	5.2	3.017	1.734
90	Burundi	8.519	2.919	3	1.708	5.0	2.840	1.708
91	Austria	8.382	2.895	3	1.702	4.9	2.794	1.702
92	Switzerland	7.807	2.794	3	1.672	4.7	2.602	1.672
93	Honduras	7.616	2.760	3	1.661	4.6	2.539	1.661
94	Bulgaria	7.562	2.750	3	1.658	4.6	2.521	1.658
95	Israel	7.302	2.702	3	1.644	4.4	2.434	1.644
96	Serbia	7.293	2.701	3	1.643	4.4	2.431	1.643
97	Tajikistan	7.075	2.660	3	1.631	4.3	2.358	1.631
98	Togo	6.587	2.567	3	1.602	4.1	2.196	1.602
99	Libya	6.546	2.559	3	1.600	4.1	2.182	1.600
100	Paraguay	6.376	2.525	3	1.589	4.0	2.125	1.589
101	Laos	6.258	2.502	3	1.582	4.0	2.086	1.582
102	Papua New Guinea	6.065	2.463	2	1.569	3.9	3.033	1.569
103	El Salvador	6.052	2.460	2	1.568	3.9	3.026	1.568
104	Jordan	6.046	2.459	2	1.568	3.9	3.023	1.568
105	Sierra Leone	5.836	2.416	2	1.554	3.8	2.918	1.554

Nations		Population 2010 (millions)	Seat Determinant (SD): $\sqrt{\text{col. b}}$ (millions)	Seats	Weight Determinant: (WD): $\sqrt{\text{SD}}$	Total Votes: SD x WD	Population per seat (millions)	Population per vote (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	
106	Nicaragua	5.822	2.413	2	1.553	3.7	2.911	1.553
107	Denmark	5.546	2.355	2	1.535	3.6	2.773	1.535
108	Slovakia	5.431	2.330	2	1.527	3.6	2.716	1.527
109	Finland	5.364	2.316	2	1.522	3.5	2.682	1.522
110	Eritrea	5.224	2.286	2	1.512	3.5	2.612	1.512
111	United Arab Emirates	5.188	2.278	2	1.509	3.4	2.594	1.509
112	Kyrgyzstan	5.141	2.267	2	1.506	3.4	2.571	1.506
113	Singapore	5.093	2.257	2	1.502	3.4	2.547	1.502
114	Turkmenistan	4.941	2.223	2	1.491	3.3	2.471	1.491
115	Norway	4.888	2.211	2	1.487	3.3	2.444	1.487
116	Central African Republic	4.845	2.201	2	1.484	3.3	2.423	1.484
117	Costa Rica	4.516	2.125	2	1.458	3.1	2.258	1.458
118	Ireland	4.451	2.110	2	1.452	3.1	2.226	1.452
119	Croatia	4.426	2.104	2	1.450	3.1	2.213	1.450
120	New Zealand	4.367	2.090	2	1.446	3.0	2.184	1.446
121	Georgia	4.356	2.087	2	1.445	3.0	2.178	1.445
122	Lebanon	4.125	2.031	2	1.425	2.9	2.063	1.425
123	Moldova	3.941	1.985	2	1.409	2.8	1.971	1.409
124	Congo, Rep. Of	3.936	1.984	2	1.409	2.8	1.968	1.409
125	Bosnia & Herzegovina	3.859	1.964	2	1.402	2.8	1.930	1.402
126	Liberia	3.763	1.940	2	1.393	2.7	1.882	1.393
127	Kuwait	3.529	1.879	2	1.371	2.6	1.765	1.371
128	Uruguay	3.372	1.836	2	1.355	2.5	1.686	1.355
129	Panama	3.328	1.824	2	1.351	2.5	1.664	1.351
130	Lithuania	3.297	1.816	2	1.348	2.4	1.649	1.348
131	Albania	3.205	1.790	2	1.338	2.4	1.603	1.338
132	Mauritania	3.205	1.790	2	1.338	2.4	1.603	1.338
133	Armenia	3.090	1.758	2	1.326	2.3	1.545	1.326
134	Oman	2.968	1.723	2	1.313	2.3	1.484	1.313

Nations	Population 2010 (millions)	Seat Determinant (SD): $\sqrt{\text{col. b}}$ (millions)	Seats	Weight Determinant: (WD): $\sqrt{\text{SD}}$	Total Votes: SD x WD	Populaton per seat (millions)	Population per vote (millions)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
135 Mongolia	2.763	1.662	2	1.289	2.1	1.382	1.289
136 Jamaica	2.702	1.644	2	1.282	2.1	1.351	1.282
137 Latvia	2.238	1.496	1	1.223	1.8	2.238	1.223
138 Namibia	2.212	1.487	1	1.220	1.8	2.212	1.220
139 Macedonia	2.051	1.432	1	1.197	1.7	2.051	1.197
140 Slovenia	2.051	1.432	1	1.197	1.7	2.051	1.197
141 Botswana	2.029	1.424	1	1.193	1.7	2.029	1.193
142 Lesotho	1.920	1.386	1	1.177	1.6	1.920	1.177
143 Gambia, The	1.751	1.323	1	1.150	1.5	1.751	1.150
144 Qatar	1.697	1.303	1	1.141	1.5	1.697	1.141
145 Guinea-Bissau	1.593	1.262	1	1.123	1.4	1.593	1.123
146 Gabon	1.501	1.225	1	1.107	1.4	1.501	1.107
147 Swaziland	1.354	1.164	1	1.079	1.3	1.354	1.079
148 Estonia	1.348	1.161	1	1.078	1.3	1.348	1.078
149 Trinidad & Tobago	1.312	1.145	1	1.070	1.2	1.312	1.070
150 Mauritius	1.282	1.132	1	1.064	1.2	1.282	1.064
151 Bahrain	1.216	1.103	1	1.050	1.2	1.216	1.050
152 Timor-Leste	1.143	1.069	1	1.034	1.1	1.143	1.034
153 Cyprus	1.085	1.042	1	1.021	1.1	1.085	1.021
Total: 153 States	6,790.659		719		2,014.0	9.445	3.372
Remaining 39 states	11.514	< 1.0 each	39	1.0	39.0	0.295	0.295
Grand Total	6,802.173		758	698	2,053.0	8.974	3.313

## Appendix V. Model C: Composition of Proposed Electoral Fields in the Americas and Apportionment of Seats per Field in a Hypothetical Popularly Elected 1,000-Seat World Parliamentary Assembly in Which the Average Number of Constituents per Seat Is More or Less Equal in Each Electoral Field

### Notes:

1. Populations of UN member nations and dependencies were rounded to nearest 100,000 when over 1 million, or to nearest 10,000 when under 1 million, and added within each electoral field. For Brazil, Mexico and the United States state-wise population totals were derived from 2010 censuses as reported in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year, 2011*.

2. Derived by dividing totals in population column by average world constituency population of 6,840.3 million (including areas of non-UN member nations and dependencies).

a	Field and its Composition	Approx. Population, 2010 (millions) <sup>1</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>2</sup>	Approx. Av. Pop. per Seat (millions)
		b	c	d
1	<b>Brazil: Central East</b> Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro	39.6	6	6.60
2	<b>Brazil: Northeast</b> Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe	44.1	6	7.35
3	<b>Brazil: Southeast</b> Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, São Paulo	69.5	10	6.95
4	<b>Brazil: West</b> Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Distrito Federal, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará, Piauí, Rondônia, Tocantins	39.7	6	6.61
5	<b>Canada</b>	34.1	5	6.82
6	<b>Colombia</b>	44.2	6	7.37
7	<b>Caribbean and Proximate Areas</b> Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, French Guiana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Netherlands Indies, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands	43.2	6	7.20
8	<b>Central America</b> Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama	41.7	6	6.95

	Field and its Composition	Approx. Population, 2010 (millions) <sup>1</sup>	No. of Seats <sup>2</sup>	Approx. Av. Pop. per Seat (millions)
	a	b	c	d
<b>9</b>	<b>Central Andes</b> Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru	53.3	8	6.66
<b>10</b>	<b>Mexico: North</b> Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Coahuila de Zaragoza, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Querétaro de Arteaga, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas Zacatecas	44.8	7	6.40
<b>11</b>	<b>Mexico: South</b> Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Hidalgo, México, Michoacán de Ocampo, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz- Llave, Yucatán	63.6	9	7.07
<b>12</b>	<b>Southern Cone</b> Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay	67.2	10	6.72
<b>13</b>	<b>United States: Great Plains and Mountain States</b> Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming	32.2	5	6.44
<b>14</b>	<b>United States: North Central States</b> Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin	54.7	8	6.84
<b>15</b>	<b>United States: Northeastern States</b> Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont	55.2	8	6.90
<b>16</b>	<b>United States: Pacific States</b> Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington	49.9	7	7.13
<b>17</b>	<b>United States: South Central States</b> Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, Texas	56.9	8	7.11
<b>18</b>	<b>United States: Southeastern States &amp; D.C.</b> District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia	59.1	9	6.57
<b>19</b>	<b>Venezuela</b>	29.0	4	7.25
	<b>Totals</b>	<b>922.0</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>6.88</b>

## **Acknowledgments**

May I here express my deep gratitude to my partner, Louise Pardee for her wise editorial counsel and her meticulous assistance in preparing spreadsheets for all five of the Appendices to this paper, as well as for several of the tables within the body of the text; to my son, Philip, and his firm, Meridian Mapping, for the capable execution of the monograph's graphs and maps; and to my friend, Professor Steven Quiring, for various forms of technical assistance.

I also thank the Department of Geography of the University of Minnesota for providing me with ample office space and unstinting logistical assistance for so many years after my official, but never *de facto*, retirement.

I am grateful as well to Andreas Bummel for encouraging me to prepare this monograph and for agreeing to publish the finished product, not knowing whether or not the work would measure up to his expectations.

Finally, I wish to thank Daniele Archibugi for writing the historically informed Foreword to this work and for situating it implicitly within the overarching context of cosmopolitan democracy with which his name is prominently associated.

For any shortcomings in the work, I assume sole responsibility.

**Joseph E. Schwartzberg**

Distinguished International Emeritus Professor  
University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA  
June 2012

## On the Author

Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1928, Joseph E. Schwartzberg received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1960. He has taught at the University of Pennsylvania (1960-65), the University of Minnesota (1964-2000) and Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (1979-80). Schwartzberg's academic specialties were the geography of South Asia, political geography, and the history of cartography. His doctoral dissertation, *Occupational Structure and Level of Economic Development in India: A Regional Analysis*, was published as a monograph of the 1961 Census of India. He is best known as the editor and principal author of the award-winning *Historical Atlas of South Asia* (1978 and 1992). Among his other books are *Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies* and *Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies*, of both of which he was principal author and associate editor. He is also co-author of *The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting New Paths to Peace* and principal author of *Kashmir: A Way Forward*, published in 1997 and 2000. Schwartzberg served as Chair of the University of Minnesota's Department of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, as a Trustee and Executive Council member of the American Institute of Indian Studies, and as Secretary of the US National Committee of the International Geographical Union.

Schwartzberg has published on UN reform in *Global Governance*, *Global Dialogue*, the *UN Chronicle* and other journals. His monograph, *Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting*, appeared in 2004. He is presently nearing completion of a wide-ranging book, *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World*,

Schwartzberg was a co-founder in 1996 of the Minnesota Alliance of Peacemakers, a consortium now including some 80 peace and justice organizations. He served on the Board of Directors of the World Federalist Association, now Citizens for Global Solutions, and, for twelve years, was President of its Minnesota Chapter. He is a member of the International Council of the World Federalist Movement. In 2009 the Office of International Programs of the University of Minnesota bestowed on him its annual Award for Global Engagement and the honorary title, "Distinguished International Emeritus Professor."

Schwartzberg has visited more than a hundred countries in all. He has lived in India, Germany, France, and Spain; and is multi-lingual.